Situation Report

Situation Update (UTC 04:05Z, 17 DEC 2025)

Key updates since last sitrep

• Peschanoye Ground Trigger Delay: As of 04:05Z, there is NO CONFIRMATION of RF heavy armor (PIR 1) crossing the Gaychur River bridgehead, despite the previous assessment that ground maneuver was imminent (NLT 0430Z). The high-intensity fire preparation (KAB strikes) assessed earlier has not yet transitioned into the anticipated maneuver phase. (04:05Z, Analyst Judgment, HIGH)
• Continued VDV Readiness Signaling: The RF VDV channel ("Дневник Десантника") posted fresh operational and training footage (04:01Z, RF Source, MEDIUM). This reinforces the assessment of high operational readiness and continues the Information Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) for a major ground action.
• UAF Deep Strike Confirmed (Krasnodar): The operational headquarters in Krasnodar Krai reported two civilian casualties resulting from an attack (03:54Z, ASTRA, MEDIUM). This confirms a successful UAF deep strike operation against the RF rear. (UNCONFIRMED target type).
• RF Diplomatic Reprioritization: The Russian MFA officially confirmed structural changes and a strategic foreign policy shift, naming Africa as the new global vanguard (03:48Z, TASS, HIGH). This signals long-term strategic reorientation away from perceived Western dependency.

Operational picture (by sector)

The operational picture remains dominated by the anticipated RF ground maneuver in the Southern Axis. The time window for the assessed MLCOA (Heavy Armor Insertion) is closing (0430Z trigger), making the current lull in kinetic ground activity a critical monitoring period.

SOUTHERN AXIS (Peschanoye): RF forces continue the IPB phase (Information and Fire preparation). The lack of heavy armor movement across the Gaychur River by 04:05Z suggests RF Command may be waiting for optimal BDA from the earlier KAB strikes (PIR 17) or consolidating initial light/infantry elements before committing the decisive armored force. The threat remains CRITICAL.

DEEP BATTLE (RF Rear): The confirmed casualties from a UAF strike in Krasnodar Krai demonstrate continued UAF reach and ability to disrupt RF logistics and C2 deep behind the front lines. This forces the RF to commit AD assets to protecting non-combat zones.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

The primary threat remains the imminent heavy armor exploitation maneuver. The current non-kinetic phase is likely being utilized for final coordination of fire support and movement orders.

1. Heavy Armor Maneuver (CRITICAL HIGH, IMMINENT): The delay in the observed ground trigger (PIR 1) does not negate the high probability of immediate action. RF Vostok Group has completed extensive preparatory fire (KAB saturation) and media signaling. The delay may be a tactical hold pending final BDA, not an abandonment of the operation.

• Assessment: The previous NLT 0430Z initiation window remains highly probable.
• Adaptation: The continued high-profile VDV social media activity (04:01Z) may indicate an effort to maintain psychological pressure while the ground force executes final staging or movement, masking the decisive moment.

2. Deep Strike Vulnerability (RF): The confirmed incident in Krasnodar Krai (03:54Z) confirms RF vulnerability in the deep rear. If this was a successful strike on critical military/logistics infrastructure (e.g., fuel depot, airbase staging area), it may slightly impact the operational timeline for the Vostok Group maneuver, though this impact is currently unquantifiable.

3. Intent (Psychological and Political): RF information operations are aggressively targeting both UAF cohesion (Zaluzhny rumors) and projecting strength/relevance abroad (Africa pivot). This aims to distract from tactical failures and normalize the strategic shifts required by sanctions pressure.

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF forces are sustaining offensive pressure in the cognitive domain and retaining deep strike capacity.

1. Strategic Counter-Pressure: UAF channels are effectively amplifying positive Western diplomatic and strategic decisions (Trump's actions on Venezuela blockade, US sanctions proposal previously reported), supporting the goal of isolating the RF regime financially and politically.
2. ISR POSTURE: All ISR assets must maintain the saturation posture requested in PIR 1. The delay is an opportunity for UAF assets to refine targeting data on staging areas or observe the initiation of pontoon bridge construction/heavy armor assembly.

Information environment / disinformation

The Information Environment (IE) is characterized by a concerted RF effort to shift domestic and international narratives away from the grinding conflict in Ukraine, coupled with direct political influence operations.

• RF Political Attacks: The use of former SBU personnel to push narratives about the political intentions of UAF military leadership (Zaluzhny, 03:40Z) is a classic influence operation aimed at generating friction between UAF political and military bodies.
• Strategic Distraction: The high-level announcement of an Africa-centric foreign policy shift (03:48Z) attempts to reposition Russia as a global power broker, dampening the narrative of strategic isolation resulting from the Ukraine conflict.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The 0430Z trigger point for ground maneuver at Peschanoye is the immediate decision marker. If the maneuver is delayed past 0500Z, the assessment of RF intent may need to shift from Immediate Exploitation to Extended Attrition.

MLCOA (Heavy Armor Insertion and Exploitation, Revised Timeline): (HIGH Confidence) RF forces will initiate the heavy armor maneuver at Peschanoye between 0400Z and 0500Z, having concluded that the KAB attrition was sufficient to suppress UAF reaction capabilities. This maneuver will prioritize rapid breach of the immediate UAF defensive layer and exploitation toward logistical hubs.

MDCOA (Extended Attrition Campaign): (MEDIUM Confidence) If the BDA review indicates insufficient suppression of UAF artillery or reserve concentration, RF Command will hold the heavy armor and commit to a sustained, high-intensity fires campaign (using KABs, high-caliber artillery, and increased UAV sorties) for the remainder of the 6-12h window, attempting to force the commitment of UAF reserves under unfavorable conditions.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

The immediate verification of RF heavy armor movement remains the top priority. The nature of the UAF deep strike in Krasnodar must be determined to assess potential cascading effects on RF capacity.