Archived operational intelligence briefing
DTG: 2025-12-18 07:06Z
The anticipated massed armored thrust from the 1km bridgehead west of the Gaychur River (MLCOA in previous sitrep) has not been confirmed within the immediate 6-12 hour window (06:36Z, RF sources claiming quiet night). However, localized combat continues, highlighted by RF claims of destroying a UAF armored vehicle during a counterattack attempt (07:00Z). This suggests UAF forces are maintaining pressure on the bridgehead through localized counter-mobility and reconnaissance. The lack of immediate heavy armor movement may indicate a tactical delay by Vostok Group, not cancellation, pending optimal weather or further preparatory fires.
The Eastern front remains characterized by sustained, high-attrition contact. The Pokrovsk direction (Krasnoarmeysk) continues to absorb the highest volume of engagements (38/134). RF Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirms the commitment of dedicated heavy artillery assets (27th Motorized Rifle Division) to this direction (07:02Z), reinforcing the assessment that RF is attempting to widen the salient or fix significant UAF reserves here, preventing their relocation South.
RF kinetic activity persists in Kharkiv Oblast (06:41Z). The detection of new UAV infiltration towards Chernihiv/Sedniv (06:44Z, 06:48Z) suggests RF is attempting to exploit gaps or saturated zones in UAF Air Defense following the 82-UAV attack, targeting deep rear areas supporting the northern shoulder.
Threat Level: CRITICAL (Maneuver, Information Operations)
UAF operations focus on maintaining defensive integrity in the East (Pokrovsk) and executing localized counter-mobility operations to prevent RF breakout at Herasymivka (implied by RF counter-mobility claims, 07:00Z). UAF Air Defense remains highly active in the Northern zone (06:44Z). The critical challenge remains managing strategic reserves: resisting the strong temptation to move assets to seal the immediate breach at Herasymivka until heavy RF armor commitment is confirmed, while simultaneously sustaining high-volume defense in Pokrovsk.
The political environment is significantly destabilized by reports of high-level, possibly back-channel, peace talks (06:38Z, 07:03Z). This may signal that RF is attempting to achieve a political objective (i.e., negotiations based on current control lines) simultaneous to maximizing military gains at Herasymivka. The narrative suggests external pressure or internal division, and UAF spokesmen must maintain a unified line reinforcing the commitment to territorial integrity.
MLCOA (Most Likely Course of Action): Armored Assault at Herasymivka (Delayed). HIGH CONFIDENCE. RF Vostok Group will likely launch the heavy armored assault from the Gaychur River bridgehead between 0900Z and 1200Z. The initial window for the thrust (aligned with the previous air attack) appears to have been missed or postponed. RF forces will aim to execute the maneuver before noon, minimizing exposure of the armored spearhead to UAF heavy fire in the afternoon light.
MDCOA (Most Dangerous Course of Action): Deep Strike against Kyiv/Central C2. MEDIUM CONFIDENCE. Following the initial targeting of Northern (Chernihiv) rear areas, RF utilizes residual long-range assets (e.g., Kalibr, Iskander) to execute a synchronized strike on a high-value command node or government target in Kyiv/Central Ukraine, aiming to maximize political shock concurrent with the diplomatic signaling (Miami talks) and the kinetic push in the South.
| Priority | Gap Description | Requirement / Tasking | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| P1 (CRITICAL) | Confirmation of heavy armor (MBTs/IFVs) crossing the Gaychur River bridgehead at Herasymivka. | ISR: Task all available high-resolution assets (SAR, EO) for continuous, high-frequency surveillance of the 2km radius west of Herasymivka. | Confirmation of the armored crossing is the critical trigger for committing UAF operational reserves to prevent an operational breakthrough. |
| P2 (CRITICAL) | Verification and precise location of the UAF counterattack attempt claimed by RF Vostok Group (07:00Z). | ISR/SIGINT: Attempt to geolocate the video footage and correlate with UAF unit movement reports to confirm the immediate tactical situation and specific location of the UAF forward defensive line near Herasymivka. | Crucial for validating UAF tactical stability and reserve positioning. |
| P3 (URGENT) | Specific targets and damage assessment in the Chernihiv/Sedniv area following new UAV infiltration (06:44Z). | IMINT/HUMINT: Deploy rapid assessment teams/UAVs to confirm the impact on C2 or logistics hubs in the Northern Operational Zone. | Assess if RF deep strike capacity is successfully degrading logistics supporting the Northeast axis defense. |
| P4 (PRIORITY) | Specificity and substance of the reported unofficial high-level political meetings (Miami talks). | HUMINT/OSINT (Diplomatic): Monitor diplomatic reporting channels to determine if these talks reflect a substantive shift in RF objectives or are purely exploratory political theater. | Necessary for national security posture and managing the Information Environment. |
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