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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-17 05:36:09Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-17 05:06:11Z)

Situation Update (05:35Z, 17 DEC 2025)

Key updates since last sitrep

  • New UAV Threat (Nikopol Direction): Enemy UAVs were detected originating from the east in Zaporizhzhia Oblast and actively tracking towards Nikopol. This places direct kinetic pressure on rear area logistics and staging grounds north of the Gaychur River operational zone. (05:02Z, Air Force of Ukraine, HIGH)
  • Southern Flank Fixing Operation Confirmed: RF Vostok Group (36th Army) is utilizing UAVs to systematically target UAF personnel and communication assets in the Vremyevskoe direction. This confirms ongoing fixing operations intended to draw UAF attention away from the primary axis at Peschanoye. (05:30Z, Воин DV, HIGH)
  • Deep Battle Claim: The RF Ministry of Defense claimed the interception of 94 Ukrainian fixed-wing UAVs overnight. While the number is likely inflated, it confirms UAF maintenance of a robust deep strike capability and indicates a major overnight sortie. (05:04Z, ASTRA, MEDIUM)
  • Diplomatic Friction (EU/Hungary): Hungary has blocked the annual European Union statement regarding enlargement concerning Ukraine, signalling internal diplomatic vulnerabilities within the EU structure. (05:29Z, РБК-Україна, HIGH)
  • Strike Casualties (Zaporizhzhia): Enemy strikes resulted in six civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia city, confirming persistent RF focus on urban attrition targeting deep into the oblast. (05:10Z, Zaporizhzhia OVA, HIGH)

Operational picture (by sector)

The operational picture remains dominated by the anticipated RF ground maneuver on the Southern Axis, currently preceded by a sustained, multi-domain attrition campaign leveraging aerial assets.

SOUTHERN AXIS (Peschanoye/Gaychur River): The ground maneuver remains delayed (CR P1 UNMET), but RF preparatory fires are escalating. The immediate threat has shifted slightly northwards with the detection of UAVs moving towards Nikopol. This area is critical for UAF lateral supply and staging. RF fixing operations are confirmed in the Vremyevskoe direction (Vostok Group, 36th Army), providing cover for the main effort's preparations. Kryvyi Rih (rear area) remains secure (05:34Z).

EASTERN AXIS (Pokrovsk Direction): RF activity continues to serve a fixing purpose. Pro-RF sources confirm successful retrospective analysis of gains in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration, indicating RF intent to maintain persistent, attritional pressure here to prevent UAF reserve reallocation southward.

NORTHERN AXIS (Sumy): Multiple enemy UAVs are reported circling the Sumy area (05:03Z). This is assessed as a potential reconnaissance effort, possibly probing UAF defenses or confirming targets in relation to the previously unconfirmed presence of proxy forces (CR P3 context).

Enemy activity / threat assessment

1. Enemy Capabilities and Intentions (Attrition Phase): RF intent remains focused on achieving decisive effect through fire superiority before committing heavy armor. The current activity confirms the execution of the MLCOA (Sustained Attrition).

  • UAV Deployment: RF is employing coordinated UAV attacks targeting both the immediate tactical rear (Vremyevskoe) and deep rear staging areas (Nikopol), confirming the critical role of drones in shaping the current attrition phase.
  • Vostok Group (36th Army): The confirmation of this unit utilizing UAVs in the Vremyevskoe direction reinforces the assessment that the Southern flank is being secured and fixed by dedicated RF maneuver elements.

2. Logistics and Sustainment: RF dependence on auxiliary fundraising (110th Brigade appeal, 05:03Z) indicates ongoing reliance on non-state sources for unit sustainment, a known characteristic of the current conflict posture.

3. Deep Battle Assessment: UAF deep strike activity remains HIGH, evidenced by the RF claim of intercepting 94 UAVs. This confirms UAF is successfully penetrating RF AD layers, maintaining strategic pressure despite defensive losses.

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF Air Force is exercising effective early warning, detecting and tracking critical UAV threats moving towards Nikopol and Sumy.

  • Counter-Attrition: UAF continues its strategic attrition campaign (Deep Strikes), forcing RF to dedicate significant AD assets to homeland defense.
  • Diplomatic Maneuver: UAF diplomatic corps is actively promoting tighter economic sanctions against Russia, notably supporting a new sanctions bill in the US Senate targeting oil revenue (05:19Z).

Information environment / disinformation

1. Strategic Alignment (Russia/China): Moscow and Beijing are collaborating on shared digital information strategy, focusing on countering perceived 'fake news' and promoting 'objective information' on Western social media platforms (YouTube, X). This confirms a deepening strategic alignment in the cognitive domain, designed to subvert Western narratives (05:34Z).

2. Political Warfare (US/EU Focus): The information space is saturated with attempts to undermine Western unity and decision-making stability:

  • US Internal Instability: Disinformation regarding sensationalized statements by former President Trump (Venezuela blockade, Putin intentions) is circulating rapidly, aiming to introduce doubt regarding future US policy stability and commitment (05:10Z-05:12Z).
  • EU Disunity: Hungary’s blockade of the EU enlargement statement is immediately amplified by pro-Ukrainian sources (05:29Z) as confirmation of Moscow-aligned obstructionism within key Western institutions.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The primary threat remains Sustained Kinetic Attrition targeting UAF C2 and logistic depth areas.

MLCOA (Targeted Attrition and Fire Shaping): (HIGH Confidence) RF forces will focus the remaining pre-noon window (0600Z - 1200Z) on suppressing key UAF support infrastructure in the Nikopol region using UAVs and long-range fires (260th GRAU, pending CR P17 status). This suppression effort is designed to sanitize the operational depth immediately north of the confirmed Peschanoye bridgehead, preparing the ground for the armor crossing NLT 2000Z. Fixing operations in Vremyevskoe and Pokrovsk will continue to consume UAF tactical reserves.

MDCOA (Air Assault/Drone Swarm on Nikopol): (MEDIUM Confidence, Increasing) The detection of UAVs moving towards Nikopol suggests RF may attempt a high-density drone swarm followed by a limited, localized air assault (via hexacopters/rotary wing assets) targeting a critical logistics node or C2 post near Nikopol to achieve a sudden tactical surprise and degrade UAF ability to react to the eventual Gaychur crossing.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

The immediate requirement is to track the newly identified UAV threats and confirm the effectiveness of the RF fixing operation in the Vremyevskoe sector.

PriorityGap DescriptionCollection Requirement (CR)Target Area / DTG
PIR 1 (CRITICAL)Confirmation of RF heavy armor (MBTs, IFVs) crossing or bridging equipment deployment West of the Gaychur River at Peschanoye.CR: ISR PERSISTENCE. Maintain persistent IR/thermal sensor coverage over crossing points and staging areas. Focus remains on detecting heavy engineering movement.Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Peschanoye) / PERSISTENT (0600Z - 1900Z)
PIR 17 (CRITICAL - REFINED)Target intent and BDA status of ongoing kinetic activity directed against the Nikopol/Marhanets area.CR: SIGINT/AD ASSET REPORTING. Determine the specific nature and volume of the UAV/Artillery threat currently moving toward Nikopol. Assess vulnerability of UAF staging areas and reserve deployment points.Nikopol District / IMMEDIATE (0600Z - 0900Z)
PIR 24 (NEW/PRIORITY)Specific force disposition and intensity of the Vostok Group's fixing operations in the Vremyevskoe direction.CR: TACTICAL ISR. Confirm if the UAV usage is preparatory for a larger tactical probe or solely for fixing UAF attention and attrition.Vremyevskoe Direction / NLT 1000Z
PIR 25 (NEW/PRIORITY)Classification and intent of the UAV activity circling the Sumy region.CR: ELINT/RADAR TRACKING. Determine if UAVs are reconnaissance (Orlan-10) or strike (Shahed variants) to assess the threat to northern GLOCs.Sumy Oblast / IMMEDIATE
Previous (2025-12-17 05:06:11Z)

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