(0751Z, 0800Z, Air Force UAF, HIGH): Active Russian tactical aviation launched KAB guided bombs against targets in Kharkiv and Donetsk Oblasts.
(0741Z, 0746Z, Air Force UAF, HIGH): New OWA-UAV threats detected; one group vectoring toward Mayaky (Odesa) and another moving toward Poltava from Chernihiv Oblast.
(0743Z, 0755Z, Sever.Realii/ASTRA, HIGH): Kremlin confirms Vladimir Putin will not deliver the constitutionally mandated annual address to the Federal Assembly in 2025.
(0801Z, DNR People's Militia, MEDIUM): RF 238th Brigade reportedly destroyed a UAF D-20 howitzer in Raiske (Donetsk) using a "Lancet" loitering munition (UNCONFIRMED).
(0741Z, Operatsia Z, MEDIUM): A humanitarian convoy from Dagestan was struck in the border region; 3 fatalities reported.
(0800Z, General Prosecutor, HIGH): UAF internal security/anti-corruption operation in Bukovyna; two officials charged in a 3.5m UAH road repair fraud scheme.
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)
The operational environment on Christmas Day is characterized by sustained Russian aerial pressure and tactical evolution.
Battlefield Geometry: Kinetic activity is intensifying in the Donetsk sector, specifically near Raiske, where RF is utilizing loitering munitions to conduct counter-battery operations. The Kharkiv sector remains under heavy aerial bombardment via KABs.
Weather & Environmental Factors: Heavy snow and blizzards are forecasted for the Moscow region on 26 Dec (TASS, 0737Z). While this may impact RF strategic logistics in the rear, the current overcast conditions over Ukraine continue to facilitate OWA-UAV and loitering munition operations.
Infrastructure Status: The Ukrainian energy grid remains under severe strain; RBK-Ukraine (0741Z) reports a mix of emergency and scheduled blackouts across the country during holiday observances.
Aerial Operations: The VKS is maintaining high sortie rates. The synchronized launch of KABs across two distinct oblasts (Kharkiv and Donetsk) suggests a coordinated effort to suppress UAF defensive positions ahead of potential ground assaults.
Loitering Munition Trends: The reported use of "Lancet" drones against tube artillery (D-20) in Raiske indicates RF is prioritizing the destruction of UAF fire support to facilitate their "banzai" mechanized assaults mentioned in previous daily reports.
Political Indicators: The cancellation of Putin’s annual address is a significant anomaly. This may indicate internal C2 friction, a shift in strategic focus that precludes public commitments, or security concerns within the Kremlin.
Logistics & Rear Security: RF is facing persistent threats to its border logistics. The strike on the Dagestani convoy (0741Z) follows a pattern of interdiction targeting non-Western Military District reinforcements.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking - IPB Step 3)
Internal Security: The General Prosecutor’s action in Bukovyna (0800Z) demonstrates that despite the high-intensity conflict, the UAF rear area remains under active civilian and military oversight, specifically targeting the misappropriation of infrastructure funds.
Air Defense (AD) Posture: AD units are actively engaged in tracking multiple UAV groups across the North (Poltava/Chernihiv) and South (Odesa). The detection of UAVs moving from Chernihiv to Poltava suggests an RF attempt to bypass central AD clusters.
Morale: High. Official channels (DeepState, Ground Forces) have released coordinated Christmas messaging to maintain unit cohesion and domestic support during the holiday period.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain - IPB Step 4)
RF Narrative Control: Pro-Russian sources (TASS, Voenkor Kotenok) are highlighting "stability" through reports of FSB counter-terrorism successes (arrest of 1999-era militants) and domestic PR (diamond mining, holiday charity). This is likely intended to project an image of "business as usual" despite the war.
UAF Strategic Messaging: UAF messaging is effectively juxtaposing the "peace of Christmas" with the "reality of the soldier" (Operativnyi ZSU, 0750Z), reinforcing the necessity of continued national defense.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): RF will continue to leverage tactical aviation (KABs) and loitering munitions (Lancets) to attrit UAF artillery and fortifications in the Myrnohrad and Raiske axes. OWA-UAVs will likely target energy nodes in Poltava and Odesa overnight to exploit holiday power usage peaks.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): A surge in KAB strikes coordinated with a mechanized breakthrough attempt in the Siversk/Raiske sector, timed specifically while UAF focus is split between frontline defense and holiday logistics.
Timeline:
0800Z-1400Z: Expected continuation of tactical CAS and KAB strikes in Donetsk/Kharkiv.
1800Z-0000Z: High probability of a multi-vector OWA-UAV wave targeting Central and Southern Ukraine.
Intelligence Gaps & Collection Requirements
Raiske BDA: (P1) Urgent verification of the D-20 howitzer loss. Determine if the 238th Brigade is deploying "fiber-optic" Lancets or standard RF variants.
UAV Vector Analysis: (P2) Track the Poltava-bound UAV group to determine if their target is the regional energy hub or tactical C2 nodes in the rear of the Kharkiv front.
Kremlin C2 Status: (P3) Monitor internal RF communications for indications of why the Federal Assembly address was canceled. Assess if this correlates with recent high-level command changes.
Actionable Recommendations
Counter-Loitering Munition Measures: (IMMEDIATE) Frontline artillery units in the Raiske/Donetsk sector must prioritize overhead masking and "decoy-and-displace" tactics to mitigate Lancet threats.
AD Resource Reallocation: (URGENT) Shift mobile AD fire groups to the Poltava-Chernihiv corridor to intercept the reported UAV group before they reach critical energy infrastructure.
Operational Security (OPSEC): Maintain strict discipline regarding holiday gatherings near the FLOT; RF tactical aviation is clearly searching for concentrated personnel targets for KAB delivery.
