Situation Report

Situation Update (UTC 02:08Z, 17 DEC 2025)

This report assesses the expansion of RF kinetic strike vectors across the Southern AO, forcing critical UAF Air Defense Command (ADCOM) asset reallocation ahead of the anticipated RF ground maneuver at Peschanoye.

Key updates since last sitrep

• New UAV Vector (Mykolaiv): A new UAV track has been confirmed moving towards Mykolaiv from the North (01:47Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH). This represents a fifth simultaneous kinetic threat vector, further stressing UAF AD resources and coverage.
• RF IO Shift (Economic Focus): RF state media (TASS) has initiated a new domestic narrative emphasizing economic resilience, reporting a 26% annual wage increase for couriers (01:49Z, TASS, HIGH). This likely serves as domestic information preparation, stabilizing the home front amid ongoing conflict.

Operational picture (by sector)

The operational picture is defined by RF attempts to maximize UAF AD saturation via widely dispersed UAV strikes, preparing the way for ground maneuver exploitation on the Southern flank.

SOUTHERN AXIS (Mykolaiv): The detection of a UAV approaching Mykolaiv from the North (01:47Z) introduces a critical and immediate threat to key port facilities, military depots, and infrastructure supporting the Odesa/Zaporizhzhia command zones. This threat is concurrent with the coastal UAV track toward Pivdenne/Chornomorske.

SOUTHERN AXIS (Dnipropetrovsk / Peschanoye): The baseline threat of RF force massing and anticipated exploitation of the Gaychur River bridgehead remains the primary operational concern (PIR 1). The ongoing, geographically expanded kinetic strikes are assessed as the final phase of preparatory fires designed to disrupt UAF C2 and logistical response capabilities before the ground push.

LOGISTICS CORRIDORS (Poltava / Odesa): The status of previous UAV attacks on Poltava (rail/fuel) and Pivdenne/Chornomorske (port infrastructure) remains unconfirmed (PIR 15, PIR 16). The success or failure of these interdiction strikes will define the immediate viability of UAF logistics sustainment in the coming 6-12 hours.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

1. Kinetic Saturation Strategy Expansion: RF C2 demonstrates continued high synchronization capability by simultaneously managing four distinct UAV attack vectors (Poltava, Chernihiv vector, Odesa coast, and now Mykolaiv). The addition of the Mykolaiv vector is a direct tactical effort to stretch UAF AD coverage thin, specifically targeting assets that may have been relocated to counter the Odesa coastal threat. (HIGH Confidence)

2. Threat to Mykolaiv HVTs: The UAV trajectory (from the North) suggests targets may include C2 nodes, maintenance facilities, or fuel depots within the Mykolaiv perimeter, vital for fueling operations along the entire Southern Front. (MEDIUM Confidence)

3. Information Preparation of the Battlefield (IPE): RF IO is pivoting its focus. Following attempts to degrade international confidence in Kyiv, the TASS report on economic stability (01:49Z) is a deliberate effort to counter Western narratives of RF economic collapse and maintain domestic support for the protracted conflict. This stabilizes the RF domestic base ahead of potentially high-casualty ground maneuvers. (HIGH Confidence)

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF ADCOM faces immediate, difficult resource prioritization choices driven by RF synchronization:

1. AD Prioritization: AD assets must be immediately redeployed or tasked to intercept the new UAV threat vector approaching Mykolaiv (01:47Z). This redirection inevitably reduces AD density in other critical zones (e.g., Poltava or the anticipated maneuver area near Peschanoye).
2. C2 & Sustainment Defense: UAF forces must focus on hardening logistics hubs and C2 facilities in the Mykolaiv/Odesa area against confirmed inbound threats while maintaining ISR saturation over the Peschanoye bridgehead.

Information environment / disinformation

The RF propaganda apparatus is utilizing a diversified strategy, running parallel narratives of Western fatigue (external focus) and domestic prosperity (internal focus).

• Objective: By highlighting robust wage growth in sectors like logistics, RF aims to normalize the high operational tempo and high demand for labor caused by the war economy, portraying it as organic "growth" rather than military mobilization stress.
• Counter-Action Required: UAF information operations must monitor and counter this narrative shift, focusing instead on the strategic costs (e.g., loss of skilled labor to military demand) rather than selective economic metrics.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The immediate outlook suggests RF is concluding its kinetic preparation phase across the Southern Theater, setting conditions for the ground action at Peschanoye.

MLCOA (Ground Probing and Continued Interdiction): (HIGH Confidence) RF forces will conclude the Mykolaiv, Poltava, and Pivdenne UAV strike series. The period following the conclusion of the strikes (estimated NLT 0300Z) will be used to conduct small-scale reconnaissance-in-force or probing attacks at Peschanoye to test UAF reserve response times, particularly if AD assets were successfully redirected elsewhere.

MDCOA (Immediate Armor Insertion at Peschanoye): (MEDIUM Confidence) If the combined, geographically diverse UAV strikes (including the new Mykolaiv vector) lead to significant kinetic BDA against UAF logistical or AD depots, RF Vostok Group could initiate immediate heavy armor crossing at Peschanoye. This exploitation window is maximized when UAF ADCOM is stretched thin managing BDA and asset reallocation.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

The introduction of the Mykolaiv vector creates a new, urgent gap regarding RF target prioritization in the Southern AO.