(00:14, РБК-Україна, MEDIUM): US intelligence (via Tulsi Gabbard) has reportedly refuted a Reuters article claiming Vladimir Putin’s intent is to seize the entirety of Ukraine. This signals a potential shift or clarification in Western assessments of RF strategic end-states.
(00:34, TASS, MEDIUM): Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) issued public guidance on identifying phone scammers. While domestic, this indicates a high volume of cyber/financial crime within the RF during the conflict period.
(00:14, НгП раZVедка, LOW): Pro-Russian mil-channels circulating video of interfaith (Hanukkah) engagement. Assessment: Likely a "soft power" narrative or distraction from ongoing kinetic operations in the South.
(CONTRIBUTING DATA, PREVIOUS SITREP, HIGH): Shahed-type UAVs remain active over the Mykolaiv-Odesa corridor following the 00:02 detection. Kinetic interception is ongoing.
Operational picture (by sector)
Southern Vector (Odesa/Bessarabia): No new kinetic strikes reported in the last 30 minutes; however, the threat to the Mayaki Bridge remains CRITICAL following the reported re-strike at 00:02. The presence of UAVs indicates an active "shaping" phase for a potential secondary missile strike.
Kharkiv Sector (Kupiansk Axis): The situation near Nechvolodivka remains the focus of RF disinformation (claims of UAF mutiny). No physical movement has been confirmed, suggesting the "mutiny" narrative is a setup for a localized probe.
Internal RF Domain: Increased focus on domestic security (MVD fraud warnings) suggests that while the military is focused externally, internal stability/cyber-security remains a point of friction for the Kremlin.
Enemy activity / threat assessment
Strategic Narrative Management: The refutation of the Reuters "total seizure" report by US intelligence sources (00:14) suggests the RF may be successfully muddying the waters regarding their true strategic objectives, potentially to facilitate diplomatic maneuvering or to reduce the perceived urgency of Western aid.
Layered Aerial Pressure: The persistence of UAVs over Mykolaiv/Odesa (00:02-00:35) is consistent with a "soak" tactic, designed to deplete AD magazines and identify radar positions before heavy munitions are committed.
Domestic Stability: The MVD’s focus on fraud (00:34) highlights a vulnerable Russian home front where wartime economic pressures are manifesting as increased domestic crime.
Friendly activity (UAF)
Air Defense (AD): Mobile fire groups and AD units in the Southern Operational Command are currently tracking and engaging multiple low-altitude targets (UAVs).
Counter-Information Ops: UAF StratCom must monitor the "Reuters refutation" narrative to ensure it does not negatively impact frontline morale or international support perceptions.
Information environment / disinformation
Strategic Rebuttal (NEW): The Gabbard/US Intel rebuttal of the Reuters report (00:14) is being rapidly amplified. This serves to portray RF goals as "limited," which directly counters the UAF narrative of an existential threat to all of Ukraine.
Tactical Deception (ONGOING): The Nechvolodivka mutiny claim (TASS, 00:04) remains UNCONFIRMED and is assessed as a MEDIUM-confidence PSYOP designed to induce local command hesitation.
Outlook (next 6-12h)
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): RF will continue the Shahed saturation of Odesa through the night. A precision strike (Iskander or Kalibr) on the Mayaki Bridge or the Palanca bypass is expected before dawn to exploit AD fatigue.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): A rapid tactical advance in the Kupiansk sector (Nechvolodivka) following the "mutiny" disinformation campaign, intended to collapse the local UAF defensive line while resources are diverted to the South.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
BDA (URGENT): Physical confirmation of Mayaki Bridge damage levels. Can it still facilitate 5+ ton logistics?
SIGINT: Monitor for increased RF command-and-control (C2) traffic in the Kupiansk sector to see if the Nechvolodivka PSYOP is being followed by movement of 1st Guards Tank Army elements.
TECHNICAL: Analysis of downed UAVs in Odesa to confirm or deny the use of "machine vision" terminal guidance as reported in the 24h summary.
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW
The battlefield remains divided between a high-intensity aerial interdiction campaign in the South (Odesa) and a high-intensity psychological campaign in the East (Kharkiv). The "Rasputitsa" (mud) continues to restrict heavy maneuver, shifting the RF focus to infrastructure attrition.
Logistics: RF internal security focus (MVD report) indicates potential friction in domestic sustainment or administrative control, but frontline munitions flow (Leningrad Arsenal data) remains consistent with an offensive posture.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UAF)
Readiness: High alert in Southern AD sectors. Engineering units are on standby for rapid bridge repair, though work is currently stalled due to active UAV threats.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
Cognitive Domain: The entry of US political figures (Gabbard) into the narrative regarding Putin’s goals adds a layer of complexity to UAF international messaging. The RF is likely to exploit this "refutation" to suggest that the threat to Kyiv/Western Ukraine is exaggerated.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
Decision Point: By 0600Z, if the Mayaki Bridge is confirmed impassable, Southern Command must immediately reroute all NATO-sourced sustainment through the Palanca (Moldova) bottleneck, which will require coordination with Moldovan border authorities.
RECOMMENDATION:
Air Defense: Utilize passive sensor arrays (acoustic/optical) to track Shaheds to avoid radar exposure until the "main" strike wave is detected.
Diplomatic/StratCom: Engage with US counterparts to clarify the Gabbard rebuttal and prevent it from being weaponized by RF propaganda to suggest a reduced threat level.
