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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-23 18:06:08Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-23 17:36:07Z)

Situation Update (1805Z Dec 23, 2025)

Key updates since last sitrep

  • (17:54, Kotsnews, HIGH): Confirmed shift in Russian strategic targeting doctrine; RF is now explicitly targeting the electrical infrastructure tied to Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) to force a total grid collapse.
  • (17:51, РБК-Україна, HIGH): Critical energy infrastructure facility confirmed damaged in Chernihiv Raion following a strike; indicates continued pressure on the Northern electrical subsystem.
  • (17:54, Операция Z, MEDIUM): RF "Center" Group claims to have "surrounded" Myrnohrad and is actively advancing across the administrative border into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
  • (18:03, БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС, HIGH): UAF 414th "Birds of Magyar" and "Svoboda" Battalion successfully conducted a joint drone strike destroying two BM-21 Grad MLRS in the Donbas sector.
  • (17:42, AV БогомаZ, MEDIUM): RF Ministry of Defense claims interception of 10 UAF fixed-wing drones over Bryansk Oblast, indicating a sustained UAF effort to disrupt RF logistics in the Northern Operational Zone.
  • (17:44, ✙DeepState✙🇺🇦, HIGH): Legal escalation in hybrid theater; Switzerland has extradited a Ukrainian national to Germany for suspected Russian-directed sabotage against cargo shipments.
  • (17:36, Kotsnews, LOW): Coordinated information operation observed targeting the United Nations, using poll-driven narratives to delegitimize international oversight.

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

The operational environment is characterized by a transition from tactical maneuvering to strategic infrastructure strangulation. The RF has officially signaled a move against NPP-linked infrastructure (17:54, Kotsnews), a significant escalation from previous electrical grid targeting. Concurrently, the ground situation in the Donbas is deteriorating as RF forces claim to be bypassing Myrnohrad to enter the Dnipropetrovsk administrative region. Weather remains a critical factor, with sub-zero temperatures (-11°C) maximizing the impact of the strike on the Chernihiv energy node (17:51).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

Tactical Maneuver & Capabilities:

  • Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad Axis: The RF "Center" Group is prioritizing the envelopment of Myrnohrad (17:54). If the claim of surrounding the city is accurate, UAF logistics for the Pokrovsk sector are at critical risk.
  • Dnipropetrovsk Incursion: RF units are attempting to establish a durable foothold across the Dnipropetrovsk border, likely utilizing the Andreevka breach identified in earlier reports.
  • Strategic Strike Adaptation: The focus on NPPs (17:54) suggests the RF aims to create "islands" of power generation that cannot be synchronized, leading to a systemic failure of the Ukrainian Integrated Power System (IPS).

Logistics and Sustainment:

  • Counter-Battery Vulnerability: The loss of two BM-21 Grads (18:03) to UAF drone teams indicates that RF rocket artillery remains susceptible to high-frequency FPV surveillance despite Russian EW adaptations (Starlink-integrated drones).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UAF)

  • Deep Strike Operations: UAF continues to leverage long-range UAS to fix RF air defense assets in the Bryansk region (17:42), likely attempting to create corridors for follow-on strikes against the "Sever" Group's logistics.
  • Precision Attrition: The "Birds of Magyar" (414th Reg) continue to demonstrate superior coordination with ground elements ("Svoboda" Battalion) to interdict RF mobile fire assets (18:03).
  • Personnel Status: Reports of a Russian POW holding a position for 2.5 months (17:42, STERNENKO) suggest a high level of defensive attrition in certain sectors, potentially indicating "frozen" pockets of the front where RF units are left without extraction support.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

  • International Law & Sabotage: The extradition of a sabotage suspect from Switzerland to Germany (17:44) confirms the "Land Bridge" to Ukraine remains a high-priority target for RF hybrid operations.
  • Institutional Delegitimation: RF-aligned channels are systematically attacking the UN's relevance (17:36), likely preparing the domestic and international information space for a rejection of future UN-brokered humanitarian or nuclear safety initiatives.
  • Regional Instability (Armenia): Deepening rifts between the Armenian government and the Apostolic Church (17:37, Рыбарь) are being closely monitored by RF intelligence as a potential vector for regional destabilization to distract Western/UK diplomatic resources.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

  • Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): RF will intensify "robot-led" (UGV) breaching operations in the Myrnohrad outskirts under the cover of the overnight aerial wave, specifically targeting frequency-regulation nodes in the Chernihiv and Western sectors to maximize grid instability.
  • Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): RF utilizes the Dnipropetrovsk border incursion to launch a high-speed mechanized push toward Pavlohrad, attempting to sever the main rail artery supplying the entirety of the Donbas front before UAF can reorient its reserve M1A1 assets.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

  1. Myrnohrad Encirclement Status: Need immediate SIGINT/UAV confirmation of UAF GLOCs into Myrnohrad. Is the city tactically surrounded, or is this "fire control" only?
  2. NPP Infrastructure Vulnerability: Assess which specific substations (330kV/750kV) tied to the Rivne or Khmelnytskyi NPPs are most at risk given the new RF targeting doctrine.
  3. Dnipropetrovsk Penetration Depth: Confirm the exact coordinates of the "Center" Group's presence within Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

  1. Grid Resilience: Immediately implement "island mode" protocols for regional grids where NPP output is critical; prioritize hardening of substations near Chernihiv.
  2. Anti-Sabotage Measures: Increase security for Western-sourced military cargo transit; the extradition from Switzerland confirms the threat is active and multi-national.
  3. Tactical Air Defense: Deploy additional point-defense systems (Gepard/Terrahawk) to the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad axis to counter the "Center" Group's increased reliance on CAS and tactical UAVs.

//REPORT ENDS//

Previous (2025-12-23 17:36:07Z)

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