Situation Report

Situation Update (UTC 01:40Z, 17 DEC 2025)

This report integrates multi-domain intelligence to assess the ongoing RF deep strike effort and its synchronization with the anticipated ground maneuver at Peschanoye. The current operational tempo is defined by the diversification of RF kinetic targets, testing UAF Air Defense Command (ADCOM) resource limits.

Key updates since last sitrep

• Odesa Coastal Threat (NEW VECTOR): A new inbound UAV group, confirmed tracking from the Black Sea, is targeting the Pivdenne/Chornomorske coastal area (01:27Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH). This confirms sustained RF operational focus on maritime logistics and port infrastructure.
• UAF Deep Strike Confirmed (Krasnodar): UAV debris impacts were confirmed in the Slavyansky district of Krasnodar Krai, resulting in civilian casualties and damage to private residences (01:05Z, TASS, HIGH). This validates UAF persistent strike capability against RF rear infrastructure.
• RF IO: Political Degradation Narrative: Russian state media amplified claims, citing an ex-SBU employee, that the West is showing "signs of draining Zelensky," a psychological operation designed to undermine internal and external confidence in UAF leadership (01:32Z, TASS, HIGH - concerning propaganda intent).

Operational picture (by sector)

The operational picture is characterized by RF kinetic synchronization across four simultaneous UAV vectors designed to maximize AD asset exhaustion ahead of the Peschanoye maneuver exploitation.

SOUTHERN AXIS (Dnipropetrovsk / Peschanoye): No new intelligence has resolved the critical threat of RF ground maneuver initiation at Peschanoye (PIR 1). RF forces remain postured for exploitation following the conclusion of the deep strike phase (estimated NLT 0200Z). Heavy ISR saturation remains the priority.

ODESA COASTAL AXIS (Pivdenne/Chornomorske): This is the newly confirmed immediate kinetic threat. The UAV group tracking from the Black Sea toward Pivdenne/Chornomorske (01:27Z) targets critical port infrastructure and maritime export capability, following up on the successful interdiction of the Zatoka area reported previously.

CENTRAL AXIS (Poltava): The status of the UAV group previously tracked toward Poltava remains unresolved (PIR 15). The potential damage to rail junctions or fuel depots in Poltava Oblast remains a critical logistical risk pending kinetic confirmation or interception success.

RF REAR AREA (Krasnodar Krai): UAF deep strike operations are successful in achieving kinetic effects in administrative centers far from the front line, confirming the ability to disrupt RF domestic operations and tie down air defense assets.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

1. Kinetic Target Diversification and Resource Exhaustion: The RF deep strike effort is strategically shifting resources to target critical, high-value choke points on the Southern flank (Pivdenne/Chornomorske) while maintaining pressure on strategic logistics nodes (Poltava). This simultaneous, geographically diverse targeting strategy is intended to force UAF ADCOM into suboptimal resource allocation and pre-emptively fix reserves. (HIGH Confidence)

2. Sustained Information Preparation of the Battlefield (IPE): RF state media is actively promoting narratives of Western fatigue and political instability within Kyiv (01:32Z). This IPE is likely intended to precede a major RF operational push (e.g., Peschanoye exploitation) by attempting to degrade UAF morale and confidence in external support.

3. Command and Control Effectiveness: RF operational C2 continues to exhibit robust capability to manage and synchronize widely dispersed kinetic assets (UAVs on multiple vectors) while sustaining a ground bridgehead at Peschanoye with unconventional logistics (heavy-lift hexacopters).

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF forces are facing critical AD asset saturation. The confirmation of the Pivdenne/Chornomorske vector requires immediate reallocation of mobile AD assets away from holding positions or other previously threatened sectors, further complicating the defense against the Poltava and Chernihiv threats.

1. AD Resource Crisis: UAF ADCOM must immediately prioritize assets to defend the newly targeted Odesa coastal HVTs while maintaining sufficient coverage over C2 nodes near Dnipropetrovsk and Poltava logistical nodes.
2. Deep Strike Response: The successful UAV strike into Krasnodar Krai (01:05Z) maintains strategic pressure on RF decision-making cycles and forces RF to expend domestic AD resources. This operational tempo should be sustained.

Information environment / disinformation

The immediate threat in the cognitive domain is the RF attempt to erode trust in Ukrainian governance and international partnership.

1. Degradation of External Support: The TASS-amplified claim of the West "draining Zelensky" (01:32Z) is a direct, high-impact PSYOP aimed at internal UAF morale and external diplomatic resolve.
2. Counter-Narrative Requirement: UAF Information Operations must immediately disseminate confirmed facts regarding multi-year Western military aid commitments (e.g., recent UK/German long-term commitments) to stabilize public and military confidence.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The immediate outlook centers on the conclusion of the UAV strikes and the subsequent RF operational decision regarding the Peschanoye bridgehead exploitation.

MLCOA (Kinetic Conclusion & Defensive Consolidation): (HIGH Confidence) RF UAV strikes targeting Poltava and Pivdenne/Chornomorske will conclude. Post-strike ISR assessment will determine if RF achieved sufficient interdiction effects. Ground forces at Peschanoye will use the period immediately following the strike conclusion (NLT 0230Z) to attempt to move critical logistical or bridging material across the Gaychur River under cover of reduced UAF AD and C2 availability.

MDCOA (Immediate Ground Exploitation): (MEDIUM Confidence) If the Poltava/Pivdenne strikes achieve high kinetic success (e.g., severing a key rail link and crippling port operations simultaneously), RF Vostok Group will accelerate the attempt to cross heavy armor at Peschanoye immediately. This would be a high-risk, high-reward move intended to prevent UAF reserves from reaching the Southern flank.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

The lack of confirmation regarding the success or failure of the UAV groups aimed at Poltava and Chernihiv constitutes a major gap in calculating UAF logistical vulnerability prior to the anticipated ground maneuver.