Situation Report

Situation Update (UTC)

DTG: 2025-12-18 12:30Z

Key updates since last sitrep

• (12:13Z, Operatyvnyi ZSU, HIGH) UAF Ministry of Defense confirmed a critical surge in C-UAS capability, increasing the daily supply of drone-interceptors to approximately 950 units per day in December, directly challenging RF UAV saturation tactics.
• (12:05Z, MoD Russia, HIGH) RF Zapad Group claimed success in thwarting a UAF counter-attack attempt west of Kupyansk using FPV assets, indicating high-intensity local combat and contested maneuver space in the Northeast Axis.
• (12:21Z, Colonelcassad, HIGH) RF confirmed the operational presence of the 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade maintaining continuous operations on the Kupyansk front, validating sustained RF commitment to the sector.
• (12:19Z, RBK-Ukraina, HIGH) Incident confirmed in Odesa involving physical assault by TCC (military recruitment center) personnel on a police officer. This creates immediate internal security friction within a crucial logistics hub.
• (12:19Z, STERNENKO, LOW) Unconfirmed report suggests the RF submarine previously struck by an SBU naval drone in Novorossiysk has begun to leak. If verified, this confirms persistent logistical strain on the RF Black Sea Fleet.

Operational picture (by sector)

Southern Axis (Dnipropetrovsk / Herasymivka)

The RF deep strike threat matrix remains active, targeting Dnipro, Kryvyi Rih, and Odesa. The most significant development is the massive scale-up of UAF C-UAS capacity (950 interceptors/day), which should immediately begin to degrade the effectiveness of the imminent RF UAV saturation strike (MLCOA from previous SITREP).

The internal security incident in Odesa (TCC/Police assault) is a localized issue but requires rapid resolution to prevent operational distraction and erosion of civil-military cooperation crucial for securing the Odesa logistics corridor.

Eastern Axis (Kupyansk)

Combat intensity remains HIGH. RF reporting confirms the continued presence of specialized maneuver units (27th SMRB) and an effective tactical drone response capability (Zapad Group) used to counter UAF ground movements west of Kupyansk. This contradicts the UAF goal of stabilizing the Kupyansk shoulder and suggests a costly, protracted attritional fight is ongoing in the city's western approaches.

Deep Operations / Maritime

UAF deep strike policy continues to be effective in creating attrition (Novorossiysk submarine leak, UNCONFIRMED). This pressure forces RF to commit resources far from the frontline, supporting the overall UAF strategy of multi-domain conflict.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

1. Kinetic Priority vs. UAF C-UAS (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF planners must now adjust their deep strike execution to account for the UAF's rapidly increasing counter-drone capability. The imminent UAV swarm strike is now vulnerable to massed electronic and kinetic interception. RF is expected to increase EW saturation to degrade C-UAS system effectiveness.

2. Kupyansk Focus (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF reports confirm sustained commitment to Kupyansk, suggesting RF views holding this ground as necessary to fix UAF forces and prevent the redeployment of Northern reserves to the critical Southern breach at Herasymivka.

3. Resource Strain (LOW-MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): Anecdotal evidence of low fundraising returns for an RF unit (12:04Z) suggests potential logistical or financial strain, which, if widespread, could impact RF force sustainment over the long term.

Friendly activity (UAF)

1. Technological Adaptation (CRITICAL): The introduction of interceptor drones at 950 units/day represents a decisive, strategic adaptation to the RF UAV threat. This capability must be rapidly integrated into AD sectors, particularly around key C2 nodes and the Herasymivka operational area.
2. Force Posture: UAF continues robust efforts in technological integration (93rd Brigade GRC forum/fundraising) and high-quality recruitment (147th DShV Brigade), focusing on quality and technical edge.
3. Command Integrity (CONCERN): The TCC-Police incident in Odesa requires immediate attention from J1/J3 to maintain discipline and prevent localized political vulnerability that RF information operations will exploit.

Information environment / disinformation

1. Internal Division Exploitation: RF state and affiliate media are utilizing both the Odesa civil-military incident and reporting on internal EU strife (Brussels protests, 12:17Z) to push narratives of UAF internal chaos and declining, distracted Western support.
2. Propaganda Focus: The RF MoD release claiming thwarting UAF counter-attacks near Kupyansk (12:05Z) aims to counter UAF claims of stabilizing the Northeast axis and boost morale among RF Zapad Group forces.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

MLCOA (Most Likely Course of Action): Maximum Kinetic Strike Saturation and EW Escalation. HIGH CONFIDENCE. RF will commit the currently identified UAV swarms NLT 1600Z, but with significantly increased EW support intended to neutralize the newly deployed UAF drone interceptors. The primary objective remains fixing UAF AD and C2 across the Southern Theatre of Operations (STO) prior to a potential armored push at Herasymivka.

MDCOA (Most Dangerous Course of Action): Targeted SEAD against UAF C-UAS Infrastructure. MEDIUM CONFIDENCE. If RF ISR confirms the effective deployment of the new interceptor capacity, RF may use high-value cruise missile or air-launched munitions (e.g., Kh-series missiles or KABs) to conduct high-precision strikes against known/suspected C-UAS production, assembly, or forward staging areas in Dnipropetrovsk and Sumy Oblasts, aiming to decapitate the new UAF defensive capability.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements