Situation Report

Situation Update (UTC 00:40Z, 17 DEC 2025)

Key updates since last sitrep

• Central Vector Refinement (CRITICAL): The RF UAV group previously tracked tracking West from Sumy Oblast is now confirmed tracking Southwest, directly toward Poltava Oblast (00:20Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH). This confirms a strategic deep strike aimed at Central Ukrainian logistics or energy infrastructure.
• US Political Framing (IO): Ukrainian aligned media disseminated claims that US political figures believe RF intent is to seize all of Ukraine, reinforcing the existential threat narrative (00:15Z, РБК-Україна, MEDIUM).
• RF Domestic Security Focus: Russian information operations are currently focused on internal reassurance, promoting proposals for enhanced school security against terror acts (00:26Z, Военкор Котенок, HIGH) and cultural nationalism (00:10Z, Операция Z, HIGH).
• Global Drone Warfare Signal: Russian military channels highlighted the recent conclusion of a joint China-Pakistan exercise featuring advanced strike drones and robotics, aligning RF narratives with global advancement in unmanned systems (00:10Z, Colonelcassad, HIGH).

Operational picture (by sector)

The operational picture remains dominated by the highly distributed RF kinetic effort designed to maximize stress on UAF Air Defense Command (ADCOM) in advance of the Peschanoye ground maneuver.

NORTHERN/CENTRAL AXIS (Sumy / Poltava): The trajectory update (00:20Z) confirms the intent of this northern wave is deep strike against Central Ukrainian assets, shifting the primary threat from Western GLOCs to infrastructure within Poltava Oblast. This area hosts key rail, fuel, and command nodes vital for sustaining forces in the Donbas and Southern sectors.

SOUTHERN AXIS (Dnipropetrovsk / Peschanoye): The critical risk remains unchanged since the last sitrep. The inbound UAV group targeting Dnipropetrovsk continues to be the kinetic fixation for the expected ground maneuver at Peschanoye (Gaychur River). The proliferation of threats in the North/Center is assessed as a resource dilution tactic to ensure the success of the Dnipropetrovsk strike.

NORTHERN AXIS (Chernihiv): The southbound UAV group from Chernihiv remains a significant unresolved threat (PIR 15), compelling UAF AD commitment to this axis against an unknown HVT deep within UAF territory.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

1. Synchronized Deep Strike Execution (CRITICAL UPGRADE): The confirmation of a defined flight path targeting Poltava Oblast (00:20Z) indicates a successful execution of RF operational C2, linking multiple, geographically disparate UAV launch groups into a single, coordinated saturation effort. This simultaneous targeting of Dnipropetrovsk (supporting ground maneuver) and Poltava (degrading strategic logistics) confirms the RF capability for true multi-domain synchronization.

2. Threat Intentions (MLCOA Support): The aerial campaign is providing critical preparation for the ground component. The Poltava strike aims to degrade the UAF's ability to reinforce or reposition reserves to counter the Peschanoye bridgehead, while the Dnipropetrovsk strike seeks localized C2/logistics paralysis.

3. Information Environment Strategy: RF IO is executing a concurrent strategy of internal security reassurance and external technological signaling. Highlighting non-Western technological parity (China/Pakistan drone usage) aims to counter Western narratives of RF technological decline and promote the viability of drone/robotic systems, implicitly justifying the current RF kinetic approach.

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF ADCOM is required to immediately adjust AD asset allocation due to the confirmed Poltava vector:

1. AD Prioritization Reallocation: Resources earmarked for potential western GLOC defense (previously the Sumy assessment) must be redirected to secure strategic HVTs in Poltava Oblast (rail junctions, fuel depots, communication relays).
2. Resource Deconfliction: Mobile AD units must be tasked with high urgency to intercept the Poltava-bound UAV group, preserving strategic AD missile inventory (Patriot, NASAMS) for the highest-priority Dnipropetrovsk defense and potential long-range cruise missile threats.

Information environment / disinformation

The political information environment is acutely charged:

1. Mobilization Messaging: UAF-aligned dissemination of claims regarding Putin's maximum intention to seize all of Ukraine serves as a powerful psychological mechanism to solidify domestic and international resolve, framing the conflict as a zero-sum war of national survival.
2. RF Internal Stability: The focus on domestic security concerns (school terror) leverages existing societal fears to demonstrate governmental focus on population protection, diverting attention from battlefield developments and fostering internal cohesion. This represents a mature adaptation of hybrid warfare, prioritizing the cognitive domain at home.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The immediate outlook is defined by the conclusion of the UAV saturation wave (estimated NLT 0200Z) and the subsequent window for RF ground exploitation.

MLCOA (Kinetic Trigger and Maneuver): (HIGH Confidence) RF forces will conclude the UAV strike execution across Dnipropetrovsk and Poltava. The resulting disruption will immediately trigger the RF Vostok Group ground maneuver at Peschanoye. ISR expects RF forces to attempt to push heavy armor or bridging equipment across the Gaychur River under the cover of the kinetic effects.

MDCOA (Central Logistics Collapse): (MEDIUM Confidence, Increased Risk) A successful, simultaneous strike on a critical UAF C2 node in Dnipropetrovsk and a major logistics hub in Poltava. This combination could severely impede UAF operational responsiveness, preventing effective reserve repositioning and potentially enabling the RF force at Peschanoye to achieve operational depth by delaying UAF counter-attacks.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements