Archived operational intelligence briefing
The operational picture remains dominated by the RF attrition campaign, which has been synchronized across strategic depth overnight, directly supporting the anticipated ground maneuver on the Southern Axis.
SOUTHERN AXIS (Dnipropetrovsk/Odesa): The strategic rear areas remain the primary kinetic focus. The confirmation of strikes in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (05:48Z) sustains the threat profile identified previously against Nikopol/Marhanets (PIR 17). Odesa also remains targeted, confirming the continuation of the logistics strangulation strategy against Southern GLOCs. The lack of new reporting on the Peschanoye bridgehead suggests RF forces are consolidating positions and continuing fire preparation, delaying the heavy armor insertion (PIR 1).
EASTERN AXIS (Donetsk - Kramatorsk/Sviatohirsk): RF preparatory strikes hit Kramatorsk (05:48Z), the strategic C2 and logistics hub for the sector. The mandatory evacuation from Sviatohirsk (05:53Z) suggests RF forces are making tactical gains or preparing for a localized offensive thrust in the northern Donetsk region. This complements the existing fixing operations in the Pokrovsk and Vremyevskoe directions.
NORTHERN AXIS (Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy): The inclusion of Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy in the confirmed strike list indicates RF intent to maintain broad strategic pressure and compel UAF to disperse Air Defense assets theater-wide, reducing density over key southern sectors. The strikes likely targeted C2 or energy infrastructure supporting these regions.
1. Enemy Capabilities and Intentions (Strategic Attrition Phase): RF intent is HIGHLY likely to be focused on achieving decisive effect through the systematic degradation of UAF energy resilience and logistical capacity before committing ground forces at Peschanoye.
2. Logistics and Sustainment: RF claims targeted successful hits on "BK (ammunition) depots," which, if confirmed, would severely impact UAF operational tempo in the sectors affected by the strikes (Kramatorsk, Dnipropetrovsk).
1. Critical Geopolitical Vulnerability (HIGH Confidence): The simultaneous reporting across various channels regarding the US pressure on the EU to abandon the use of frozen Russian assets (€210 billion) is the most significant development in the information environment. This represents a potential strategic rupture in the unified financial sanctions front and threatens a major source of long-term UAF financing. DS Analysis supports the hypothesis of disagreement on asset utilization between US influence (Trump) and the EU.
2. Psychological Operations (RF): Pro-RF sources are amplifying the Sviatohirsk evacuation to suggest UAF military failures and instability in key Donetsk positions ("nothing was threatened," 05:53Z), attempting to undermine local morale and confidence in UAF leadership.
The primary operational focus for the next six to twelve hours (until 1200Z) will be the assessment of damage from the overnight strikes and potential follow-up enemy fire missions targeting identified vulnerable infrastructure.
MLCOA (Assessment and Secondary Attrition): (HIGH Confidence) RF forces will dedicate the next period to Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) of the overnight strikes, especially in Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa, to determine if the kinetic suppression was sufficient to support the main effort. Expect follow-up missile/UAV launches targeting non-essential repairs or newly identified C2/logistics nodes. Fixing operations in Vremyevskoe and the northern Donetsk area (Sviatohirsk) will continue to consume UAF tactical attention.
MDCOA (Strategic Financial Erosion): (HIGH Impact, MEDIUM Probability) The geopolitical conflict regarding frozen assets escalates immediately. If the US pressure forces key EU nations (Germany, France) to publicly waver on the asset expropriation plan, the strategic outlook for UAF financing shifts dramatically negatively. This political success for the Kremlin could have greater long-term impact than a tactical breach on the front line.
The immediate requirement is to quantify the effectiveness of the widespread RF deep strikes and verify the specific nature of the tactical threat necessitating the Sviatohirsk evacuation.
| Priority | Gap Description | Collection Requirement (CR) | Target Area / DTG |
|---|---|---|---|
| PIR 1 (CRITICAL) | Confirmation of RF heavy armor (MBTs, IFVs) crossing or bridging equipment deployment West of the Gaychur River at Peschanoye. (Unchanged, remains paramount) | CR: ISR PERSISTENCE. Maintain persistent IR/thermal sensor coverage over crossing points and staging areas. | Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Peschanoye) / PERSISTENT (0600Z - 1900Z) |
| PIR 17 (CRITICAL - REFINED) | BDA status of critical infrastructure (energy/logistics nodes) in Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa Oblasts following confirmed overnight strikes. | CR: UAF DAMAGE ASSESSMENT/SIGINT. Determine the operational impact of targeted strikes on UAF combat power and readiness. Assess vulnerability of UAF staging areas and reserve deployment points near Nikopol. | Dnipropetrovsk/Odesa Oblasts / IMMEDIATE (0600Z - 1200Z) |
| PIR 26 (NEW/PRIORITY) | Specific RF unit movement or fire intensity driving the mandatory evacuation from Sviatohirsk. | CR: TACTICAL ISR/HUMINT. Determine if this is a response to localized maneuver (advance/flanking) or extreme indirect fire/KAB usage. | Sviatohirsk/Northern Donetsk / NLT 1200Z |
| PIR 27 (NEW/STRATEGIC) | Formal diplomatic stance of key EU nations (Germany, France) regarding the US pressure on frozen Russian assets. | CR: OSINT/HUMINT (DIPLOMATIC). Monitor key statements from EU leaders and US officials following the Politico report for confirmation of shifting intent. | Brussels/Major European Capitals / PERSISTENT |
We only use optional analytics cookies if you allow them. Necessary cookies stay on for sign-in and site security.
Learn more in our Privacy Policy.