(07:06, Operativnyi ZSU, HIGH): Final after-action report for overnight air defense engagement: RF launched 3 Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 51 UAVs. Interception rate: 0/3 missiles and 31/51 UAVs (approx. 60%).
(07:14, UAF Air Force, HIGH): Confirmed launches of KAB (guided aerial bombs) against targets in Donetsk Oblast; tactical aviation remains active.
(07:16, Kadyrov_95, MEDIUM): Confirmed presence and active assault operations of the 78th Motorized Rifle Regiment ("Sever-Akhmat") and the 1194th Regiment (4th Brigade) in the Kostiantynivka direction.
(07:31, GUR/Operativnyi ZSU, HIGH): GUR Chief Budanov reports RF strategic preparation for potential occupation of Baltic states and kinetic strikes (non-occupational) against Poland.
(07:33, MoD Russia, MEDIUM): RF "Yug" (Southern) Group reports using Grad MLRS to destroy two UAF UAV command posts and a temporary deployment area in the Donetsk sector.
(07:32, WarGonzo, HIGH): US conducted airstrikes against ISIS targets in Syria, indicating shifting global kinetic focus during the Miami peace summit period.
Kostiantynivka Salient: This sector has seen a marked increase in intensity. The deployment of Chechen "Akhmat" units (07:16) alongside regular RF motor rifle regiments suggests a renewed push to "cleanse" the area. RF is utilizing a combination of Grad MLRS (07:33) and KAB strikes (07:14) to soften UAF defenses.
Information Operations: Multiple Russian channels (DNR, Colonelcassad) are circulating footage claiming UAF surrenders in Kostiantynivka (07:09, 07:33). (UNCONFIRMED - LOW CONFIDENCE); assessed as a coordinated IO effort to degrade UAF morale.
Pokrovsk: High-intensity drone operations by the 414th Brigade continue as the primary defensive stopgap (per baseline).
2. Southern Sector (Odesa/Crimea/Bessarabia):
Logistics: The bypass through Moldova (Chisinau rail link) remains the critical GLOC following the M-15 Mayaki bridge severance. The State Border Guard Service (DPSU) has issued travel/transit advice (07:35), indicating high holiday volumes which may mask or complicate military logistics.
Air Defense: The overnight failure to intercept the 3 Iskander-M missiles suggests RF is successfully identifying gaps in the southern/central AD umbrella or utilizing decoys to saturate terminal defenses.
3. Strategic/Deep Strike Domain:
Aerial Attrition: The 60% interception rate of UAVs (31 of 51) is a decrease from previous high-efficiency nights, likely due to the inclusion of the 3 ballistic missiles which complicate the air picture.
Enemy activity / threat assessment
Tactical Shift: In the Donetsk sector, RF is integrating Chechen assault units with heavy MLRS support to target UAF command and control (C2), specifically focusing on UAV pilot nodes (07:33).
Strategic Intent: Per GUR assessment, the RF long-term COA involves expansion toward the Baltics, suggesting the current mobilization and VPK sustainment are geared for a multi-year conflict beyond Ukraine's borders.
Course of Action (MLCOA): RF will continue high-frequency KAB strikes in the Kostiantynivka/Donetsk sector to facilitate infantry advances by "Akhmat" units.
Friendly activity (UAF)
Air Defense Posture: UAF Air Force is actively vectoring against KAB-carrying tactical aircraft, but the lack of ballistic missile interceptions overnight indicates a critical requirement for additional ATACMS/Patriot-class interceptors in the Eastern/Southern sectors.
Strategic Signaling: GUR Chief Budanov’s statements (07:31) serve to galvanize NATO support by framing the Ukrainian theater as the primary barrier to a wider European conflict.
Information environment / disinformation
Surrender Narrative: Coordinated release of "surrender" videos (07:09, 07:16, 07:33) is intended to capitalize on the tactical pressure in Kostiantynivka.
Normalization/Distraction: Russian state media (TASS) and social channels (Новости Москвы) are heavily promoting domestic holiday narratives (07:06, 07:17) and international sports (07:07) to minimize domestic focus on the escalating Caspian/Donetsk casualty rates.
Outlook (next 6-12h)
Most Likely (MLCOA): RF will launch a second wave of KAB strikes against Kostiantynivka to support the 78th Regiment's assault. Expect continued UAV probing of the Odesa-Moldova logistics bypass.
Most Dangerous (MDCOA): RF exploits the confirmed "zero-interception" of Iskander missiles from the previous wave to launch a larger ballistic strike against the Chisinau-Kyiv rail infrastructure or the Odesa port terminal.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
(CRITICAL): Identify the impact points and damage assessments for the 3 Iskander-M missiles that bypassed AD.
(TACTICAL): Confirm the current frontline trace in Kostiantynivka; verify if the "surrender" footage corresponds to recent territorial losses or is archived/staged.
(LOGISTICS): Monitor Moldovan border throughput for any RF-aligned sabotage attempts on the "holiday" transit routes.
IPB ANALYSIS SUMMARY
The operational focus is shifting toward Kostiantynivka, where RF has introduced specialized assault infantry (Akhmat) supported by heavy artillery and KABs. This suggests an attempt to achieve a breakthrough while UAF attention is divided by the Caspian strikes and the Odesa logistics crisis. The 0% interception rate on ballistic missiles in the last 24 hours is a critical vulnerability. Actionable Judgment: UAF must urgently reinforce C2 nodes in the Kostiantynivka sector against MLRS/UAV-hunts and re-evaluate the AD positioning for ballistic protection along the Eastern rail corridors.
