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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-28 05:06:08Z
1 month ago
Previous (2025-12-28 04:36:06Z)

Situation Update (0505Z 28 DEC 25)

Key updates since last sitrep

  • STRATEGIC DEPTH DRONE STRIKES (HIGH): RF Ministry of Defense and local sources confirm a wave of 25 UAF UAVs across 6 Russian regions, including explosions in Syzran, Samara Oblast—approximately 800km from the border. (0437Z, ASTRA; 0454Z, Два майора, HIGH).
  • KYIV INFRASTRUCTURE CRITICALITY (MEDIUM): Reports indicate multiple districts in Kyiv are experiencing total blackouts, including loss of water and district heating. (0438Z, ТАСС, MEDIUM).
  • RF DIPLOMATIC ESCALATION (HIGH): Foreign Minister Lavrov officially designated potential European contingents in Ukraine as "legitimate targets," signaling a hardening of the RF stance against Western intervention. (0459Z, ТАСС, HIGH).
  • THERMOBARIC UTILIZATION (MEDIUM): Footage confirmed active operations of heavy flamethrower units (likely TOS-1A) in unspecified sectors, supporting previous reports of "burning out" defensive positions. (0435Z, Colonelcassad, MEDIUM).
  • DIPLOMATIC SCHEDULE SHIFT (UNCONFIRMED): Low-reliability reports suggest a 2-hour advancement of the meeting between Donald Trump and President Zelenskyy. (0449Z, RusPanorama, LOW).

Operational picture (by sector)

  • Northern Sector (Kharkiv/Kupyansk): Pressure from the RF 7th Regiment continues. The confirmed presence of heavy flamethrower units (0435Z) suggests RF is prioritizing the rapid liquidation of UAF strongpoints to exploit the Siversk command vacuum.
  • Eastern Sector (Siversk/Bakhmut): No new kinetic data since the relief of brigade commanders; however, the GS UAF operational update (0457Z) indicates ongoing high attrition rates for the adversary, suggesting a high-intensity defensive battle is still underway despite C2 transitions.
  • Kyiv/Rear Area: The reported loss of heating and water in Kyiv (0438Z) aligns with the MDCOA identified in the 27 DEC Daily Report. Sub-zero temperatures make this a critical humanitarian and operational threat, potentially forcing a reallocation of military logistics to civil support.
  • RF Rear (Samara/Syzran): The expansion of the drone campaign to Samara Oblast indicates UAF is targeting specific industrial or energy nodes (Syzran is home to a major refinery) to create a reciprocal energy crisis within the RF.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

  • Tactical Course of Action: RF is combining "blinding" strikes on the Kyiv grid with high-lethality thermobaric strikes on the front lines. The goal is a synchronized collapse of civilian morale and tactical defensive lines.
  • Strategic Rhetoric: Lavrov’s comments regarding European troops serve as a "red line" deterrent, likely timed to coincide with high-level diplomatic meetings (Trump/Zelenskyy) to discourage increased NATO/EU security guarantees.
  • Capabilities: Continued use of TOS-1A systems indicates RF still possesses significant stockpiles of specialized munitions, despite high overall equipment losses reported by GS UAF (0457Z).

Friendly activity (UAF)

  • Asymmetric Response: UAF maintains a high operational tempo in the aerial domain. The 25-drone wave targeting 6 regions (including deep strikes in Samara) demonstrates a refusal to yield the initiative despite domestic infrastructure failure.
  • Defensive Resilience: GS UAF reports suggest consistent attrition of RF assets, maintaining a "favorable" loss ratio even under intense pressure.

Information environment / disinformation

  • Narrative Weaponization: RF state media (TASS) is leading the reporting on Kyiv’s infrastructure failure, likely to amplify panic and domestic pressure on the UAF General Staff.
  • Dehumanization: Pro-RF channels continue to use derogatory descriptors ("Narcissist/Drug addict") for Ukrainian leadership to delegitimize the state in the eyes of Western audiences (0449Z).
  • Hybrid Distraction: Reports of "Gosuslugi" (RF state services) scams (0447Z) may be an attempt to frame any upcoming RF digital mobilization or data collection as "external fraud" or to mask internal security vulnerabilities.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

  • Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): RF will continue thermobaric-supported assaults in the Kharkiv/Kupyansk sector while leveraging the Kyiv blackout narrative to push for a tactical breakthrough.
  • Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): A confirmed strike on a major European or Western "liaison" node following Lavrov's warning, intended to test NATO Article 5 resolve or European political cohesion.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

  1. Kyiv Grid Status: Independent verification of the extent of the Kyiv blackout. Is the heating failure systemic or localized?
  2. Syzran BDA: Satellite or ELINT confirmation of the target in Syzran (Refinery vs. Railway vs. Military).
  3. European Presence: Monitor for any movement of Western military advisors or training missions in response to Lavrov's threat.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

The conflict has entered a "Critical Cooling" phase. The RF is prioritizing the destruction of Kyiv's life-support systems (Heating/Water) to coincide with heavy frontal assaults using thermobaric weapons. UAF has responded by extending its strike radius to 800km+, targeting the RF's own industrial depth.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

  • Capabilities: RF is increasingly reliant on specialized high-lethality units (heavy flamethrowers) to compensate for UAF's stubborn defense.
  • Intentions: Foreign Minister Lavrov’s statement (0459Z) indicates the Kremlin is preparing the information space for an escalation against Western assets within Ukraine, possibly as a response to the UAF's deep-strike drone campaign.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

  • Vulnerability: The infrastructure collapse in Kyiv is the primary non-kinetic threat to force readiness. If troops' families are in freezing conditions without water, front-line morale will be impacted.
  • Successes: The reach of the 25-drone wave proves that UAF long-range strike capabilities are resilient and capable of bypassing RF AD in multiple oblasts.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

  • Cognitive Domain: The high belief score (0.115) for Propaganda efforts reflects a multi-pronged RF IO: celebrating Soviet history (Konev) to bolster domestic pride, while simultaneously threatening Western allies and mocking Ukrainian leadership.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

  • Timeline: The next 12 hours are critical for Kyiv’s grid. If power is not partially restored, we may see the first wave of "utility-driven" internal displacement since the winter of 2022.
  • Decision Point: UAF High Command must determine if the Syzran strike warrants a shift in RF AD from the front to the rear, which could provide a window for UAF tactical aviation or further drone sorties.

//ANALYSIS ENDS//

Previous (2025-12-28 04:36:06Z)

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