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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-18 02:06:25Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-18 01:36:24Z)

Situation Update (UTC)

DTG: 2025-12-18 02:06Z

Key updates since last sitrep

  • (01:54Z, UAF AF, HIGH): Russian Federation (RF) forces conducted confirmed Guided Aerial Bomb (KAB) launches targeting Donetsk Oblast. This expands the high-payload glide bomb campaign geographically, confirming RF intent to utilize KAB saturation across the entire Eastern Operational Area (Donetsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia).
  • (01:58Z, TASS, HIGH): The RF has formally patented technology for a new low-observable (stealth) strike Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). This does not represent an immediate operational capability but signals a critical long-term technological focus aimed at defeating current UAF air defense networks.
  • (02:00Z, Colonelcassad, HIGH): Documented delivery of supplies (masking nets, warm gear) via the MOO "VECHE" organization confirms sustained NGO-facilitated logistical support for RF forward units, indicating robust morale and sustainment efforts.

Operational picture (by sector)

The current operational phase continues to be dominated by the RF deep strike campaign designed to set optimal conditions for the imminent ground maneuver assault at Herasymivka. UAF Air Defense (AD) assets are now confirmed to be actively engaged across four separate geographical axes (Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kharkiv/Sumy, and now Donetsk).

SOUTHERN AXIS (Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia)

  • Herasymivka Bridgehead: The critical operational window for the anticipated heavy armored assault (MLCOA) remains NLT 0300Z (T-minus 54 minutes). All available indicators suggest RF forces are maximizing deep strikes to fix UAF operational reserves and degrade C2 integrity prior to the breach attempt.
  • Logistics Corridors: BDA for the Mykolaiv energy strike (PIR 105) and Odesa strike (PIR 101) remains critical and pending, impacting the Southern Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) stability.

EASTERN AXIS (Donetsk)

  • KAB Engagement: The expansion of KAB strikes into Donetsk Oblast represents a critical escalation. These munitions pose a significant threat to UAF operational depth, potentially targeting rear assembly areas, forward logistics nodes, or heavy artillery positions supporting the defense of Pokrovsk and Siversk.

NORTHEAST AXIS (Kharkiv/Sumy)

  • KAB activity remains monitored. This sector, alongside the newly targeted Donetsk sector, confirms the RF strategy of geographically stretching UAF AD capabilities away from the decisive point in the Southern Axis.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

1. Deep Strike Synchronization (CRITICAL THREAT): (HIGH Confidence) RF forces have successfully widened the theater of conflict using deep strikes, now utilizing KABs to apply pressure along the entire main contact line and associated rear areas (Donetsk included). This confirms the synchronization goal: maximize operational friction against UAF AD and C2 immediately preceding the Herasymivka ground attack. The deep strike complex (UAV/Missile/KAB) is intended to achieve operational paralysis in UAF reserve deployment decisions.

2. Herasymivka Ground Assault (IMMINENT THREAT): (HIGH Confidence) The armored breakout remains the Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA). The increase in kinetic activity across other sectors confirms the RF's application of the principle of mass and economy of force, using deep strikes to hold UAF attention on secondary axes while preparing the decisive thrust in Dnipropetrovsk.

3. Long-Term Technological Threat (Future Capability): (MEDIUM Confidence) The confirmed patenting of the low-observable UAV indicates that RF research and development is prioritizing technologies designed to overcome current UAF AD effectiveness, particularly against slower, longer-range strike platforms. UAF AD acquisition and development must adapt to this emerging stealth threat profile.

4. Logistics Sustainment (RF): (HIGH Confidence) Continuous NGO support deliveries mitigate potential logistics strain on Russian formal military channels, confirming redundancy in sustainment, particularly for low-cost, high-volume items (nets, clothing).

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF forces are facing increasing pressure across the AD network. The confirmed KAB launches on Donetsk require immediate resource allocation and defensive shifting, further complicating the readiness posture for the impending ground conflict in the South. Strategic reserves remain fixed, awaiting confirmation of PIR 74 (Heavy Armor crossing at Herasymivka). Maintaining C2 integrity under the current deep strike saturation is the primary operational objective until the ground assault is initiated.

Information environment / disinformation

The information environment continues to feature routine RF state media attempts to project external global instability (e.g., TASS report on US actions in the Pacific) and domestic propaganda focused on morale and civilian support for the conflict (MOO VECHE supply deliveries). There are no new indicators of high-impact tactical deception operations specifically masking the Herasymivka threat.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The next 60 minutes are decisive for the Southern Operational Area.

1. Herasymivka Ground Assault (0300Z - 0400Z): (HIGH Confidence) The MLCOA remains an armored thrust across the Gaychur River. If PIR 74 is satisfied, UAF decision-makers must execute the reserve commitment plan. The intensity of fighting in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast will immediately rise to CRITICAL.

2. Deep Strike Maintenance (0200Z - 0500Z): (HIGH Confidence) RF will sustain the high rate of deep strikes utilizing KABs, missiles, and UAVs, maximizing geographical saturation (including Donetsk) to maintain the current paralyzing effect on UAF response. Targets will likely continue to focus on infrastructure (Mykolaiv, Odesa) and rear C2/logistics (Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk).

3. Decision Point/Reserve Commitment: (HIGH Confidence) Commitment of strategic reserves to the Southern Axis will likely occur NLT 03:30Z, assuming confirmation of heavy armor movement. Delaying reserve commitment beyond 0400Z risks RF operational exploitation of the bridgehead.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

The core gap (PIR 74) is now approaching its critical NLT time. New gaps pertain to quantifying the effects of the expanded deep strike campaign.

PriorityGap DescriptionCollection Requirement (CR)Target Area / DTG
PIR 74 (CRITICAL)Visual confirmation of heavy armor (MBTs/IFVs) crossing the Gaychur River into the Herasymivka bridgehead.CR: ISR/FMV. Persistent drone surveillance of known crossing points.Herasymivka / IMMEDIATE (NLT 0300Z)
PIR 107 (NEW - Deep Strike Effects)Identification and BDA of specific targets hit by KABs in Donetsk Oblast. Assessment of impact on UAF operational depth (e.g., C2 nodes, artillery parks).CR: UAF Air Def Report/IMINT. Focus on confirmed impact points.Donetsk Oblast / IMMEDIATE
PIR 105 (CRITICAL - Infrastructure Threat)Functional status assessment of the damaged Mykolaiv energy infrastructure (substation/power plant) and impact on rail and civilian supply.CR: Utility Reports/HUMINT/IMINT.Mykolaiv Oblast / NLT 0300Z
PIR 108 (NEW - Long-Term Threat Assessment)Detailed technical specifications and funding allocation for the recently patented RF low-observable strike UAV.CR: OSINT/TECHINT. Monitoring RF defense procurement reporting and technical forums.RF Research & Development / Long-Term
Previous (2025-12-18 01:36:24Z)

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