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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-23 18:36:10Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-23 18:06:08Z)

Situation Update (1835Z Dec 23, 2025)

Key updates since last sitrep

  • (18:20, Operativnyi ZSU, MEDIUM): SBU reveals new details of a multi-stage operation in the Black Sea; claims a Russian Il-38N maritime reconnaissance aircraft was neutralized to facilitate the subsequent strike on a Russian submarine in Novorossiysk.
  • (18:07, Повітряні Сили ЗС України, HIGH): Immediate aerial threat to Chernihiv; enemy UAV (likely Shahed/Geran) detected approaching from the north.
  • (18:06, ✙DeepState✙🇺🇦, HIGH): Critical personnel crisis identified; evidence shows UAF elements holding positions for 130 consecutive days without rotation, signaling severe systemic fatigue and manning shortages.
  • (18:30, General Staff ZSU, HIGH): UAF engineering units report high lethality; approximately 800 RF personnel were neutralized by engineering munitions (mines/IEDs) during November operations.
  • (18:34, Dnipropetrovsk ODA, HIGH): Successful interception of an RF reconnaissance/strike UAV over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast during daylight hours.
  • (18:07, Igor Artamonov, HIGH): Ukrainian long-range UAV threat triggered region-wide alerts in Lipetsk Oblast, Russia, indicating sustained UAF deep-strike pressure on the RF interior.
  • (18:09, Alex Parker Returns, LOW): UNCONFIRMED/MISLEADING: Claim that the Czech Defense Minister canceled his visit and ended ammo procurement for Ukraine; assessed as an information operation.

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

The operational environment is currently defined by a high-intensity aerial domain and a mounting sustainability crisis within UAF infantry units. While the UAF continues to demonstrate high-level coordination in deep strikes (e.g., the Il-38N/Submarine operation) and defensive engineering, the tactical frontline is strained by lack of rotation (18:06). In the North, the RF continues to utilize the border as a vector for UAV incursions targeting Chernihiv (18:07), while the UAF maintains reciprocal pressure on RF logistics and C2 hubs in Lipetsk (18:07).

Weather/Environmental Factors: Sub-zero temperatures (-11°C) persist, favoring frozen-ground mechanized movement but exacerbating the physical degradation of troops who have exceeded standard deployment durations.


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT) (IPB Step 2)

Tactical Maneuver & Capabilities:

  • Drone Operations: The "Rubikon Centre" (MoD Russia, 18:05) has emerged as a specialized drone strike element, demonstrating refined UAV lethality against UAF tactical positions.
  • Aerial Pressure: The RF continues to probe northern air defenses (Chernihiv) using one-way attack (OWA) UAVs (Geran/Shahed), likely attempting to map AD locations for follow-on missile strikes against the energy grid.

Logistics and Internal Security:

  • Economic Attrition: Significant tankers "jams" of Russian oil near India and China (18:25) suggest mounting friction in RF energy exports, which may impact long-term war-funding.
  • Crowdsourcing Dependency: "Arkhangel Spetsnaza" (18:13) continues to rely on public donations for basic military equipment, indicating that RF state logistics still fail to meet the "last mile" requirements for frontline units.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING) (IPB Step 3)

Operational Successes:

  • Asymmetric Naval Warfare: The SBU’s reported suppression of RF maritime surveillance (Il-38N) prior to the Novorossiysk strike (18:20) indicates a sophisticated understanding of RF "kill chains" and the ability to conduct multi-domain shaping operations.
  • Defensive Lethality: The effectiveness of engineering munitions (18:30) remains a primary attrition driver against RF mechanized and infantry assaults.

Force Readiness & Constraints:

  • Rotation Failure: The report of units serving 130 days without relief (18:06) is a critical indicator of combat ineffectiveness risk. Prolonged deployment leads to cognitive decline, increased casualty rates, and potential "brittle" points on the FLOT.
  • Air Defense: Successful daylight interceptions in Dnipropetrovsk (18:34) confirm that regional air defenses remain responsive despite the broad targeting of the electrical grid.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

  • Alliance Sabotage: Pro-Russian channels are aggressively pushing narratives of a "Czech withdrawal" (18:09) and "Polish-Ukrainian tension" (18:22) to undermine international support. The Czech claim is highly likely a fabrication.
  • Preemptive Nuclear Framing: RF "military correspondents" (18:22) are preemptively discrediting reports of Russian strikes near the Chernobyl (ChNPP) New Safe Confinement, framing future UAF warnings as "western-backed horror stories." This suggests the RF may be planning operations near the exclusion zone.
  • Soft Power: Continued RF educational expansion in the CAR (18:22) highlights Russia's intent to maintain long-term influence in Africa to bypass Western diplomatic isolation.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

  • Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): RF will maintain the current tempo of UAV harassment against Northern (Chernihiv) and Central (Dnipropetrovsk) hubs to exhaust UAF AD munitions. Simultaneously, they will intensify IO campaigns focusing on Ukrainian personnel exhaustion to encourage desertion or surrender.
  • Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): Exploiting the identified 130-day deployment fatigue, RF "Rubikon" and "Center" groups launch a concentrated breakthrough in a sector where UAF units are at their most physically degraded, potentially leading to a localized collapse of the defensive line before reserves can be committed.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

  1. Personnel Rotation Status: Determine if the 130-day deployment is isolated to one battalion/brigade or represents a systemic ZSU-wide failure.
  2. Novorossiysk BDA: Confirm the status of the Il-38N and the submarine via satellite imagery to validate SBU claims.
  3. Czech Munitions Program: Verify with Ministry level (Czech Republic) the status of the ammo procurement program to counter active disinformation.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

  1. Immediate Force Rotation: Prioritize the rotation of units identified as having exceeded 90 days of combat duty to prevent tactical collapse.
  2. C-UAS Prioritization: Deploy mobile fire groups to the northern approaches of Chernihiv to intercept low-flying OWA UAVs.
  3. IO Counter-Strike: Issue official denials regarding the Czech ammunition program and highlight the engineering success (800 RF casualties) to bolster domestic morale.

//REPORT ENDS//

Previous (2025-12-23 18:06:08Z)

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