(01:09:41, UAF Air Force, HIGH): Multiple KAB (guided aerial bomb) launches detected targeting Kharkiv Oblast.
(01:15:09, Nikolaevskiy Vanyok, MEDIUM): Approximately 20 OWA-UAVs launched from the Black Sea, vectoring toward Zatoka (bridge), Karolino-Bugaz, and Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi.
(01:19:25, Nikolaevskiy Vanyok, MEDIUM): Two UAVs from the Odesa-bound wave have split toward Chornomorsk and Odesa city.
(01:26:35, TASS, LOW): Russian state media claims EU leaders failed to reach an agreement on the expropriation of Russian assets. (UNCONFIRMED / Potential IO)
(01:35:23, RBC-Ukraine, HIGH): Confirmed widespread drone attacks across Eastern and Southern oblasts, continuing the saturation of UAF air defense.
Operational picture (by sector)
Northeast (Kharkiv/Sumy): The launch of KABs into Kharkiv (01:09Z) signals an intensification of tactical aviation. This likely targets UAF assembly areas or logistics nodes intended to reinforce the Eastern front.
East (Donetsk/Luhansk): No new kinetic ground updates. However, the reported "street fighting" in Krasny Lyman from previous reports remains the primary intelligence gap for this sector.
Central-South (Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia): The UAV threat to Samar (from 00:36Z) persists. This remains the most likely vector for interdicting UAF reserves ahead of the anticipated Herasymivka breakout.
South (Odesa/Kherson): A significant escalation in the Odesa region. The detection of ~20 UAVs (01:15Z) specifically targeting the Zatoka bridge and surrounding coastal infrastructure confirms an effort to sever logistics links between Odesa and the southern border regions.
Enemy activity / threat assessment
Aviation & Missile: RF has shifted from sporadic UAV probes to a massed swarm (~20 units) against the Odesa/Zatoka corridor. This is a concentrated effort to destroy fixed infrastructure (bridges) and exhaust local AD magazines.
Ground Maneuver: The Herasymivka bridgehead remains the most critical threat. With the 260th GRAU Arsenal confirmed empty (Daily Report), the current air saturation campaign is assessed as the final preparatory phase for a pre-dawn armored assault by the 5th Tank Brigade.
Strategic Deterrence: The "Oreshnik" threat in Belarus continues to act as a "fixing" mechanism for Western-based AD systems, preventing their movement to the south.
Friendly activity (UAF)
Air Defense: Mobile Fire Groups (MFGs) are heavily engaged in Odesa and Kharkiv. The concentration of UAVs near Zatoka will test the density of AD coverage in the coastal region, especially if the power grid remains unstable.
Logistics: The focus is on maintaining the integrity of the Zatoka/Karolino-Bugaz supply line, which is essential for movement in the Southern sector.
Information environment / disinformation
Economic Sabotage Narrative: The TASS report (01:26Z) regarding an EU failure to seize Russian assets directly contradicts earlier reports of a finalized agreement. This is assessed as a Psychological Operation (PSYOP) designed to undermine UAF morale and create doubt regarding long-term sustainment during a period of high tactical stress.
Humanizing the Adversary: State media reporting on Putin’s holiday plans (01:11Z) serves as a distraction and a "business as usual" signal to the Russian domestic audience during high-intensity operations.
Outlook (next 6-12h)
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): RF will launch a multi-battalion armored thrust from the Herasymivka bridgehead between 0400Z and 0600Z. This will be supported by the current UAV swarm (fixing AD) and the Kharkiv KAB strikes (fixing reserves).
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): Destruction of the Zatoka bridge via OWA-UAV/missile strike, followed by a major airborne or amphibious feint in the Odesa region to force UAF to divert the Operational Reserve away from the Herasymivka breach.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
P1 (CRITICAL): Status of the Zatoka Bridge. Confirm if the 01:15Z swarm achieved kinetic impact or if the bridge remains trafficable.
P2 (URGENT): Ground truth in Krasny Lyman. Use tactical ISR to confirm/deny the presence of RF infantry in the city center.
P3 (PRIORITY): Technical confirmation of the "Oreshnik" units in Belarus. Are they in "warm" launch status?
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) Summary
Factor
Assessment
Battlefield Geometry
RF is attempting to isolate the Southern theater by targeting the Zatoka bridge while pressuring the Kharkiv/Sumy flanks.
Enemy Capabilities
RF is demonstrating the ability to coordinate multi-domain effects: massed UAV swarms, tactical aviation (KABs), and strategic PSYOP.
Sustainment
The depletion of the 260th GRAU indicates RF is in a "use it or lose it" ammunition posture for this offensive window.
Information Domain
High-intensity IO is being used to counter-message EU financial support and humanize RF leadership.
