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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-25 07:36:10Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-25 07:06:08Z)

Situation Update (0735Z 25 DEC 25)

Key updates since last sitrep

  • (0709Z, General Staff UAF, HIGH): Finalized tally for overnight OWA-UAV attack: 106 targets downed or suppressed out of 131 launched.
  • (0734Z, Air Force UAF, HIGH): New OWA-UAV detected in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, vectoring toward Balabyne.
  • (0700Z–0722Z, TASS, MEDIUM): Major fire at "Varshavskaya Plaza" business center in South Moscow; 60 evacuated, 300sqm damaged. Cause remains UNCONFIRMED, but context suggests potential sabotage.
  • (0706Z, Operativnyi ZSU, MEDIUM): Ukrainian UAVs successfully interdicted a Russian military convoy (originating from Dagestan) in the border region; casualties reported.
  • (0701Z, Colonelcassad, LOW): RF claims precision airstrike (4x FAB-500 with UMPK) against the UAF 63rd OMBr in Lyman (UNCONFIRMED).
  • (0937Z 02 DEC - confirmed 25 DEC, 57th OMBr, HIGH): Ongoing defense of Vovchansk (Day 571); RF has transitioned to small infantry group "meat" assaults supported by optical-fiber drones to bypass UAF EW.
  • (0719Z, Kotsnews, MEDIUM): Russian VKS reportedly received a full squadron of Su-35S multirole fighters in late 2025, bolstering regional air superiority capabilities.

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

The operational tempo remains high on the Christmas holiday, with the Russian Federation (RF) maintaining pressure through mixed-domain strikes.

  • Battlefield Geometry: The Kharkiv Sector remains the primary point of friction. The 57th OMBr confirms Vovchansk is under continuous assault by small infantry units. In the Donetsk/Siversk Sector, activity has shifted to the Kirovo/Sviat-Pokrovske axis, indicating an attempt to outflank the Siversk defensive node from the south.
  • Infrastructure/Environmental: While the Pechenihy Dam remains a strategic concern (refer to 0705Z sitrep), internal RF infrastructure is increasingly targeted, as evidenced by the Varshavskaya Plaza incident in Moscow and the border convoy interdiction.
  • Weather: Overcast conditions favor low-altitude UAV operations; the appearance of optical-fiber drones (57th OMBr) indicates an adaptation to persistent electronic warfare (EW) environments.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment - IPB Step 2)

  • Tactical Adaptations: RF is deploying drones controlled via optical fiber (0937Z 02 DEC message). This technology is immune to conventional radio-frequency jamming, representing a significant threat to UAF frontline positions and EW-shielded assets.
  • Logistics & Sustainment: The strike on the Dagestani convoy (0706Z) indicates RF is pulling reinforcements from distant ethnic republics, potentially highlighting localized manpower shortages in the Western Military District.
  • Air Capabilities: The introduction of Su-35S squadrons (0719Z) and the reported use of FAB-500 UMPKs (0701Z) suggest a high-intensity aerial bombardment phase targeting UAF tactical depth (Lyman).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking - IPB Step 3)

  • Defensive Posture: The 57th OMBr and the "Ares" artillery reconnaissance battery continue to hold the northern shoulder in Vovchansk. Their success in neutralizing specialized RF "fiber-drones" (0640Z 01 DEC) demonstrates high technical proficiency.
  • Morale: National unity is being reinforced through a synchronized 0900Z minute of silence (KMVA, General Staff). Zaporizhzhia-based units (118th, 65th Brigades) have released holiday communiqués to maintain domestic support.
  • Deep Strike Capability: UAF continues to demonstrate "long-arm" reach into RF territory, targeting logistics (convoys) and potentially high-value urban targets (Moscow).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain - IPB Step 4)

  • RF Propaganda: Pro-Russian sources (Rybar, Colonelcassad) are emphasizing "unrealistic" Ukrainian peace plans and citing Western media (NYT) to create a perception of declining international support (0711Z).
  • Strategic Disclosures: The release of Putin-Bush transcripts (0710Z) is likely intended to frame the conflict as a long-term historical inevitability, targeting Western academic and policy audiences.
  • Sanctions Evasion: Reports of Indian oil procurement (0715Z) highlight the ongoing challenges in maintaining the global economic blockade of the RF.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

  • Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): RF will intensify "small group" infantry assaults in Vovchansk and Myrnohrad, relying on the newly delivered Su-35S and FAB-500/UMPK kits to degrade UAF defensive fortifications while continuing OWA-UAV pressure on Zaporizhzhia.
  • Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): A coordinated "double-tap" strike: a massive OWA-UAV/missile wave targeting energy infrastructure in the Kyiv-Zaporizhzhia corridor, synchronized with a breakthrough at Siversk (Kirovo axis) following a successful dam breach at Pechenihy.
  • Timeline:
    • 0900Z-1500Z: High probability of tactical CAS (Close Air Support) strikes in the Lyman and Siversk sectors.
    • Next 24h: Increased UAV activity over Zaporizhzhia as RF probes for gaps in regional AD.

Intelligence Gaps & Collection Requirements

  1. Lyman Strike Verification: (P1) Confirm BDA (Battle Damage Assessment) of the claimed FAB-500 strike on 63rd OMBr. Assess current operational readiness of the unit.
  2. Moscow Fire Attribution: (P2) Determine if the Varshavskaya Plaza fire was an SBS/Partisan action or a technical failure. Identify any sensitive RF MoD or FSB tenants in the building.
  3. Fiber-Optic Drone Volume: (P1) Quantify the proliferation of fiber-controlled drones. Are these localized field-modifications or standardized industrial production?

Actionable Recommendations

  1. Tactical EW Evolution: (IMMEDIATE) Distribute "physical interception" guidance to frontline units (nets, shotgun-equipped anti-drone teams) to counter optical-fiber UAVs that ignore electronic jammers.
  2. Logistical Dispersal: (URGENT) Given the reported FAB-500/UMPK strikes in Lyman, ensure maximum dispersal of PVDs (Point of Deployment) and ammo caches within 30km of the FLOT.
  3. Strategic Communications: Counter the "unrealistic peace plan" narrative by highlighting the successful 80% interception rate of overnight strikes and the successful interdiction of RF logistics.

//REPORT ENDS//

Previous (2025-12-25 07:06:08Z)

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