(10:25, MoD Russia, MEDIUM): RF forces ("Tsentr" Group) claim the liberation of Svetloye and the "neutralization" of an encircled UAF force in Dimitrov (Myrnohrad), Donetsk Oblast.
(10:21, MoD Russia, MEDIUM): RF "Sever" Group claims to have liberated Vysokoye in the Sumy region.
(10:14, GSZSU/Liveuamap, HIGH): UAF General Staff reports repelling 8 Russian assaults in the Kursk/Sumy border directions over the last 24 hours.
(10:07, Operativno ZSU/Kuleba, HIGH): RF strike on Port Pivdennyi (Odesa region) confirmed; storage tanks hit, causing significant infrastructure damage.
(09:50, RBK-UA, HIGH): UAF successfully thwarted an RF armored breakthrough in the Donetsk direction, destroying an MTU-20 bridge-layer and multiple tanks.
(10:33, Colonelcassad/Operativno ZSU, MEDIUM): Wreckage of "modified" Shahed/Geran drones recovered in Odesa; assessment suggests the region is being used as a testbed for new UAV variants.
(10:15, US Mission to NATO, HIGH): US Ambassador Whitaker states Ukraine must prepare for combat operations extending into 2026.
Operational picture (by sector)
1. Pokrovsk / Donetsk Axis:
Dimitrov (Myrnohrad) Encirclement: RF sources (10:25, 09:56) claim Russian forces are "clearing" Dimitrov and have established an encirclement. While GSZSU (10:16) confirms "intense clashes" in the vicinity of Myrnohrad and Rodynske, the total fall of the city remains UNCONFIRMED by independent or Ukrainian official sources.
Defensive Success: Ukrainian forces successfully interdicted an RF maneuver element in the Donetsk sector (09:50), specifically destroying an MTU-20 bridge-laying vehicle. This indicates RF's continued reliance on specialized engineering assets to overcome UAF defensive lines.
Toretsk: Aerial reconnaissance (09:58) confirms the near-total destruction of urban infrastructure in Toretsk, which remains a high-attrition "gray zone."
2. Northern / Sumy Sector:
Vysokoye Capture: The RF MoD claim of liberating Vysokoye (10:21) suggests an expansion of tactical operations in the Sumy border region. This aligns with the "Sever" Group's increased activity but may represent a cross-border raid rather than a permanent territorial shift. UAF reports 8 repelled assaults in this general area (10:16).
3. Odesa & Black Sea Domain:
Logistics Interdiction: Following the Mayaki Bridge closure (baseline), the strike on Port Pivdennyi (10:07) targets the remaining high-capacity export and fuel storage infrastructure. This is a deliberate "Logistical Strangulation" campaign.
UAV Evolution: The use of "modified Shaheds" (10:33) indicates an RF adaptation to UA air defenses. UA units successfully downed at least one Shahed via MANPADS (Igla) at 09:51.
4. Zaporizhzhia / Southern Sector:
Airstrike Intensity: Surge in KAB (guided bomb) employment against Zaporizhzhia, Huliaipole, and Vozdvyzhivka (09:55, 10:15). RF "Vostok" Group is utilizing specialized "Far Eastern Winds" drone units for precision targeting of UAF positions.
Enemy activity / threat assessment
Tactical Encirclement Doctrine: RF forces are increasingly attempting small-scale tactical encirclements (e.g., Dimitrov) rather than broad frontal assaults. This suggests a refinement in "Tsentr" Group tactics.
Technological Adaptation: The deployment of NRTK (Unmanned Ground Vehicles) for supply and potentially combat in the Dimitrov area (10:00) highlights RF's efforts to reduce infantry exposure in high-attrition urban zones.
Multi-Vector Pressure: Simultaneous claims of progress in Sumy (North) and Myrnohrad (East) are designed to force UAF to commit reserves across a widened front, preventing the reinforcement of the Odesa corridor.
Friendly activity (UAF)
Anti-Armor Interdiction: High-level proficiency in destroying RF engineering assets (MTU-20) is slowing RF's ability to cross fortified lines in the Donetsk sector.
Air Defense Resilience: Despite the saturation of "modified" UAVs, UAF MANPADS teams continue to score hits (09:51).
Prisoner Operations: (10:00) Exploitation of RF POWs reveals systemic logistical failures within certain RF units (reports of lack of water/food for 2 months), which UAF is using for psychological operations (PsyOps).
Information environment / disinformation
"Dimitrov Fallen": RF sources are heavily pushing the "encirclement/clearing" narrative (09:56, 10:25) to induce panic and demoralize the Pokrovsk garrison.
Social Engineering: RF channels are circulating narratives regarding "Indian programmers" working as sweepers in St. Petersburg (10:14) to project an image of successful labor migration and societal stability.
External Pressure: Use of security expert quotes (10:02) to link Putin's positions with US political figures (Trump) aims to create a perception of Western fragmentation during the Miami talks.
Outlook (next 6-12h)
Most Likely (MLCOA): RF will maintain the high tempo of KAB strikes on Zaporizhzhia and Odesa to paralyze logistics while attempting to formalize the control of Dimitrov (Myrnohrad) before the next diplomatic briefing.
Most Dangerous (MDCOA): RF forces in the Sumy direction (Sever Group) exploit the Vysokoye claim to launch a deeper flanking maneuver toward Sumy city, forcing UAF to divert assets from the critical Pokrovsk defense.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
(CRITICAL): Visual confirmation of control in Dimitrov (Myrnohrad). Is the encirclement a physical reality or a fire-control "pocket"?
(URGENT): Identify the modifications in the "New Shahed" variants (e.g., carbon-fiber coatings, new seeker heads, or increased EW resistance).
(TACTICAL): Confirm the extent of the RF presence in Vysokoye (Sumy). Is this a reconnaissance-in-force or a battalion-sized lodgment?
IPB ANALYSIS SUMMARY
The operational tempo is accelerating ahead of the Miami negotiations. RF forces are attempting a "land-grab" strategy, specifically targeting the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad urban agglomeration to present a fait accompli. The strike on Port Pivdennyi, combined with the earlier Mayaki bridge closure, confirms a strategic intent to isolate Odesa from both sea and land supply.
Actionable Judgment: UAF must prioritize the deployment of mobile ATGM teams to the Myrnohrad outskirts to break potential encirclement corridors. J2 must evaluate if the Sumy activity (Vysokoye) is a diversion; primary defensive mass should remain focused on preventing the collapse of the Myrnohrad-Pokrovsk hinge.
