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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-18 06:36:48Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-18 06:06:30Z)

Situation Update (UTC)

DTG: 2025-12-18 06:36Z

Key updates since last sitrep

  • (06:35Z, AFU Air Force, HIGH) Ukrainian Air Defense forces successfully intercepted or suppressed 63 out of 82 total Russian Federation (RF) UAVs launched in a recent mass attack. Approximately 50 of the inbound targets were Shahed-type drones.
  • (06:10Z, Оперативний ЗСУ, HIGH) RF Navy units scuttled multiple barges at the entrance to the Novorossiysk military harbor, creating a physical barrier to prevent the ingress of Ukrainian Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs). This confirms RF high concern regarding UAF naval drone capabilities.
  • (06:35Z, Colonelcassad, MEDIUM) RF 11th Guards VVS PVO Army is conducting fixed-wing close air support, dropping unguided ordnance ("cast iron" bombs) on UAF positions within the Vostok Group's Area of Responsibility (AOR). This supports the assessment of continued high-tempo combat in the Southern Axis.
  • (06:16Z, Два майора, HIGH) RF security services (MVD/FSB) reported preventing a terrorist attack in Volgodonsk, Rostov Region, involving a 10kg Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and the arrest of a suspect. This highlights RF focus on securing internal territory against claimed sabotage.

Operational picture (by sector)

Southern Axis (Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia/Naval)

The operational center of gravity remains the tactical breach west of the Gaychur River near Herasymivka (baseline context).

  1. Herasymivka/Gaychur River: RF Vostok Group operations are ongoing and supported by dedicated close air support utilizing 'dumb' bombs (06:35Z). This fire support directly correlates with the predicted timing for the armored breakout attempt. The 82-UAV saturation attack overnight likely intended to fix UAF air defense assets and disrupt C2 in the rear, providing cover for the maneuver force preparation.
  2. Naval/Black Sea: The physical barricading of the Novorossiysk military harbor (06:10Z) represents a decisive, resource-intensive measure by the RF Black Sea Fleet to protect high-value naval assets. While this action limits UAF USV penetration, it also bottlenecks access to the main port facilities, potentially complicating RF logistics and redeployment if the barrier is not easily removed.

Eastern Axis (Pokrovsk/Siversk)

General picture stable. The identified Vostok Group air activity (06:35Z) may be located further north in the Pokrovsk sector or southwest of Donetsk, but the general indicator is continued high-attrition warfare in the East/South-East. No new indicators regarding the Siversk objective in this reporting cycle.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Level: CRITICAL (Maneuver, Deep Strike)

  1. Deep Strike Volume (CRITICAL Threat): The use of 82 total UAVs (including 50 Shaheds) confirms RF maintains the capacity and intent to conduct large-scale, coordinated saturation attacks against rear areas and critical infrastructure. While UAF air defense performance was high (63 suppressed), the sheer volume strains resources and forces wide dispersal of AD assets.
  2. Maneuver Support (HIGH Confidence): Vostok Group is confirming the preparatory phase for the armored thrust by utilizing dedicated, high-intensity close air support (06:35Z). This action reinforces the previous assessment that the launch of the heavy armor breakout is imminent, utilizing the advantage conferred by the 1km bridgehead established at Herasymivka.
  3. Naval Force Protection Adaptation (HIGH Confidence): The RF defensive measure at Novorossiysk demonstrates that UAF USV operations have successfully altered RF naval doctrine and forced the commitment of significant resources to passive defense. This validates UAF targeting strategy in the maritime domain.

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF Air Defense forces maintained high readiness during the recent mass UAV attack, achieving a success rate of approximately 76.8% (63 intercepts/suppressions out of 82 total targets) (06:35Z). This defensive success mitigated significant damage in rear operational areas, which was the probable target of the synchronized deep strike campaign. Friendly forces must capitalize on the logistical issues caused by the Artsyz outage (baseline context) while RF forces are preoccupied with the maneuver phase at Herasymivka.

Information environment / disinformation

  1. RF Counter-Terrorism Narrative (HIGH Threat): RF channels are exploiting the claimed prevention of a terrorist attack in Volgodonsk (06:16Z) to project internal security competence and justify increased domestic surveillance and control.
  2. Anti-Western Influence Operations (LOW Confidence/HIGH Threat): A claim attributed to Seymour Hersh suggests the US seeks 50% of revenue from Ukraine reconstruction companies (06:33Z). This uncorroborated, third-party claim disseminated by RF sources is specifically designed to erode Ukrainian public confidence in the integrity and motives of key international partners.
  3. Domestic Surveillance (HIGH Confidence): The requirement by the FSB for the Ministry of Digital Development to establish a unique numbering database (06:17Z) indicates a further tightening of RF digital and population control measures, likely in reaction to perceived internal threats related to the conflict.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

MLCOA (Most Likely Course of Action): Armored Assault at Herasymivka. HIGH CONFIDENCE. RF Vostok Group will attempt to execute the armored breakout from the 1km bridgehead west of the Gaychur River. The preparatory steps (artillery surge anticipation, concurrent deep strikes, dedicated air support) are all in place. RF intent is to exploit the breach before UAF operational reserves can decisively relocate from the Northern or Eastern axes.

MDCOA (Most Dangerous Course of Action): Operational Bypass and Logistics Cut. MEDIUM CONFIDENCE. RF utilizes mobile forces from Herasymivka to bypass the main UAF forward defensive line, driving rapidly north-west toward key logistics nodes or C2 centers near the Dnipropetrovsk administrative border, specifically aiming to interdict the E-W road network (T0401/T0408) that supports the Velyka Novosilka defense.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

PriorityGap DescriptionRequirement / TaskingRationale
P1 (CRITICAL)Confirmation of heavy armor (MBTs/IFVs) crossing the Gaychur River bridgehead at Herasymivka.ISR: Task all available high-resolution assets (SAR, electro-optical, HUMINT) for near real-time tracking of movement W of the Gaychur River, 2km radius of Herasymivka.Confirmation of the armored crossing is the critical trigger for committing UAF operational reserves to prevent an operational breakthrough.
P2 (CRITICAL/NEW)Status of critical RF logistical/fuel transit capacity at Novorossiysk following the defensive scuttling of barges.IMINT/GEOINT: Analyze commercial satellite imagery of the Novorossiysk military/commercial port entrance to determine the degree of restriction on normal vessel traffic.Assess impact on RF sustainment and naval readiness resulting from their own defensive measures.
P3 (URGENT)Specific target locations of the 82-UAV mass attack.SIGINT/ELINT/ISR: Correlate air defense intercepts with potential target sets (e.g., C2 facilities, logistics hubs, rear repair depots, or power generation facilities in Zaporizhzhia/Dnipropetrovsk).Determine RF prioritization for disruption ahead of the Herasymivka thrust.
P4 (PRIORITY)Indicators of force generation movement towards the Siversk axis.ISR/SIGINT: Maintain prioritization of the Luhansk occupied rear area to detect bulk troop or materiel movements (Class V/III) indicative of massing for the Siversk objective (as designated by RF political leadership).Prepares UAF J3 for potential rapid redeployment to counter RF strategic shift.
Previous (2025-12-18 06:06:30Z)

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