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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-17 09:06:09Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-17 08:36:16Z)

Situation Update (09:05Z, 17 DEC 2025)

ANALYST NOTE: The enemy is formally integrating Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) into strategic capabilities, evidenced by the creation of a specialized Drone Service within the RF Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN). This institutionalization indicates an intent to increase the precision and coordination of deep strikes, potentially augmenting the current KAB/Missile campaign against UAF infrastructure and high-value targets. Tactical pressure continues in the North (Sumy) and against UAF support infrastructure in the East (Druzhkivka).

Key updates since last sitrep

  • RVSN Integrates UAS Capability: The Russian Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN) have formally established a Drone Systems Service, signaling the organizational institutionalization of UAVs for strategic reconnaissance and support (08:57Z, Poddubny, MEDIUM).
  • Northern UAV Pressure Maintained: A UAV was tracked inbound to Sumy from the north, confirming the continued multi-domain air threat following the expansion of KAB launches into this region (08:42Z, AF UAF, HIGH).
  • GSChS Struck in Donetsk: An RF FPV drone struck State Emergency Service personnel in Druzhkivka, Donetsk Oblast, injuring four employees (08:55Z, ASTRA, HIGH). This confirms focused RF targeting against UAF civil support and rear area resilience.
  • Odesa Sea Threat Abatement (Temporary): Local UAF sources report a temporary cessation of the immediate, direct threat from the sea approaching Odesa (08:59Z, Vanek, MEDIUM). However, UAVs are still active east of Odesa, moving north inland (08:45Z, AF UAF, HIGH).
  • Critical Counter-Intelligence Success: Ukrainian authorities detained a suspected FSB agent operating within the UAF Defense Forces (09:00Z, Prosecutor General, HIGH).

Operational picture (by sector)

SOUTHERN AXIS (Odesa/Zaporizhzhia):

  • Odesa Corridor (GLOCs): While the immediate maritime threat from UAVs is reportedly negative, the threat remains HIGH as UAVs are confirmed inbound inland, indicating a shift in approach vectors or targets away from the immediate coastal ports (Ovidopol/Dalnyk).
  • Zaporizhzhia Flank: Localized fighting includes successful RF counter-drone operations (RF claim, 09:00Z). The key terrain around Gerasymivka (PIR 33) remains unconfirmed, preventing a full assessment of the Dnipro rear flank stability.

EASTERN AXIS (Donetsk):

  • Donetsk Rear Area: The FPV strike on GSChS in Druzhkivka (08:55Z) demonstrates RF capability and intent to utilize tactical drones for precision targeting of non-combatant support functions well behind the immediate frontline, further degrading UAF ability to sustain civilian life and repair vital infrastructure.

NORTHERN AXIS (Sumy/Kharkiv):

  • UAV activity confirmed against Sumy (08:42Z) maintains the pressure profile across this newly expanded target zone, forcing continued deployment of mobile air defense units away from critical Eastern/Southern sectors.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

1. Strategic Force Modernization (CRITICAL): The RVSN’s creation of a dedicated Drone Systems Service marks a significant RF military reform. This organizational change formalizes the use of UAVs (likely reconnaissance and target acquisition platforms) to support the Strategic Missile Forces. This poses an elevated threat to stationary UAF assets and infrastructure, as deep strikes may now benefit from enhanced BDA and terminal guidance derived from RVSN-controlled UAVs.

2. Attrition and Sustainment: UAF claims of 1,730 personnel losses (08:47Z) suggest RF assault density is extremely high. However, RF reconnaissance troops in Zaporizhzhia are publicly appealing for financial support (09:02Z), indicating severe decentralized logistical shortfalls despite aggressive central offensive planning.

3. Information and Influence Operations (IO): RF and proxies are aggressively pushing narratives focused on:

  • Escalation Risk: Lukashenko’s statement warning of a new Russian mobilization if the conflict escalates (08:41Z) is a direct IO targeting Western decision calculus.
  • Diplomatic Deadlock: Confirmation that security guarantees are "unacceptable" to Russia (08:53Z), coupled with reports of Hungarian PM Orban appealing to Putin regarding frozen assets (09:04Z), highlights the RF goal of projecting strategic resolution and driving wedges between EU member states and Ukraine.

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF defensive operations are maintaining high attrition rates against RF forces (1,730 personnel, 33 artillery systems lost). The successful counterintelligence operation, leading to the detention of an FSB agent, is a critical operational success that protects command integrity and force security. UAF General Staff (GS ZSU) re-validated the successful deep strike against the Slavyansky Refinery (08:44Z), sustaining pressure on RF logistics chains.

Information environment / disinformation

The Information Environment is currently weaponizing strategic narratives:

  1. Infrastructure Degradation: UAF reporting on scheduled nationwide power cuts (08:39Z) confirms the tangible, operational impact of RF strikes on the energy grid, which feeds into domestic anxiety.
  2. Internal Security Projection: RF state media amplified a "foiled terror plot" in Rostov (08:40Z, 09:03Z), specifically targeting Central Asian migrants, likely as part of a campaign to justify increased domestic control and security measures.
  3. Political Influence: Circulation of imagery connecting former US President Trump and President Putin (09:01Z) is intended to seed doubt regarding long-term U.S. commitment and future policy stability among UAF allies.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The immediate kinetic outlook is driven by managing the systemic air threat and verifying ground stabilization.

MLCOA (Enhanced Precision Attrition): (HIGH Confidence) RF forces will leverage the new organizational structure (RVSN Drone Service) to enhance targeting precision for deep strikes, likely focusing on command nodes, fixed logistics hubs, and critical infrastructure identified via UAV reconnaissance. UAV swarm tactics will continue against Sumy and Odesa inland routes, aiming to fix UAF AD assets. Ground combat in the Pokrovsk salient and Zaporizhzhia will remain high-intensity attrition warfare.

MDCOA (Targeted Air Campaign): (MEDIUM Probability) Following RVSN integration, RF launches a highly coordinated strike package utilizing newly enhanced target acquisition data (UAV/SIGINT fusion). This strike attempts to neutralize one or more key AD systems, leading to localized air superiority that facilitates a large-scale KAB bombardment of UAF forward positions or key reserves areas.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

The organizational shift in RF RVSN requires immediate analysis to determine technological and doctrinal impact. The Southern Flank status remains critically ambiguous.

PriorityGap DescriptionCollection Requirement (CR)Target Area / DTG
PIR 35 (CRITICAL - NEW)Doctrine and specific capabilities of the newly formed RF RVSN Drone Systems Service.CR: SIGINT/COMINT/OSINT. Identify specific drone types (e.g., heavy lift, MALE, reconnaissance) and operational protocols (e.g., C2 structure).RF Strategic Assets / IMMEDIATE
PIR 33 (CRITICAL - REITERATED)Verification of RF control over Gerasymivka and tactical implications on the Gaychur River bridgehead.CR: GEOINT/HUMINT. UAF frontline reporting and ground force confirmation/denial.Zaporizhzhia/Dnipro Flank / IMMEDIATE (NLT 1200Z)
PIR 17 (CRITICAL - REFINED)Quantify operational impact of ongoing UAV strikes on Odesa GLOCs, especially inland routes and key rail/road intersections north of the city.CR: UAF DAMAGE ASSESSMENT/AD EXPENDITURE. Focus shifted to inland logistics nodes rather than just maritime approaches.Odesa Oblast / NLT 1400Z
PIR 36 (PRIORITY - NEW)Confirmation of targeting criteria for FPV drone usage against soft targets (GSChS, civilian infrastructure) in the Eastern rear.CR: BDA/GEOINT. Determine frequency and location patterns of FPV strikes >10km from the Line of Contact (LOC).Donetsk Oblast (Druzhkivka, Pokrovsk Rear) / NLT 1800Z
Previous (2025-12-17 08:36:16Z)

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