Situation Report

Situation Update (UTC)

DTG: 162205Z DEC 25 FOCUS: Conclusion of RF Deep Strike Wave; Expansion of Northern Vector; Confirmed UAF Counter-Strikes into RF Territory.

Key updates since last sitrep

• Deep Strike Wave Concluded: Air Defense (AD) alerts were cancelled in Kyiv (21:51Z) and Zaporizhzhia Oblast (21:47Z), indicating the immediate threat package has been neutralized or departed, concluding the high-tempo deep strike period reported in the previous sitrep (HIGH, KMVA/Zaporizhzhia OVA).
• Northern Vector Deep Penetration: The RF UAV previously detected in Sumy Oblast is now confirmed to be tracking further south/west, entering Poltava Oblast airspace (21:53Z, Air Force, HIGH). This expands the geographic scope of the RF fixation strategy into Central Ukraine.
• UAF Deep Counter-Strikes Confirmed: Explosions and AD activity were reported in two strategic Russian locations: Saratov region (21:39Z, ASTRA, MEDIUM) and Yeysk suburbs, Krasnodar Krai (22:01Z, Portfel Genshtaba, MEDIUM). This confirms sustained UAF long-range operational reach against RF military/industrial targets.
• RF Propaganda Focus: Pro-Russian sources are immediately leveraging information warfare narratives, mocking the effectiveness of UAF mobilization efforts (22:01Z, Colonelcassad, HIGH) and amplifying Belarusian statements designed to undermine UAF international support (21:37Z, TASS, HIGH).

Operational picture (by sector)

CENTRAL AXIS (Kyiv/Poltava): The primary deep strike threat to Kyiv has been mitigated (21:51Z). However, the operational focus has shifted east/south from the Sumy axis. The UAV penetration into Poltava Oblast (21:53Z) aims to force UAF Central Command to commit mobile AD assets away from the Southern or Eastern axes. This confirms the multi-domain fixation strategy is geographically adaptive.

SOUTHERN AXIS (Zaporizhzhia/Odesa): The air threat has temporarily subsided with the cancellation of the AD alert (21:47Z). This provides a narrow window for UAF forces to re-position. The CRITICAL ground threat (PIR 1) related to the Peschanoye bridgehead (Gaychur River) remains the center of gravity. The cessation of aerial preparatory fires (KABs) may signal either a preparatory pause before the ground thrust or a temporary logistical issue for the RF Vostok Group.

ENEMY REAR AREA (RF Territory): UAF long-range strike capability remains active.

1. Saratov: Attack likely targeted military industrial complex or strategic bomber/storage facilities.
2. Yeysk (Krasnodar): Given its coastal location and reported AD engagement (22:01Z), this strike likely targeted naval/port infrastructure or the local airbase, disrupting RF logistical and air operations capability in the Black Sea theater.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

1. Enemy Intention - Operational Sequence: RF High Command maintains its synchronization plan: AD Fixation (Kyiv/Poltava) + Logistics Strangulation (Odesa) + Ground Decisive Action (Peschanoye). The conclusion of the current deep strike wave indicates the RF may judge that sufficient kinetic and psychological fixation has been achieved. The next step is highly probable to be the committed ground maneuver (MLCOA/MDCOA).

2. Threat to UAF Reserves (Poltava Vector): The new UAV vector into Poltava poses an immediate risk to critical infrastructure, supply lines, or C2 nodes in Central Ukraine. UAF AD allocation must rapidly adjust to counter this expanded, deeper threat, which strains the AD coverage previously concentrated closer to the front lines.

3. Command & Control (RF): UAF counter-strikes deep into RF territory (Saratov, Yeysk) potentially challenge RF domestic narrative control and force RF resources (AD, damage control) to be diverted from the immediate theater of operations. This puts stress on RF logistics and C2 resilience.

Friendly activity (UAF)

• Successful AD Operations: UAF AD forces achieved success by neutralizing the strike package over the Central Axis (Kyiv), demonstrating resilience against the saturation tactics.
• Sustained Deep Strike Capability: UAF forces demonstrated the intent and capability to maintain pressure on RF strategic depth through long-range UAV strikes (Saratov, Yeysk). Actionable Intelligence: BDA on these strikes is required to assess their operational impact.
• Information Operations: UAF tactical channels (Operativny ZSU, Madjar's Birds) are actively publishing engaging content immediately after defensive successes, boosting morale and countering RF narratives (21:51Z).

Information environment / disinformation

RF information operations are intensifying efforts to undermine UAF resilience:

1. Mobilization Discredit: RF sources are actively circulating narratives mocking UAF mobilization success (22:01Z), aiming to decrease recruitment and demoralize existing personnel.
2. External Political Dependence: Quotes from Lukashenko (21:37Z) are used to push the narrative that the conflict's end depends solely on US political decisions (Trump), implying UAF agency is irrelevant and international support is fragile.
3. Cyber Context: Historical (Nov 2025) RF messages from sources like Joker DNR highlight a long-standing intent to leverage cyber vulnerabilities (Starlink, generative AI, phishing) against UAF digital and command infrastructure.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The tactical situation suggests the aerial shaping phase is concluding, signaling the high probability of transitioning to decisive ground action in the Southern Axis.

MLCOA (Immediate Ground Thrust at Peschanoye): (HIGH Confidence) Following the tactical pause in preparatory fires (AD clear), RF Vostok Group capitalizes on the confirmed geographical dispersion of UAF AD (Poltava distraction) and commits its maneuver elements—either infantry and light armor sustained by hexacopters, or, less likely but possible, bridging and heavy armor—across the Gaychur River at Peschanoye NLT 170400Z. Concurrently, RF forces maintain targeted strikes (UAVs) against supply routes in Poltava to prevent UAF reserve movement.

MDCOA (Unmitigated Flank Collapse): (MEDIUM Confidence) RF forces successfully conceal the movement of heavy armor across the Gaychur River bridgehead, initiating a rapid penetration operation toward the rear of the Zaporizhzhia grouping under sustained KAB cover (reactivated). The UAF inability to redeploy reserves due to the Poltava/Kyiv fixation leads to a forced, disorganized withdrawal from key defensive lines NLT 170600Z.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

The immediate verification of RF ground force activity at the Peschanoye bridgehead remains the single most critical intelligence gap. New collection is required for BDA on UAF deep strikes.