Situation Report

Situation Update (UTC)

DTG: 2025-12-18 14:37Z FOCUS: RF ARMORED EXPLOITATION WINDOW WIDENING & UAF TACTICAL AIR LOSS

Key updates since last sitrep

• (14:30Z, UAF Multi-Source, HIGH) UAF has confirmed the combat loss of an Mi-24 attack helicopter crew from the 12th Separate Army Aviation Brigade (OBRAA) while repelling an enemy attack. This represents a significant tactical air asset loss, potentially impacting Close Air Support (CAS) capabilities needed to address the Southern breach.
• (14:17Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH) New groups of RF Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) were detected over Sumy Oblast (Velyka Pysarivka direction). This confirms the expansion of RF aerial fixation operations across the Northeast Command Area of Responsibility (AOR).
• (14:07Z, RF TASS/Gerasimov, LOW) RF Chief of General Staff Gerasimov claimed RF is advancing on the Krasnolymanske direction and that street fighting is currently ongoing in Krasny Lyman city. This claim is assessed as highly improbable battlefield geometry but is a significant piece of RF information operation (IO) designed to fix UAF attention and reserves.
• (14:09Z, RF TASS/Gerasimov, HIGH) RF officially announced the formation of a new Air Defense-Missile Defense (PVO-PRO) division equipped with S-500 systems. This signals a long-term strategic enhancement of RF air defense architecture.
• (14:30Z, UAF Zelenskiy, HIGH) Ukrainian President Zelenskyy confirmed diplomatic friction with Belgium regarding the implementation mechanisms for utilizing frozen Russian assets, noting Belgian "reservations" on the reparations loan structure. This indicates the critical strategic financial lifeline (confirmed in baseline) still faces implementation hurdles.

Operational picture (by sector)

Southern Axis (Herasymivka / Dnipropetrovsk)

The breach threat remains CRITICAL. The confirmed loss of the Mi-24 helicopter (location unstated, but high probability of occurring near a key axis of advance) marginally widens the operational window for the confirmed armored elements (5th Tank Bde, 37th GMRB) identified in the baseline report.

• Immediate Threat Status: The immediate air threat (air raid alert) over Zaporizhzhia City was lifted (14:30Z), but the regional missile danger remains, maintaining the pressure on GLOCs supporting the Herasymivka defense.
• RF Narrative Reinforcement: RF Vostok Group claims successful advances in "Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts" (14:08Z), explicitly signaling the area of greatest operational focus to the international community.

Eastern Axis (Donetsk / Krasnolymanske)

• Krasny Lyman IO: The RF claim of street fighting in Krasny Lyman (14:07Z) is assessed as high-value disinformation. UAF must confirm the integrity of defenses in this sector immediately. If this claim were true, it would necessitate a massive UAF operational response, diverting resources from the South.
• Tactical Claims: RF sources claim the destruction of UAF positions near Suvorovo (14:01Z), indicating continued high-intensity tactical attrition.

Northeast Axis (Sumy)

• Kinetic Expansion Confirmed: The confirmed UAV activity (14:17Z) follows the KAB strikes reported in the baseline sitrep. RF is executing a multi-layered air campaign designed to stretch UAF Air Defense (AD) capability thinly across the North, providing an advantage for the ground maneuver in the South.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

1. Window for Armored Exploitation Widening (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The loss of a crucial Mi-24 attack helicopter reduces UAF capacity for rapid, low-altitude interdiction strikes against an RF armored spearhead at Herasymivka. This loss reinforces the analytical judgment that the window for the MDCOA (Armored Breakout) remains wide and highly dangerous.

2. Strategic Level Information Operation (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The coordinated General Gerasimov briefing (14:02Z - 14:11Z) serves as a strategic IO to project RF confidence and erode Western support. Key themes: exaggerated territorial gains, inflated UAF losses, and political signaling regarding NATO expansion resistance (Hungary, US, Slovakia mentioned, 14:25Z).

3. Strategic Capability Upgrade (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF claim of deploying a new PVO-PRO division with S-500 systems (14:09Z) suggests a prioritization of strategic air defense modernization, potentially complicating future UAF long-range air strikes deep into RF territory.

Friendly activity (UAF)

1. Critical CAS Capacity Attrition (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The loss of the Mi-24 helicopter is a severe blow to the 12th OBRAA and UAF maneuver support. Priority must be given to locating replacement aircraft or augmenting ground-based anti-armor measures immediately in the potential path of the armored thrust.

2. Financial Implementation Risk (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): While the European agreement to use frozen assets is a strategic win, the NBU contingency planning (14:19Z) and the confirmed Belgian reservations (14:30Z) show the timeline for realizing this financial support remains fragile. Operational planning must account for potential delays in external budget support.

3. Diplomatic Mobilization (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Zelenskyy's meetings in Brussels (14:18Z, 14:30Z) emphasize the ongoing, high-level effort to coordinate security and peace guarantees with European partners (Spain, Belgium), counteracting RF efforts to undermine Western cohesion.

Information environment / disinformation

1. Amplification of Anti-Ukrainian Hybrid Warfare (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF media is leveraging the confirmed death of the 15-year-old girl in Sevastopol (14:18Z, 14:35Z) to maximize justification for current operations and portray UAF strikes as "barbaric," targeting civilian morale and international perception.

2. Focus on Long-Term Material Support (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): The report on Poland and Baltic states manufacturing anti-personnel mines (14:07Z) signals a major shift in long-term Western military support, providing mass-produced munitions for defensive operations, although framed by RF as aggressive NATO militarization.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

MLCOA (Most Likely Course of Action): UAV Fixation, Consolidation, and Artillery Preparation at Herasymivka. HIGH CONFIDENCE. RF will continue the synchronization effort: using UAVs/KABs to fix AD systems (Sumy, Odesa) while Vostok Group completes final positioning of the 5th Tank Bde and 37th GMRB west of the Gaychur River. The loss of the Mi-24 will embolden RF to complete these preparations with lower expected UAF CAS interference.

MDCOA (Most Dangerous Course of Action): Armored Breakout toward Dnipropetrovsk Border, supported by Information Diversion. HIGH CONFIDENCE. RF Vostok Group will likely execute the armored thrust before UAF can consolidate after the Mi-24 loss. The release of the highly dubious "Krasny Lyman street fighting" claim simultaneously suggests an intent to use IO to divert UAF intelligence focus and reserve allocation during the critical penetration phase in the South.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements