(0613Z, Air Force UAF, HIGH): High-speed aerial target (likely missile or ballistic) detected over Sumy Oblast, moving in a South-Western direction.
(0606Z, Air Force UAF, HIGH): Multiple OWA-UAVs (Shahed-type) detected entering Chernihiv Oblast from the north.
(0634Z, TASS, MEDIUM): Humanitarian convoy from Dagestan reportedly struck by UAF in a border region; death of Shamilsky District Deputy Head confirmed by regional authorities.
(0624Z, RBC-Ukraine, HIGH): Emergency power shutdowns in Odesa have led to critical disruptions in the municipal water supply system.
(0622Z, TASS, MEDIUM): Tajikistan security services claim the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border has stabilized following the "destruction of terrorists"; reduces immediate pressure for RF lateral redeployments.
(0632Z, Operativno ZSU, MEDIUM): UAF-linked channels amplifying declassified 2001-2008 US-Russia transcripts to underscore long-term RF intent to delegitimize Ukrainian sovereignty.
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)
The operational environment on Christmas morning is characterized by a renewed RF aerial offensive targeting Northern and Central Ukraine, combined with a deepening utility crisis in the South.
Battlefield Geometry: The air domain is currently the primary friction point. The trajectory of the high-speed target over Sumy (0613Z) toward the SW suggests a potential strike on energy nodes in Poltava or Cherkasy, consistent with the MDCOA identified in the previous daily report.
Infrastructure Status: Odesa’s transition from power loss to water service failure (0624Z) indicates the "islanding" of regional grids is reaching a critical threshold where secondary life-support systems are collapsing.
Weather: Overcast conditions across the north facilitate OWA-UAV penetration by complicating visual detection, though AD units remain active.
Aviation/Missile Tactics: The simultaneous launch of slow-moving UAVs (Chernihiv) and high-speed missiles (Sumy) suggests a saturation tactic designed to fix UAF Air Defense (AD) in the north while the high-speed asset bypasses the screen toward a strategic target.
Logistics & Personnel: The death of a Dagestani deputy district head in a "humanitarian" convoy (0634Z) suggests the RF continues to use civilian-framed logistics for the transport of political or administrative leadership into occupied or border zones.
Regional Stability: The reported "calm" on the Tajik-Afghan border (0622Z) suggests the RF/CSTO has contained the initial clash. This minimizes the likelihood of the "Most Dangerous Course of Action" involving a major RF force diversion away from Ukraine in the immediate 6-12h window.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking - IPB Step 3)
Interdiction Success: The strike on the Dagestani convoy represents a successful interdiction of high-value RF administrative targets. This indicates effective UAF reconnaissance in the border regions or the use of long-range precision fires (HIMARS/GMLRS).
Morale/Sustainability: Civilian fundraising remains a critical component of the war effort (0610Z), bridging gaps in tactical equipment procurement during the high-intensity winter phase.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain - IPB Step 4)
RF Narrative Shaping: RF channels (Fighterbomber, Basurin) are heavily emphasizing the "1400th day" milestone (0629Z) and questioning Kyiv's willingness to compromise (0622Z). This is likely a coordinated effort to frame the UAF as the obstacle to peace following the RF's formal rejection of the 20-point plan.
UAF Counter-Messaging: Strategic use of historical transcripts (0632Z) aims to remind the international community and domestic population that RF territorial ambitions predate current political triggers, countering the "NATO expansion" justification.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): RF will continue the multi-vector aerial assault through the morning, specifically targeting thermal power plants (TPPs) and pumping stations to maximize the civilian impact of "Christmas" strikes.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): A coordinated "double-tap" strike: high-speed missiles targeting AD reload sites while Odesa's utility collapse is exploited by a secondary wave of sea-launched Kalibr missiles, aiming for a total municipal evacuation scenario.
Timeline:
0700Z-0900Z: Expected impact/interception window for the high-speed target moving SW from Sumy.
Next 6h: Assessment of the "Glaz/Groza" integration effectiveness in the Myrnohrad sector as morning assaults commence.
Intelligence Gaps & Collection Requirements
High-Speed Target Identification: (P1) Confirm if the target over Sumy was an "Oreshnik" variant, Iskander-M, or Kh-22 to assess AD effectiveness requirements.
Dagestan Convoy Specifics: (P2) Identify the exact location of the strike on the Dagestan convoy; if deep inside RF territory, it signals an expansion of the UAF kinetic zone.
Odesa Grid Status: (P3) Determine if the water disruption is due to pump failure or damage to the Mir-1/Mir-2 750kV lines.
Actionable Recommendations
Odesa Civil Defense: Deploy emergency mobile power generation units to Odesa water pumping stations immediately to prevent a complete sanitary collapse.
AD Alert State: Maintain HIGH alert for AD units in the Cherkasy/Kropyvnytskyi corridor; the missile path from Sumy indicates these as the most probable targets for the current high-speed vector.
Border Reconnaissance: Increase UAV monitoring of "humanitarian" corridors in the Bryansk/Kursk/Belgorod sectors; the success against the Dagestani official suggests a vulnerability in RF administrative movements.
