(1357Z, RBK-UA, HIGH): Significant escalation in the Myrnohrad sector; approximately 10 Russian units have been committed to the capture of the city.
(1402Z, Operatsiya Z, HIGH): DTEK CEO confirms the loss of 50% of generation capacity following sustained Russian strikes, warning of the most difficult winter on record.
(1403Z, Operativnyi ZSU, MEDIUM): President Zelensky reports that Russian forces are utilizing Chinese satellite imagery to coordinate strikes against the Ukrainian energy grid.
(1400Z, ASTRA, HIGH):Ukrnafta production facilities targeted for the second consecutive day; fires and emergency operations are ongoing.
(1356Z, Butusov Plus, MEDIUM): The "Chervona Kalyna" Brigade reports a tactical shift by Russian forces toward "banzai-style" mechanized assaults using heavy equipment to compensate for high infantry losses.
(1358Z/1359Z, AFU Air Force, HIGH): Active UAV incursions over Northern Kyiv (Ivankiv) moving west and Chernihiv from the north; combined with KAB launches in Kharkiv and Donetsk.
(1342Z, Dnevnik Desantnika, LOW): Claim that French servicemen are in Donbas training on drones. UNCONFIRMED (likely disinformation/propaganda).
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB)
The operational environment is currently defined by a Russian effort to achieve a decisive energy collapse while simultaneously committing tactical reserves to the Myrnohrad axis.
Battlefield Geometry: The focus has shifted from the broad "problematic" Kupyansk sector (Ref: Previous Sitrep) to a concentrated mechanized push toward Myrnohrad. The southern sector (Huliaipole) remains active but secondary to the eastern breakthroughs.
Weather/Environment: Continued sub-zero temperatures are maximizing the impact of the 50% generation capacity loss at DTEK. The grid is at a critical "frequency-regulation" tipping point.
Technical Factors: Integration of third-party (Chinese) IMINT into the Russian targeting cycle indicates a high degree of coordination and bypass of Western-restricted satellite data.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
Capabilities & Intentions:
Mechanized Escalation: Russian commanders are moving away from purely "meat-grinder" infantry tactics to high-speed mechanized "banzai" attacks (1356Z). This suggests an intent to force a breakthrough before UAF can stabilize the Myrnohrad-Pokrovsk line.
Targeting Intelligence: Use of Chinese satellite data (1403Z) provides Russia with a persistent ISR capability that is difficult for UAF to degrade via traditional EW, allowing for precise re-strikes on energy repair efforts (e.g., Ukrnafta).
Course of Action: The commitment of 10 units to Myrnohrad (1357Z) indicates this is the primary effort for the next 24-48 hours. Parallel UAV/KAB strikes in the North are likely intended to pin Air Defense (AD) assets and prevent their redeployment to the Donbas.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
Posture & Readiness:
Defensive Resilience: The "Chervona Kalyna" Brigade has successfully repelled the initial waves of heavy mechanized assaults. However, the intensity of these attacks is stressing localized anti-armor (ATGM/FPV) stocks.
Strategic Intelligence: UAF has reportedly gained detailed technical data on the Russian "Oreshnik" systems deployed in Belarus (1400Z), providing a better baseline for missile defense planning.
Resource Constraints: Urgent fundraising for the Kherson region (1339Z) suggests localized logistics gaps in the south, specifically regarding small-unit equipment and sustainment.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
Internal Destabilization: Russian sources are aggressively circulating footage of Ukrainian civilians confronting TCK (recruitment) officials (1340Z) to amplify narratives of social collapse.
Geopolitical Fractures: Orbán’s statements on EU "collapse" (1339Z) and the Vatican’s criticism of the lack of a Christmas truce (1354Z) are being leveraged by RF media to portray Ukraine as the sole obstacle to peace.
Hybrid Ops: The "French troops in Donbas" narrative (1342Z) is likely a reflexive response to the Swedish Gripen training announcement, aimed at framing the conflict as a direct Russia-NATO engagement.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): RF will continue the mechanized assault on Myrnohrad while maintaining a 24/7 UAV "loitering threat" over the Kyiv-Chernihiv corridor. Total regional blackouts in the North are probable within 12 hours if substations cannot be protected from the current UAV wave.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): A mechanized breakthrough at Myrnohrad coincides with a successful strike on a critical frequency-control node in the Western grid, leading to a cascading national blackout and the isolation of UAF command centers from the FLOT.
Intelligence Gaps & Collection Requirements
Chinese Satellite Link: Identify the specific commercial or state-owned Chinese satellite providers supplying the IMINT to RF; determine if the data is being transmitted in real-time to tactical field commanders.
Myrnohrad OOB: Identify the specific units among the "10 units" committed—are these fresh reserves or reconstituted units from the Pokrovsk axis?
Ukrnafta BDA: Assess the exact nature of production loss at Ukrnafta to determine the impact on domestic fuel supplies for the UAF.
Actionable Recommendations
Tactical (Anti-Armor): Prioritize the shipment of heavy ATGM (Javelin/Stugna-P) and loitering munitions to the "Chervona Kalyna" Brigade and Myrnohrad defenders to counter the surge in heavy mechanized "banzai" tactics.
Operational (AD): Deploy mobile fire groups along the western flight paths from Ivankiv to prevent UAVs from reaching western energy interconnects.
Strategic (Diplomatic): Document and publicize evidence of Chinese satellite assistance to the Russian military to pressure Beijing and seek international sanctions against the involved satellite providers.
