Situation Report

Situation Update (UTC)

DTG: 2025-12-18 11:37Z Assessment Focus: RF deep strike campaign is transitioning to execution phase across Central and Southern axes, coinciding with increased strategic ISR penetration into UAF operational depth and significant coordinated Western sanctions against key RF economic sectors.

Key updates since last sitrep

• (11:17Z, AFU Air Force, HIGH) New RF UAV groups detected inbound from the Black Sea, focused specifically on the critical logistical and maritime nodes of Zatoka, Ovidiopol, and Chornomorsk (Odesa Oblast).
• (11:08Z, AFU Air Force, HIGH) RF UAV reconnaissance confirmed moving deep into Poltava Oblast (near Pyriatyn) on a southwest vector, indicating a strategic ISR push targeting UAF depth and potential operational reserve staging areas.
• (11:25Z, Dnipropetrovsk OVA, HIGH) Official administrative warning issued confirming active enemy UAVs inbound toward Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, reinforcing the assessment of an imminent concentrated strike against Dnipro City.
• (15:38Z Dec 17, LSR, LOW) Pro-Ukrainian militia claimed interdiction (sabotage) of a key RF railway line supplying the occupied Zaporizhzhia Iron Ore Combine, a route allegedly used for military logistics transfer to Crimea. (UNCONFIRMED)
• (11:09Z, 11:10Z, TASS/ASTRA, HIGH) The UK and EU implemented synchronized, escalated sanctions against major RF energy firms (Tattneft, Russneft) and 41 vessels comprising the RF ‘shadow fleet.’

Operational picture (by sector)

Southern Axis (Herasymivka/Dnipropetrovsk/Odesa)

The most critical threat remains the coordinated air-ground operation focused on exploiting the Herasymivka breach.

1. Dnipropetrovsk (Deep Strike Execution): The immediate kinetic threat identified in the previous sitrep (UAV saturation strike on Dnipro C2/Logistics) remains active and confirmed by regional authorities (11:25Z). UAF air defense readiness is paramount.
2. Odesa (Logistics Interdiction): The new UAV vector targeting Zatoka/Chornomorsk (11:17Z) confirms RF intent to degrade or deny maritime access and key coastal infrastructure, which serves as a vital artery bypassing the inland logistical challenges (e.g., Artsyz power outage).
3. Zaporizhzhia: RF ISR confirmed operating south of Zaporizhzhia City (11:29Z). This activity supports the ongoing KAB campaign aimed at fixing UAF reserves and coordinating subsequent ground action. The claimed LSR railway interdiction, if verified, could temporarily complicate RF internal logistics redistribution in the occupied south.
4. Kherson: RF artillery maintains fixing fires on UAF positions along the Dnipro, specifically targeting Quarantine Island (11:28Z).

Central Axis (Poltava/Chernihiv/Kyiv)

RF is prioritizing ISR across strategic depth. The detection of a UAV moving southwest from Pyriatyn, Poltava Oblast (11:08Z), indicates RF is actively mapping potential corridors for UAF operational reserve movement or locating C2 nodes that manage the central-southern defense axis. This represents a potential precursor to deeper missile strikes designed to degrade UAF ability to rapidly reinforce the critical Southern flank.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

1. Kinetic Threat (Time-Sensitive): The massive, synchronized kinetic strike against Dnipropetrovsk City and Odesa coastal infrastructure is assessed as imminent (NLT 1600Z). The primary objective is achieving operational shock to facilitate ground exploitation at Herasymivka.

2. RF Hybrid Strategy: RF internal security forces are projecting success (FSB arrests of 19 alleged agents (11:35Z)), temporarily hindering UAF deep reconnaissance and intelligence collection critical for targeted strikes within RF territory or occupied zones.

3. Economic Pressure Absorption: The escalation of sanctions by the UK and EU targeting major RF energy companies and the "shadow fleet" (11:09Z, 11:10Z) aims to restrict RF’s ability to finance sustained warfare. RF will likely seek to mitigate this through non-conventional methods or increased pressure on global oil prices.

4. Domestic Cohesion Risk (RF): Reports of public appeals from occupied Mariupol residents directed at Putin regarding failure to provide housing (11:18Z) indicate significant domestic governance fragility in newly claimed territories, which UAF can leverage in psychological operations.

Friendly activity (UAF)

1. Air Defense Command and Control (C2): UAF AF command and control continues to demonstrate high efficacy in real-time threat detection across multiple domains (Black Sea, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk), providing maximum warning time for civil and military assets.
2. Civil Resilience Measures: The official rollout of the "112 Ukraine" emergency application (11:22Z, 11:28Z), designed to function without standard cellular service, demonstrates UAF command's recognition and mitigation strategy against RF communication strikes.
3. Diplomatic Support: EC President von der Leyen's commitment to finalizing Ukrainian financing at the current EU Summit (11:07Z) increases the probability of crucial financial support being confirmed within the tactical window.

Information environment / disinformation

1. Narrative Amplification (Draft Evasion): Pro-Kremlin channels are heavily circulating narratives focused on high rates of draft evasion and perceived hardship for Ukrainian refugees (11:31Z, 11:50Z). Assessment: This is a coordinated psychological operation (PsyOp) designed to undermine the morale of fighting forces and discourage mobilization efforts.
2. RF Governance Failure: The visible dissatisfaction and public protest from residents in occupied Mariupol provides strong counter-narrative material demonstrating RF reconstruction failures (11:18Z).

Outlook (next 6-12h)

MLCOA (Most Likely Course of Action): Maximum Kinetic Strike Saturation on Dnipro/Odesa C2/Logistics. HIGH CONFIDENCE. RF will commit the currently identified UAV swarms to a massed strike against Dnipro City and key Odesa maritime infrastructure (Chornomorsk/Ovidiopol) NLT 1600Z. The primary objective is to achieve immediate functional degradation of UAF response capacity in the Southern theatre.

MDCOA (Most Dangerous Course of Action): Armored Breakout at Herasymivka supported by SEAD. MEDIUM CONFIDENCE. Concurrent with the MLCOA, RF will initiate Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) operations targeting critical UAF AD systems in Dnipropetrovsk. Should UAF AD be successfully suppressed, RF heavy mechanized forces (MBTs/IFVs) will attempt a breakthrough at Herasymivka, aiming to achieve an operational exploitation toward the Dnipropetrovsk administrative border (NLT 1900Z).

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements