Nightwatch logo
'Nightwatch' text with white and gray letters
Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-16 22:36:07Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-16 22:06:11Z)

Situation Update (UTC)

DTG: 162235Z DEC 25 FOCUS: RF Deep Strike Re-vectoring into Kharkiv Sector; Maintenance of Critical Threat at Peschanoye; Intensification of RF Domestic Xenophobic IO.

Key updates since last sitrep

  • UAV Threat Re-vectors to Kharkiv: The RF UAV (likely Shahed variant) previously detected tracking south/west towards Poltava has abruptly shifted trajectory east/northeast and is now confirmed moving toward Kharkiv Oblast (22:20Z, Air Force, HIGH). This changes the immediate AD priority from Central GLOC protection to Eastern HVT/urban defense.
  • RF Geopolitical IO Expansion (Africa): RF Deputy Foreign Minister claimed the West is attempting to destabilize Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, areas seeing increased Russian cooperation (22:23Z, TASS, HIGH). This is a strong indicator of RF intent to leverage global friction points to divert international focus from the Ukraine theater.
  • RF Economic IO Strategy: The CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) suggested Russia could replace the United Kingdom in a technological partnership deal with the United States (22:32Z, TASS, MEDIUM). This narrative aims to sow political discord between NATO allies and inflate RF technological relevance.
  • Intensified Domestic Extremist Messaging: Highly toxic, xenophobic propaganda surfaced on RF channels, explicitly targeting Central Asian and Caucasian populations and contrasting their reactions to domestic events (murder) with the Crocus City attack (22:35Z, Alex Parker Returns, HIGH). This suggests a potentially sanctioned effort to manage internal societal tensions through ethnic scapegoating.

Operational picture (by sector)

CENTRAL AXIS (Poltava/Sumy/Kharkiv): The operational objective of the current deep-penetration UAV mission has changed. The confirmed re-vectoring towards Kharkiv Oblast (22:20Z) indicates the RF aim is now likely to target HVTs, defense production, or key logistics hubs within the Kharkiv/Oblast sector, rather than forcing AD commitment deep into Poltava. This may be a response to effective UAF AD in the Poltava region or an adjustment to maximize kinetic impact against infrastructure supporting the Eastern Grouping.

SOUTHERN AXIS (Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia): The critical operational risk associated with the Peschanoye bridgehead (Gaychur River) remains unchanged. No new kinetic reporting has been received since the conclusion of the previous deep strike wave, reinforcing the analytical judgment that the RF is in a consolidation or final preparation phase for ground maneuver. UAF must assume the ground attack is imminent.

ENEMY REAR AREA (RF Territory): No new information regarding the Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) for the UAF deep strikes against Saratov and Yeysk. The continued silence from RF official sources suggests either significant damage assessment is underway or active suppression of the information environment is prioritized to maintain domestic morale.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

1. Tactical Adaptation (UAV Re-vector): The shift of the UAV asset toward Kharkiv (PIR 10, Updated) demonstrates RF tactical flexibility in their fixation strategy.

  • Intention: To draw UAF AD assets North/East, relieving pressure on potential RF advances near Kupiansk or fixing AD assets that could otherwise be moved south to protect reserves against the imminent Peschanoye ground push.
  • Assessment: MEDIUM confidence the UAV targets a C2 node or critical industrial site in the Kharkiv region. UAF AD assets must track and neutralize this threat while minimizing asset redeployment from the Southern Axis.

2. Ideological Warfare / Hybrid Threat: The extremist messaging amplified by RF sources (22:35Z) is highly concerning. This type of xenophobic rhetoric, particularly when contrasted with high-profile domestic events like the Crocus attack, suggests an attempt by RF information control elements to:

  • Strengthen hardline nationalist support.
  • Distract the domestic population from military setbacks.
  • Potentially prepare the ground for internal security crackdowns or mobilization campaigns targeting specific demographics.

3. Strategic Diplomatic Signaling: RF statements regarding Africa (22:23Z) and US technology partnerships (22:32Z) serve to:

  • Signal continued global strategic relevance, despite the war.
  • Attempt to undermine Western cohesion (UK/US relationship).
  • Justify RF proxy expansion in the Sahel region, potentially setting conditions for future resource allocation.

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF Air Force tracking and reporting capabilities remain effective, providing rapid updates on high-speed low-observable threats (UAV, 22:20Z). This crucial ELINT/Wartime C2 function is providing the necessary lead time for AD asset adjustment.

ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE: UAF Command must prioritize the defense of fixed infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast identified as high-value targets. Mobile fire teams should immediately stage along likely approach vectors.

Information environment / disinformation

The IE is dominated by synchronized RF narratives designed to erode internal and external cohesion:

  1. Undermining Western Alliances: TASS continues to push narratives suggesting the UK is failing as a US partner, framing Russia as a viable, stable alternative (22:32Z). This is a direct informational attack on NATO technological cooperation.
  2. Global Proxy Conflict Framing: RF MFA attempts to frame its proxy operations in Africa (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger) as defensive measures against Western destabilization, legitimizing its expansion and resource expenditure abroad (22:23Z).
  3. Domestic Psychological Operation (CRITICAL): The introduction of explicitly racist, inflammatory content (22:35Z) marks a significant spike in ideological toxicity. This level of xenophobia suggests internal strains are being redirected by state or state-aligned actors.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The immediate outlook remains dominated by the high probability of a kinetic breakthrough operation in the Southern Axis, coupled with continued aerial fixation efforts directed elsewhere.

MLCOA (Immediate Ground Thrust at Peschanoye, Fixed by Kharkiv Strike): (HIGH Confidence) RF forces will execute the ground maneuver at Peschanoye (Gaychur River) NLT 170400Z, utilizing infantry/light armor while the UAF Central/Eastern Command is distracted by the UAV strike wave directed at Kharkiv infrastructure. RF intent is to achieve maximum tactical surprise and prevent effective UAF reserve repositioning.

MDCOA (Breakout and Envelopment): (MEDIUM Confidence) If the UAV successfully damages a critical C2 or logistics hub in Kharkiv, disrupting UAF Eastern command coordination, the RF Vostok Group at Peschanoye will commit heavy armor immediately upon crossing the Gaychur, initiating a sustained breakout maneuver that threatens the tactical depth of the UAF Zaporizhzhia grouping.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

The operational shift of the UAV requires an immediate update to Collection Requirement (CR) for the Central Axis. The confirmation of RF ground movement at Peschanoye remains the overall theater priority.

PriorityGap DescriptionCollection Requirement (CR)Target Area / DTG
PIR 1 (CRITICAL)Confirmation of RF heavy armor massing, bridging equipment deployment, or transit West of the Gaychur River at Peschanoye.CR: ISR SATURATION (PERSISTENT). Prioritize persistent IR/thermal coverage against ground movement.Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Peschanoye) / IMMEDIATE (NLT 170000Z)
PIR 10 (CRITICAL - Updated)Confirmation of RF intent, target type, and trajectory for the UAV now tracking towards Kharkiv Oblast. Assess if a high-value target (HVT) or strategic infrastructure is compromised.CR: AD/ELINT FOCUS. Track and intercept the UAV. Assess BDA immediately upon neutralization or strike.Central/Eastern Axis (Kharkiv Oblast) / IMMEDIATE
PIR 12 (URGENT - Baseline)Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) of UAF long-range UAV strikes on RF territory (Saratov and Yeysk).CR: IMINT/OSINT/HUMINT. Request rapid satellite imagery tasking over military facilities. Monitor RF internal OSINT channels for corroboration.Saratov and Yeysk, RF / NLT 170600Z
PIR 13 (NEW)Assessment of the extent and orchestration of RF domestic xenophobic messaging targeting ethnic cohesion.CR: HUMINT/OSINT (IO FOCUS). Analyze source lineage (state vs. proxy) and assess the likelihood of this narrative preceding a new wave of mobilization or internal control measures.RF Internal IO Channels / NLT 171200Z
Previous (2025-12-16 22:06:11Z)

We only use optional analytics cookies if you allow them. Necessary cookies stay on for sign-in and site security.

Learn more in our Privacy Policy.