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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-18 11:07:17Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-18 10:37:14Z)

Situation Update (UTC)

DTG: 2025-12-18 11:15Z Assessment Focus: Escalated RF deep strike preparation against Dnipropetrovsk and continued fixing operations across Northern and Southern Axes.

Key updates since last sitrep

  • (11:00Z, AFU Air Force, HIGH) Multiple RF Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) detected converging on the Dniprovskyi district and Dnipro City from the East, South, and West, indicating preparation for a saturation strike targeting critical C2 or logistical nodes.
  • (10:42Z, 10:48Z, AFU Air Force, HIGH) Persistent RF UAV reconnaissance confirmed targeting Odesa Oblast near Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi and Ovidiopol, sustaining the threat to the critical Southern logistics corridor.
  • (10:34Z, STERNENKO, HIGH) RF border guards executed a confirmed border intrusion into Estonian territory for approximately 20 minutes, demonstrating willingness to engage in low-level, deniable hybrid provocations on the NATO flank.
  • (10:35Z, ASTRA, HIGH) RF Federal Security Service (FSB) claims the detention of 19 individuals across 12 Russian regions, alleging they operated a communications network for Ukrainian special services, suggesting a successful degradation of UAF deep intelligence/covert operations capability.
  • (10:52Z, 11:02Z, Poddubny/Kotsnews, MEDIUM) Reports indicate the EU intends to impose a 'Buy European' condition on potential loans secured by frozen Russian assets for Ukraine, potentially limiting UAF flexibility in procuring defense materials globally.

Operational picture (by sector)

Southern Axis (Herasymivka/Dnipropetrovsk/Odesa)

RF Vostok Group efforts are transitioning from general interdiction (KABs in Zaporizhzhia) to pinpoint strike preparation against operational command centers and logistical nodes in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

  1. Dnipropetrovsk Strike Imminent (HIGH Confidence): Converging UAV patterns on Dnipro City (11:00Z, 11:06Z) suggest an imminent, coordinated kinetic strike (likely UAV swarms, potentially followed by missile use) aimed at decapitating or paralyzing UAF defenses responding to the Herasymivka bridgehead.
  2. Odesa Logistics Threat (HIGH Confidence): Continuous UAV presence near Ovidiopol and Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi maintains pressure on the Southern rail/road network, reinforcing the existing logistics constraint caused by the Artsyz power outage (Previous Daily Report).
  3. Huliaipole Contact (UNCONFIRMED/LOW Confidence): RF sources claim localized fighting near Huliaipole (10:41Z), continuing the fixing efforts along the Zaporizhzhia LOC.

Eastern Axis (Kupyansk/Pokrovsk)

  1. Kupyansk Counter-Offensive Pressure: RF claims their UAVs thwarted a UAF counterattack attempt west of Kupyansk (10:58Z). This UNCONFIRMED claim suggests UAF forces remain engaged in aggressive tactical maneuvering to consolidate the 90% control achieved in Kupyansk (Previous Daily Report).

Northern Axis (Sumy/Chernihiv)

  1. Escalated ISR Deep Penetration (HIGH Confidence): RF UAV reconnaissance is detected moving deep into Chernihiv Oblast towards Baturyn/Bakhmach and toward the Poltava region via Varva (11:03Z). This is a strategic ISR push, likely tasked with locating UAF operational reserves that may be moving south to reinforce the Dnipropetrovsk sector, or to identify C2 nodes for future deep strikes.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

1. Immediate Kinetic Threat Shift (Dnipropetrovsk): The most critical threat in the immediate 6-hour window is the concentrated strike preparation against Dnipro City. RF is attempting to synchronize deep fire effects with maneuver pressure at Herasymivka.

2. Asymmetric/Hybrid Strategy (NATO Flank): The confirmed border intrusion into Estonia (10:34Z) serves as a low-cost, high-impact tactical distraction. This act tests NATO collective response mechanisms and consumes RF resources and attention, without requiring large-scale conventional commitment. This is assessed as a deliberate, calculated escalation.

3. Internal Security Success (RF): The reported neutralization of a UAF communication network by the FSB (10:35Z) suggests a temporary improvement in RF internal security posture and a setback for UAF deep intelligence capabilities, which could degrade UAF ability to execute deep strike targeting (e.g., Rostov).

Friendly activity (UAF)

  1. Early Warning Success (HIGH Confidence): UAF Air Force has demonstrated robust early warning detection capabilities, successfully identifying multiple, simultaneous UAV vectors heading towards critical areas (Odesa, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk). This is crucial for enabling timely activation of air defense systems and ensuring P2 gap tasking can be implemented.
  2. Tactical Defenses Holding (Kupyansk): UAF forces maintain pressure on RF units west of Kupyansk, suggesting effective stabilization and counter-maneuver capabilities in the Eastern Axis, preventing RF from freeing up significant reserves for transfer south.

Information environment / disinformation

  1. Economic Coercion and Disunity Narrative (HIGH Confidence): Pro-Kremlin channels are successfully leveraging the EU's "Buy European" conditionality (10:52Z, 11:02Z) and the threat of RF counter-confiscation ($127bn) to amplify two themes: 1) Western aid is conditional and self-serving, and 2) RF possesses viable retaliation options, deterring EU action on frozen assets.
  2. Consolidation of Power (RF Domestic): Preparations for Putin's "Year-End" summary (10:46Z) and minor domestic legislation (11:04Z) are used to project an image of internal stability and routine governance, contrasting with the conflict environment.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

MLCOA (Most Likely Course of Action): Massive Coordinated UAV/Missile Strike on Dnipro Axis. HIGH CONFIDENCE. RF will execute a high-volume, multi-domain kinetic strike on Dnipropetrovsk City (NLT 1700Z) utilizing the currently identified UAV swarms. The primary objective is the functional degradation of the UAF operational reserve staging areas and logistics/C2 networks that govern the defense of the Herasymivka breach. Failure to neutralize the air threat could lead to significant operational loss.

MDCOA (Most Dangerous Course of Action): Immediate Armored Insertion at Herasymivka concurrent with Dnipro Strike. MEDIUM CONFIDENCE. Should the air strike successfully degrade UAF air defense or C2 capacity in Dnipropetrovsk, RF Vostok Group forces will immediately exploit the window of operational shock by committing Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) and heavy mechanized formations across the Gaychur River (P1 trigger) to achieve an operational breakout toward the Dnipropetrovsk border (NLT 1900Z).

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

PriorityGap DescriptionRequirement / TaskingRationale
P1 (CRITICAL)Confirmation of heavy armor (MBT/IFV) crossing the Gaychur River at Herasymivka.GEOINT/ISR (Southern Command): Continuous monitoring for heavy tracks, MBT/IFV concentrations, or pontoon bridge construction west of the river.Provides the trigger for committing strategic reserves and validates the MDCOA timeline.
P2 (CRITICAL)Assessment of intended RF targets in the Dniprovskyi district and Dnipro City given the converging UAV activity (11:00Z, 11:06Z).TECHINT/HUMINT (Central Command): Identify RF targeting patterns based on UAV type/trajectory; Pre-position counter-battery/air defense assets based on likely critical infrastructure (e.g., rail junctions, known C2 bunkers).Anticipates the immediate kinetic threat and allows for pre-emptive defense of critical nodes. (ACTIONABLE: Prepare AD for saturated attack on Dnipro)
P3 (URGENT)BDA verification of damage to military C2 or troop staging areas from the confirmed Zaporizhzhia KAB strikes (previous sitrep).IMINT/HUMINT (Central Command): Assess specific damage to military C2 structures or key troop concentrations in the identified strike zones.Quantify the tactical success of the RF deep interdiction campaign and determine immediate resource shortfalls for refitting/repositioning.
P4 (PRIORITY)Identification of specific RF units involved in the recent Estonian border intrusion (10:34Z).HUMINT/OSINT/SIGINT (Northern/Diplomatic): Identify markings, unit insignia, and command structure of the RF border guard elements involved.Determines if the intrusion was a local error, a rogue unit action, or directed by a specific RF military/intelligence formation.
Previous (2025-12-18 10:37:14Z)

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