Situation Update (UTC)
DTG: 2025-12-18 10:06Z
Key updates since last sitrep
- (10:02Z, GSZSU, HIGH) RF aviation confirmed widespread airstrikes across nine locations in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts, targeting rear areas including Kushuhum, Svyatopetrivka, and Pokrovske, sustaining the deep interdiction campaign aimed at fracturing the Southern defense.
- (09:42Z, 09:53Z, UA Sources, HIGH) Three Russian border guards breached NATO member Estonian territory for approximately 20 minutes, confirming a specific, low-level hybrid security incident on the NATO flank.
- (09:55Z, AFU Air Force, HIGH) A UAV was detected southwest of Pryluky (Chernihiv region), moving southwest, indicating continued RF airborne reconnaissance or strike asset movement in the North.
- (09:46Z, Colonelcassad, MEDIUM) RF FPV drone struck a local vehicle refueling station (AZS) in Druzhkivka (Donetsk Oblast), confirming sustained kinetic targeting of UAF tactical logistics infrastructure in the Eastern rear.
- (09:48Z, БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС, HIGH) A Russian serviceman deserted following documented severe physical abuse and extortion (1 million RUR demand) by a Company Deputy Commander ("Zampolit"), indicating acute, localized erosion of RF command discipline and troop cohesion.
- (09:52Z, Операция Z, HIGH) Pro-RF channels corroborated earlier reports that European Commission President Von der Leyen insists the EU Summit will not conclude until financing for Ukraine is resolved, stabilizing the near-term strategic financial outlook for UAF.
Operational picture (by sector)
Southern Axis (Herasymivka/Zaporizhzhia/Dnipro)
RF kinetic operations are fully aligned with the predicted MLCOA: deep interdiction to degrade C2 and reserve maneuver capacity prior to armored commitment at the Gaychur River.
- Deep Strike Execution (HIGH Confidence): The confirmed air strikes (10:02Z) against Pokrovske, Pidhavrylivka, Bratske (Dnipropetrovsk), Svyatopetrivka, and Kushuhum (Zaporizhzhia) target the immediate staging and C2 nodes supporting UAF forces attempting to contain the Herasymivka bridgehead. This action attempts to prevent timely reinforcement or counter-attack planning.
- Information Operations: RF Vostok Group confirms active PSYOPs focused on Huliaipole (10:00Z), suggesting Huliaipole is identified as a key defensive position or junction point targeted in the immediate operational plan.
Eastern Axis (Donetsk/Kharkiv)
RF maintains fixing operations through persistent ground assaults and tactical interdiction behind the Line of Contact (LOC).
- LOC Clashes (HIGH Confidence): GSZSU reports confirm continuous fighting in high-priority sectors: Siversk and Kostiantynivka operational directions (10:03Z). This is a standard RF effort to prevent UAF reserves from being shifted to the critical Southern axis.
- Tactical Logistics Interdiction (MEDIUM Confidence): The FPV strike on the Druzhkivka AZS (09:46Z) demonstrates RF capability and intent to target tactical fuel and lubricant (F&L) nodes well beyond the artillery engagement zone, increasing friction on UAF motorized movements.
- Kharkiv Targeting: Civilian infrastructure in the Borivska community continues to be struck (09:47Z).
Northern Axis (Chernihiv/Sumy)
RF activity is limited to ISR and deep-strike staging.
- UAV Detection (HIGH Confidence): The detection of a UAV southwest of Pryluky (09:55Z) signals active reconnaissance against key railway nodes or air defense systems protecting Central Ukraine. This area is critical now that the Artsyz logistics corridor is functionally severed.
Enemy activity / threat assessment
Threat Level: CRITICAL (Focus on Operational Paralysis prior to Armored Breakthrough)
1. Kinetic Priority Shift Confirmation: The confirmed, multi-point aviation strike package (10:02Z) across two Oblasts validates the shift in RF prioritization: maximizing deep kinetic effects against rear-area C2 and logistics to enable the breakthrough at Herasymivka with minimal UAF opposition. This is highly synchronized operations.
2. Internal Command Strain (Acute): The detailed reporting of severe physical abuse, high-level extortion (1 million RUR), and desertion within RF command elements (09:48Z) suggests that low troop morale is being compounded by active command failure and criminal activity, likely degrading the effectiveness of deployed units significantly over time.
3. Hybrid Provocation (Estonian Border): The deliberate 20-minute border breach by RF border guards in Estonia (09:42Z) serves as a persistent, low-grade tactical threat intended to test NATO reaction times, confirm surveillance patterns, and divert strategic focus from the Ukraine conflict. This warrants immediate NATO liaison reporting.
Friendly activity (UAF)
- C2 and Reporting Resilience: UAF General Staff (GSZSU) demonstrated timely and detailed reporting (10:02Z) on incoming RF kinetic activity, indicating effective Battle Damage Assessment and awareness despite the high tempo of strikes.
- Sustainment Certainty: Confirmation of the immediate EU financial resolution (09:52Z) provides crucial planning stability for long-term UAF force generation and equipment procurement.
- Morale and Social Cohesion: UAF and Ministries are actively reinforcing social support systems (Winter Support, 10:01Z) and promoting veterans' affairs (09:43Z), counteracting RF attempts to erode internal cohesion.
Information environment / disinformation
- PSYOPS Targeting Mobilization (HIGH Confidence): RF propaganda is aggressively pushing the narrative of inevitable "women's mobilization" using imagery of political figures (09:59Z). This is a deliberate attempt to increase stress and fear within the Ukrainian populace regarding conscription.
- Militarization of Youth (HIGH Confidence): RF reporting on the massive success of the "Zarnitsa 2.0" youth military-patriotic organization (10:00Z) highlights the institutional focus on preparing the next generation for conflict, reinforcing the RF objective of a long-term war footing.
- Targeted Digital Propaganda: The confirmed PSYOP by Vostok Group near Huliaipole (10:00Z) shows direct alignment between information operations and kinetic/maneuver goals.
Outlook (next 6-12h)
MLCOA (Most Likely Course of Action): Sustained Air Interdiction and Bridgehead Fortification.
HIGH CONFIDENCE. RF forces will maintain high-volume strikes (KABs/missiles) targeting the confirmed strike areas in Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia (NLT 1600Z) to suppress UAF reaction forces. Simultaneously, ground units at Herasymivka will maximize forward deployment of fire support and tactical air defense to secure the existing 1km bridgehead, preparing the crossing point for heavy armor insertion.
MDCOA (Most Dangerous Course of Action): Coordinated Armored Thrust utilizing Air Superiority Effects.
MEDIUM CONFIDENCE. If RF ISR confirms significant disruption to UAF C2 or logistics via the recent strikes, RF Vostok Group will likely commit mechanized and armor elements across the Gaychur River (NLT 1400Z). The objective would be to exploit the temporary operational paralysis created by the deep strikes, pushing rapidly toward the Dnipropetrovsk administrative border.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
| Priority | Gap Description | Requirement / Tasking | Rationale |
|---|
| P1 (CRITICAL) | Confirmation of heavy armor (MBT/IFV) crossing the Gaychur River at Herasymivka. | GEOINT/ISR (Southern Command): Continuous monitoring for heavy tracks, MBT/IFV concentrations, or pontoon bridge construction west of the river. | Provides the trigger for committing strategic reserves and validates the MDCOA timeline. |
| P2 (CRITICAL) | Status of diesel locomotive capacity and operational feasibility on the Artsyz rail line. | J4 Logistics/TECHINT: Determine if immediate deployment of diesel traction is viable or if track/signal damage is extensive enough to halt all rail traffic. | Assess the effectiveness of the RF logistics denial and determine UAF supply constraint severity following power loss. |
| P3 (URGENT) | BDA verification of damage to military C2 or troop staging areas from the confirmed Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia strikes (10:02Z). | IMINT/HUMINT (Central Command): Assess specific damage to military C2 structures, major fuel/ammo depots, or key troop concentrations in the identified strike zones. | Quantify the tactical success of the RF deep interdiction campaign and determine immediate resource shortfalls. |
| P4 (PRIORITY) | Identification of units/platforms used in the kinetic interdiction strike at Druzhkivka (09:46Z). | TECHINT (Eastern Command): Collect debris/video evidence to identify the specific FPV drone model and launch methodology targeting the tactical fuel node. | Assess RF adaptation and range extension of cheap FPV assets for rear-area targeting. |