Situation Report

Situation Update (0705 UTC Dec 23, 2025)

Key updates since last sitrep

• (06:41-06:48, Vanyok/Tsapliyenko, HIGH): Launch maneuvers confirmed for two (2) Tu-95MS strategic bombers from the Arkhangelsk region. This indicates an imminent second wave of cruise missiles (CMs) targeting the Ukrainian interior.
• (06:36-06:40, Air Force/Vanyok/Tsapliyenko, HIGH): The Kh-47M2 "Kinzhal" threat has concluded for this wave. A total of three (3) missiles were recorded; all are reported neutralized or "clean" (intercepted or missed targets).
• (06:39-06:54, Zhytomyr OVA/Kyiv OVA/RBC-UA, HIGH): Kinetic impacts and debris have caused civilian casualties. Zhytomyr Oblast reports 6 injured (including 2 children). In Kyiv Oblast (Vyshhorod district), a residential fire caused by an attack resulted in one death (woman, b. 1949) and 3 injuries. Kyiv City (Svyatoshynskyi district) reports 2 injuries from falling debris.
• (06:58, RBC-UA, HIGH): Poland and Allied forces have scrambled combat aviation in response to the scale of the Russian strike near NATO borders.
• (07:04, Archangel Spetsnaza, LOW): Unconfirmed reports of UAF counterattacks in the Huliaipole sector (Zaporizhzhia). (Note: Source is pro-Russian/uncorroborated).
• (07:00, Tsapliyenko, MEDIUM): Frontline reports indicate a shift in FPV drone tactics, with Russian forces utilizing fiber-optic guided FPVs to bypass EW; UAF units are adapting with physical interception tools (shotguns/net-throwers).

Operational picture (by sector)

Northern Axis (Kharkiv/Sumy)

While the kinetic focus has shifted to the air domain, the ground situation remains critical following the loss of Vilcha and Prylypka (reported 06:35). No new territorial changes reported in the last 30 minutes, but the air raid remains active over the region.

Eastern Axis (Donbas/Pokrovsk)

Confirmed presence of the 33rd Guards Motor Rifle Regiment (RF) in the Dobropillya salient (07:02, Dva Mayora). This confirms the RF is maintaining high-quality motorized units in the north-of-Pokrovsk sector to exploit any potential thinning of UAF lines.

Southern Axis (Zaporizhzhia/Huliaipole)

RF sources claim UAF counter-offensive activity near Huliaipole (07:04). If confirmed, this suggests a UAF attempt to disrupt the Russian flank or seize the initiative while RF aviation is focused on the strategic strike mission.

Western/Central Axis (Strike Zone)

Active air defense engagements continue. Shahed UAVs remain a threat in Shepetivka, Khmelnytskyi, Boryspil, and Kyiv (06:45). The focus is transitioning from the hypersonic threat to the arrival of the next cruise missile wave from the Tu-95MS platforms.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

• Staggered Strike Methodology: The RF is using a "laddered" approach—hypersonic (Kinzhals) to suppress/reveal AD, followed by a second wave of Tu-95MS cruise missiles to hit high-value targets while AD reloads or remains fixed by Shahed drones.
• Tactical Adaptation (EW Bypass): The deployment of fiber-optic FPVs indicates a Russian effort to render UAF localized electronic warfare (EW) ineffective.
• C2/Logistics: The 33rd MRR's active fundraising and deployment in Dobropillya suggest they are being sustained for long-term offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction.

Friendly activity (UAF)

• Air Defense Maneuver: UAF AD successfully navigated the Kinzhal wave with zero reported high-value hits from that specific asset class.
• Tactical Response: UAF ground forces in the south may be attempting localized counter-maneuvers (Huliaipole) to capitalize on the RF's focus on the strategic air campaign.
• Civil Defense: Massive coordination by regional VAs (Zhytomyr, Kyiv) is managing casualty surges and debris-related fires.

Information environment / disinformation

• Russian Morale/Tradition: RF channels are heavily amplifying "Long-Range Aviation Day" (06:42) to frame the mass killing of civilians as a professional celebration.
• European Instability Narrative: Pro-Russian channels (Starshiy Eddy, Operatsiya Z) are circulating high-production propaganda targeting European audiences ("Putin's fault" Christmas ads) and claiming Norwegian military aid has caused a domestic crisis (06:41-06:47).
• Distraction: TASS continues to inject "noise" (EGE vocabulary rulings) to dilute international focus on kinetic strikes.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

• MLCOA (Most Likely): Arrival of cruise missiles from the two Tu-95MS bombers within the next 60-120 minutes. Primary targets likely remain energy infrastructure and rail hubs in Western Ukraine.
• MDCOA (Most Dangerous): The RF uses the air strike as a shield to launch a multi-regiment assault from the Vilcha-Prylypka breach toward the Vovchansk-Kharkiv road, aiming for a rapid operational encirclement.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

1. Huliaipole Verification: Urgent need for SIGINT or drone reconnaissance to confirm or deny UAF counter-offensive activity near Huliaipole.
2. Tu-95MS Loadout: Determine if the two bombers launched from Arkhangelsk are carrying full salvos or specialized munitions.
3. Fiber-Optic FPV Proliferation: Assess the scale of fiber-optic FPV use across other sectors (Bakhmut/Lyman) to determine if this is a localized trial or a theater-wide shift.

//REPORT ENDS//