Situation Report

Situation Update (10:35Z, 17 DEC 2025)

Key updates since last sitrep

• Herasymivka Control Confirmed (RF): RF Ministry of Defence (MoD) released video confirmation of Vostok Group forces in Herasymivka (Dnipropetrovsk region), reinforcing the assessment that the bridgehead west of the Gaychur River is secured and being exploited (10:19Z, MoD Russia, HIGH Confidence - based on corroboration).
• Zaporizhzhia Residential Strikes: UAF sources confirm three enemy strikes impacting Zaporizhzhia City and District, resulting in damage to two residential buildings (10:23Z, 10:25Z, UAF/OVA, HIGH Confidence). This follows the reported KAB saturation campaign.
• Active UAV Threat: UAF Air Force detected a UAV approaching Zaporizhzhia City from the south, indicating immediate and ongoing targeting and suppression efforts against the city (10:20Z, AF UAF, HIGH Confidence).
• RF Cyber Security Incident: Hackers successfully penetrated a working session of the developer responsible for Russia's unified military service register, suggesting a significant compromise of RF mobilization planning infrastructure (10:34Z, МОБИЛИЗАЦИЯ, MEDIUM Confidence - supported by DS analysis).
• Unconfirmed SAU Loss (Sumy): RF claimed the destruction of two UAF 2S1 Gvozdika Self-Propelled Artillery Units (SAUs) in the Sumy border region via specialized attack drones, linking the action to buffer zone expansion (10:11Z, Поддубный, LOW Confidence - UNCONFIRMED).

Operational picture (by sector)

SOUTHERN AXIS (Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia):

• Herasymivka Bridgehead (Exploitation Phase): RF control is validated by their MoD (10:19Z). The immediate operational threat is the transition from light infantry holding action to the deployment of heavy engineering assets necessary for a sustained heavy armor crossing (PIR 1 remains CRITICAL). RF is currently establishing local security and air defense coverage.
• Deep Fires and Suppression: The continued aerial activity and confirmed strikes on Zaporizhzhia City (10:23Z-10:30Z) are assessed as preparatory fires and logistics interdiction, designed to fix UAF operational reserves and degrade the C2 capability necessary for an organized counter-attack on Herasymivka.
• Huliaipole: Pro-RF reporting highlights continued activity around Huliaipole (10:32Z). This is analyzed as a dedicated fixing operation by the RF Vostok Group to draw UAF attention away from the primary breakthrough axis at Herasymivka.

EASTERN AXIS (Northern Sector/Sumy):

• RF claims successful suppression of UAF artillery units in the Sumy border area (10:11Z). While unconfirmed, this aligns with the broader RF strategy of degrading UAF capacity across the northern front to prevent resource redeployment to the critical Southern Axis.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

1. Enemy Intent: Tactical Consolidation: RF operational intent is clearly focused on consolidating the Herasymivka bridgehead (Gaychur River). The synchronization of confirmed deep strikes on Zaporizhzhia with the Vostok Group's ground efforts indicates an immediate aim to paralyze UAF response capabilities.

2. Cyber Warfare Adaptation: The demonstrated vulnerability of the RF mobilization register development process (10:34Z) suggests the conflict’s cyber domain remains highly active. Successful penetration of sensitive systems can impact RF long-term troop generation capacity and introduces intelligence gathering opportunities.

3. Fire Priority (Zaporizhzhia): The targeting of civilian residential infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia (10:23Z-10:30Z) underscores the RF strategy of employing terror and precision strikes simultaneously. The immediate threat (10:20Z) of incoming UAVs requires UAF AD assets to maintain maximum readiness in the city sector.

Friendly activity (UAF)

• Situational Awareness: UAF Air Force maintains excellent real-time detection capabilities for incoming asymmetric threats (UAVs 10:20Z).
• Public Information Integrity: UAF Regional Military Administrations (OVA) provided rapid, corroborated reporting on the damage in Zaporizhzhia, maintaining C2 integrity and mitigating RF disinformation effectiveness regarding strike locations.

Information environment / disinformation

• Strategic Distraction/Morale Degradation: RF IO efforts are focused on high-impact disinformation, including falsely quoting CINC Zaluzhnyi about an imminent "Civil War" (10:17Z) to sow internal discord.
• Exploitation of Tactical Gains: The official RF MoD presentation of Herasymivka (10:19Z) is calculated to project overwhelming momentum to both domestic and international audiences, capitalizing on tactical success to achieve strategic information effects.
• Narrative Control (Odesa): RF sources are actively linking UAF failures to defend infrastructure (Odesa strikes) with perceived UAF failures in other areas ("Promised blackout in Moscow, got one in Odesa" 10:07Z).

Outlook (next 6-12h)

MLCOA (Heavy Equipment Preparation): (HIGH Confidence) RF will maintain continuous protective fire and utilize localized air defense systems within the Herasymivka bridgehead area. The immediate operational priority is to deliver heavy engineering assets (pontoon bridge components or fixed bridge materials) to the Gaychur River crossing point, likely concealed by electronic warfare (EW) and localized smoke screens. UAF must initiate intense counter-battery and drone interdiction missions against this specific area.

MDCOA (Immediate Armor Probe): (MEDIUM Confidence) If local UAF reserves are fixed or disorganized by the current strike campaign in Zaporizhzhia, RF Vostok Group may launch a limited, mechanized armored probe directly north from Herasymivka (West of the Gaychur), testing the integrity of the UAF secondary defense line before the full heavy brigade deployment. This move would necessitate an immediate, heavy UAF reserve commitment.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

The core threat remains the exploitation of the Southern Flank bridgehead by heavy armor.