(0955Z, MoD Russia, HIGH): Official confirmation from the "Vostok" Group of Forces regarding the liberation of Zarechnoe (Zaporizhzhia). RF claims control of a 9 sq km defensive sector formerly held by UAF (0948Z, TASS).
(1001Z, Rybar, MEDIUM): Significant internal friction reported in RF command regarding the Kupyansk sector; sources cite severe "command and control (C2) problems," suggesting a lack of coordination in recent offensive attempts.
(0953Z, ASTRA, MEDIUM): Five Russian FAB (glide bombs) were accidentally released/dropped by RF aerospace forces over the Belgorod region and occupied Ukrainian territories in the last 24h, indicating persistent technical/procedural failures in the RF air campaign.
(0936Z, AFU Air Force, HIGH): Launch of KABs (Guided Aerial Bombs) detected targeting Zaporizhzhia Oblast, marking a shift from ground assault to aerial suppression following the fall of Zarechnoe.
(0948Z, Operativno ZSU, HIGH): Clarification on the Pivdennyi Port strike: the leak consists of vegetable oil mixed with combustion products. This indicates a targeted strike on Ukraine's agricultural export infrastructure rather than just fuel terminals.
(1000Z, Tsaplienko, MEDIUM): Internal Ukrainian reporting confirms the 20-point peace plan explicitly excludes any commitment for Ukraine to remain out of NATO, contradicting Russian demands.
(0942Z, Mobilization News, MEDIUM): Russian authorities in Buryatia have begun surveying schoolchildren’s parents regarding their readiness to sign military contracts, indicating a shift toward aggressive, localized recruitment data collection.
Operational picture (by sector)
Northern Axis (Kharkiv/Sumy/Chernihiv):
The UAV threat remains high with active tracks over Northern Chernihiv (south-west course, 0948Z) and Sumy (toward Trostyanets/Krasnopillya, 0952Z). While the Hrabovske incursion (previous report) remains a localized threat, the air activity suggests a continued effort to map UAF tactical reserves.
Eastern Axis (Donbas/Pokrovsk/Kupyansk):
Kupyansk: The sector is currently categorized by RF command dysfunction. Internal critiques suggest that while RF holds the initiative, tactical execution is hampered by poor leadership at the regimental/brigade level.
Pokrovsk: High-intensity FPV operations continue. The RF 238th Brigade is reportedly targeting UAF communications infrastructure (antennas) and mortar positions to blind local defense before further ground pushes (1004Z).
Southern Axis (Zaporizhzhia/Kherson/Mykolaiv):
Zarechnoe: RF is now in the consolidation phase. The 9 sq km area provides a buffer for the "Vostok" Group. Expect increased long-range fires from this new position.
Rear Areas: Reconnaissance UAVs are active over Eastern Mykolaiv (0942Z) and Northern Kherson (0959Z), likely vectoring for upcoming missile or KAB strikes on logistical hubs.
Enemy activity / threat assessment
Command Dysfunction: The Rybar report on Kupyansk (1001Z) reveals a window of opportunity for UAF counter-attacks or spoiling raids while RF leadership is in flux.
Aerial Incompetence: The accidental dropping of 5 FABs (0953Z) suggests that high-tempo operations are straining RF ground crews and pilot fatigue, leading to "friendly fire" or "neutral zone" incidents.
Recruitment Pressure: The school surveys in Buryatia (0942Z) suggest the RF is exhausted of traditional volunteer pools and is moving toward highly intrusive data-mining for future mobilization waves.
Friendly activity (UAF)
Air Defense Engagement: Active engagement of reconnaissance UAVs in Mykolaiv and Kherson (0942Z, 0959Z). UAF is successfully preventing "deep eyes" from loitering over critical nodes.
Strategic Policy: Maintaining the NATO non-negotiable stance (1000Z) signals UAF leadership's commitment to long-term security guarantees despite tactical setbacks in Zaporizhzhia.
Economic Resilience: Managing the fallout of the Pivdennyi Port strike; the shift to targeting vegetable oil suggests Russia is aiming at Ukraine's foreign currency earnings (agri-exports) rather than just immediate military logistics.
Information environment / disinformation
"Shuttle Diplomacy": Russian channels (Colonelcassad, TASS) are promoting Kirill Dmitriev as a "key informal negotiator" who has reported directly to Putin on talks with the US (0950Z, 0958Z). This is likely aimed at projecting a "reasonable" Russian posture to Western audiences while maintaining military pressure.
Domestic Opacity: The Russian Federation Council's approval of laws to stop annual income declarations for officials (0938Z) indicates a move toward total state opacity to hide the financial costs of the war and internal corruption.
Outlook (next 6-12h)
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): RF will intensify KAB strikes on Zaporizhzhia to exploit the gap created by the Zarechnoe breakthrough. UAVs currently over Sumy and Chernihiv will likely conduct "strike-on-sight" missions against energy infrastructure or TDF positions.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): A major RF offensive in the Kupyansk sector aimed at resolving internal C2 issues through a "brute force" surge, potentially utilizing the 136th OMSBr (0941Z) to bridge gaps in coordination.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
Kupyansk C2 Breakdown: Urgently require SIGINT/HUMINT to identify which specific RF units are experiencing "command problems" to prioritize HIMARS/artillery targeting on their C2 nodes.
FAB Malfunction Analysis: Identify if the accidental FAB drops are due to a specific technical failure in the UMPK kits or pilot error; this could inform EW strategies to induce further malfunctions.
Buryatia Recruitment: Monitor the results of school surveys to gauge the timeline for the next potential mobilization surge (Expected: Spring 2026).
