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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-21 01:06:07Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-21 00:36:06Z)

Situation Update (2025-12-21 01:05 UTC)

Key updates since last sitrep

  • (00:49, UAF Air Force, HIGH): Detection of Shahed-type UAVs over southern Chernihiv region (vicinity of Desna), currently on a south-westerly heading toward Kyiv region. This indicates a multi-vector aerial assault is underway, expanding beyond the southern corridor.
  • (01:03, Colonelcassad, LOW/UNCONFIRMED): Pro-Russian mil-channels circulating video allegedly showing a single Russian drone capturing three UAF personnel. This is assessed as tactical PSYOP intended to demonstrate technical dominance and demoralize frontline units.
  • (00:44, TASS, MEDIUM): Kirill Dmitriev (RDIF CEO) escalating strategic rhetoric, accusing "Deep State" actors of provoking WWIII via "anti-Russian paranoia." This aligns with recent efforts to frame the RF as a "rational actor" against an "aggressive West."
  • (01:05, Analytic Assessment, MEDIUM): The shift of UAV activity to the Northern Sector (Chernihiv/Kyiv) while Odesa remains under threat suggests a coordinated attempt to saturate and fix UAF Air Defense (AD) assets across multiple regions simultaneously.

Operational picture (by sector)

  • Northern Vector (Chernihiv/Kyiv): NEW THREAT. UAVs are navigating the Desna corridor. This area is critical as it houses training centers and serves as a northern approach to the capital. AD units in the Kyiv region are now on high alert.
  • Southern Vector (Odesa/Bessarabia): No new kinetic impacts reported since the 00:02 strike on the Mayaki Bridge. However, the threat remains active as UAVs continue to loiter in the Mykolaiv-Odesa corridor. The "partial restoration" of the bridge (from daily report) remains highly vulnerable.
  • Eastern Vector (Kupiansk/Lyman): The situation near Nechvolodivka remains static but tense; the previously reported "mutiny" narrative has not materialized into a ground assault, reinforcing its status as a PSYOP/deception measure.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

  • Multi-Vector Aerial Pressure: By launching UAVs from both the South and the North, the RF is forcing UAF to choose between protecting critical logistics (Mayaki Bridge) and political centers (Kyiv).
  • Tactical Innovation (Drone Captures): The claim of a drone-led surrender (01:03), even if fabricated, suggests the RF is prioritizing "technical superiority" narratives. This follows reports of "machine vision" Gerans, suggesting a concerted effort to portray UAF electronic warfare (EW) as obsolete.
  • Logistics Interdiction: Strategic focus remains on the southern GLOCs (Ground Lines of Communication). The Artsyz rail strike and Mayaki Bridge targeting are synchronized to isolate the Bessarabia region.

Friendly activity (UAF)

  • Air Defense (AD) Maneuver: Mobile fire groups are repositioning in the Kyiv/Chernihiv sectors to intercept the 00:49 UAV wave.
  • Information Operations: UAF is currently countering the Nechvolodivka mutiny claims; however, the new "drone capture" video requires immediate debunking by StratCom to prevent local morale degradation.

Information environment / disinformation

  • Strategic Framing: The RF is running a "Good Cop/Bad Cop" narrative. While Gabbard (00:14) is used to suggest limited RF goals, Dmitriev (00:44) uses "WWIII" rhetoric to threaten escalation. This creates a cognitive "pincer" for Western policymakers.
  • Tactical Deception (NEW): The Colonelcassad "capture" video (01:03) is a textbook example of using unverified combat footage to support a broader technical superiority narrative. Confidence: LOW.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

  • Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): Shahed saturation of the Kyiv and Odesa regions will continue through 0400Z. RF will likely launch a high-precision missile strike (Iskander-M) against a weakened AD node once UAVs have forced radar activation.
  • Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): A coordinated "double-tap" strike on the Mayaki Bridge and the Palanca bypass in Moldova's vicinity, coupled with a localized ground probe in the North (Chernihiv) while AD resources are focused on UAV interception.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

  1. TECHNICAL (URGENT): Recover and analyze UAV wreckage from the Chernihiv/Kyiv wave to confirm if they also utilize the "machine vision" reported in the South.
  2. HUMINT/SIGINT: Verify the location and authenticity of the "drone capture" video (01:03). Are these actual UAF personnel or a staged RF performance?
  3. BDA: Updated status of the Artsyz rail spur—is the line operational for NATO-sourced heavy equipment?

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

The operational theater is currently experiencing a synchronized dual-axis UAV campaign. The Northern vector (Chernihiv -> Kyiv) and the Southern vector (Odesa) are being used to stretch UAF defensive density. Weather conditions remain conducive for low-altitude UAV flight despite seasonal "Rasputitsa" affecting ground maneuver.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

  • Intentions: To achieve a "logistic siege" of the South while creating "defensive panic" in the North.
  • Adaptation: RF is increasingly relying on hybrid outcomes—using drone footage (real or staged) to amplify psychological effects where kinetic ground gains are slowed by mud.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UAF)

  • Posture: Defensive/Reactive. UAF is successfully intercepting a high percentage of UAVs, but the cost-exchange ratio (missiles vs. Shaheds) remains a point of attrition.
  • Constraint: Limited AD coverage in the southern Bessarabia region makes the Mayaki-Artsyz corridor a "soft" target compared to Kyiv.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

  • Cognitive Domain: The RF is successfully injecting "Deep State" and "WWIII" conspiracy theories into the TASS-linked info-space to appeal to specific Western political segments, potentially aiming to slow aid packages during the Miami negotiations.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

  • Decision Point: If the UAVs over Chernihiv reach the Kyiv AD ring by 0300Z, Southern Command must expect a secondary strike in the Odesa sector, as RF typically uses Kyiv-bound threats to draw AD assets away from logistics nodes.

RECOMMENDATION:

  1. Tactical: Deploy additional acoustic sensor arrays in the Chernihiv-Kyiv corridor to track UAVs without activating radar.
  2. StratCom: Issue an immediate advisory regarding the "drone capture" video to frontline units to maintain morale.
  3. Logistics: Accelerate the hardening of the Palanca bypass as the Mayaki Bridge is likely to be targeted again within 6 hours.

//END OF REPORT//

Previous (2025-12-21 00:36:06Z)

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