(1834Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH): High-speed aerial target (likely ballistic or supersonic cruise missile) detected inbound to Kharkiv Oblast from the North.
(1815Z, Operativno ZSU/Terehov, HIGH): RF has shifted targeting priorities in Kharkiv to critical heating and water infrastructure (Slobidskyi and Shevchenkivskyi districts) to induce a humanitarian crisis.
(1817Z, RBK-Ukraine, MEDIUM): UAF confirms a localized RF border breach in the vicinity of Hrabovske (Sumy Oblast).
(1828Z, Butusov Plus, HIGH): 1st OShP successfully neutralized a mechanized assault on the Dobropillia axis using integrated FPV drone strikes.
(1830Z, Operativno ZSU, HIGH): 425 OShP "Skelya" reports high-intensity drone attrition of RF assets in the Pokrovsk sector.
(1827Z, Kotsnews, MEDIUM): Reports of a second "terrorist" incident in Moscow targeting police officers, occurring near the recent assassination site of General Fanil Sarvarov.
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB)
The operational tempo has shifted toward systematic infrastructure destruction in Kharkiv and tactical diversification along the northern border.
Battlefield Geometry: The RF is attempting to widen the front by introducing tactical penetrations in Sumy (Hrabovske), likely intended to fix UAF reserves and prevent their deployment to the Kupyansk or Pokrovsk axes.
Infrastructure Attrition: RF targeting has evolved from broad grid strikes to specific "life-support" nodes (heating/water) in Kharkiv. With the previously reported 50% generation loss, this threatens total urban unhabitability during sub-zero temperatures.
Control Measures: RF continues to deploy specialized "Rubikon" drone teams (1820Z) to counter UAF technical advantages in the Donbas.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
Tactical Shift (Infrastructure): The deliberate targeting of water and heating (1815Z) indicates a "Weaponization of Winter" strategy aimed at forcing civilian displacement and overwhelming local logistics.
Border Operations (Hrabovske): The breach at Hrabovske (1817Z) suggests RF is testing the viability of a secondary axis in Sumy to alleviate pressure on their stalling Kupyansk offensive.
Internal Security (Moscow): Recurring kinetic incidents targeting security forces (siloviki) in the RF capital (1827Z) suggest a significant breach of internal stability or active partisan penetration. The RF narrative of "fraudsters" deceiving attackers is likely a cover for organized resistance.
Force Generation: RF continues aggressive recruitment for specialized UAV units, specifically the "Kaira" detachment of the 39th Brigade (1834Z), indicating a long-term commitment to drone-centric warfare.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
Defensive Stability: UAF specialized assault units (1st OShP, 425 OShP) remain the primary force multiplier in the Donbas, effectively using FPV systems to blunt mechanized "banzai" charges.
Morale: Despite high-intensity combat, units (e.g., 72nd/Holodny Yar) are leveraging Christmas messaging to maintain cohesion and domestic support (1813Z).
Air Defense (AD) Posture: AD assets in the North are under extreme pressure from "high-speed targets" (1834Z), requiring rapid interceptor relocation to protect Kharkiv’s remaining utility nodes.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
PsyOps (Internal Disruption): Russian channels (Colonelcassad, 1821Z) are disseminating manipulated content of former CinC Zaluzhnyi to spark internal resentment among frontline UAF personnel. Confidence: HIGH (Propaganda Effort).
Religious/Ethnic Tensions: RF media is amplifying incidents of religious vandalism in Kazakhstan (1823Z) to promote a narrative of rising "Wahhabism" and instability in the CSTO periphery, potentially justifying future regional interventions.
Censorship: Internal RF policy indicates a reluctance to ban VPNs through 2026 (1823Z), suggesting the Kremlin prioritizes maintaining a "veneer of normalcy" and utilizing the platform for its own disinformation over total digital isolation.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): RF will maintain the "high-speed" missile pressure on Kharkiv through the next 6-12 hours to prevent the repair of heating/water systems. Small-scale incursions in Sumy will continue to distract UAF C2.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): A coordinated mechanized push from the Hrabovske breach point toward Sumy, timed with a massive "Geran" swarm on Kyiv to paralyze the central command response.
Timeline: High kinetic activity expected through 0600Z 25 DEC.
Intelligence Gaps & Collection Requirements
Hrabovske Penetration Depth: Confirm if the RF breach in Sumy includes heavy armor or is limited to DRG (Sabotage/Reconnaissance) elements.
Kharkiv Heating Nodes: Identify specific damage levels at the Slobidskyi/Shevchenkivskyi utility sites to estimate time-to-repair before pipe-freeze occurs.
Moscow Incident Attribution: Determine if the second attack in Moscow is linked to the same cell that targeted Gen. Sarvarov.
Actionable Recommendations
Tactical (Sumy): Deploy rapid-response drone teams to the Hrabovske axis to "seal" the breach before RF can establish a semi-permanent lodgment.
Operational (AD): Prioritize Point Defense for Kharkiv’s utility infrastructure. Use mobile AD groups to intercept "high-speed targets" along the northern corridor.
Civilian Defense: Local Kharkiv authorities must prepare emergency warming centers and water distribution points, as RF targeting clearly identifies these as primary objectives for the 24-48 hour window.
Strategic: Expose the Colonelcassad/Zaluzhnyi disinformation via AFU StratCom to neutralize the attempt at demoralization.
