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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-16 19:36:11Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-16 19:06:14Z)

Situation Update (UTC)

DTG: 161935Z DEC 25

Key updates since last sitrep

  • MDCOA Triggered (Dnipropetrovsk KAB): (19:11Z, Air Force UAF, HIGH) RF forces initiated Guided Aerial Bomb (KAB) launches targeting Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. This action is the primary indicator of preparatory fires supporting the anticipated heavy armor thrust from the Peschanoye bridgehead, significantly increasing the probability of the Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA).
  • Serebryanka Loss Corroborated: (19:35Z, MoD Russia, HIGH) The Russian Ministry of Defence issued an official announcement of localized territorial gains, effectively corroborating previous DeepState (18:48Z, PSR) and RF military blogger claims regarding the capture of Serebryanka (Donetsk Oblast). This confirms a tactical penetration on the Seversk axis.
  • Deep Strike Targeting Kremenchuk: (19:29Z, Air Force UAF, HIGH) A group of RF Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) was tracked in Poltava Oblast moving toward Kremenchuk. This confirms continued RF intent to degrade deep infrastructure, specifically targeting a key industrial and logistics hub previously outside the immediate air strike vector (18:50Z, PSR Myrhorod track).
  • KAB Threat Expansion (Kharkiv): (19:30Z, Air Force UAF, HIGH) KAB launches were reported targeting Kharkiv Oblast, signaling a geographical expansion of RF high-precision glide bomb saturation aimed at fixing UAF reserves in the Northeast.
  • Strategic Maritime Threat (Baltic): (19:33Z, РБК-Україна, MEDIUM) Sweden reported the presence of RF military personnel aboard commercial oil tankers operating within Russia’s "shadow fleet" in the Baltic Sea. This highlights RF's integrated hybrid approach to resource sustainment and force protection on key logistics lines outside the immediate combat zone.

Operational picture (by sector)

Operational momentum favors the Russian Federation (RF) in the Eastern and Southern sectors, supported by escalating preparatory fires.

SOUTHERN AXIS (Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia): The operational environment here is rapidly deteriorating. The confirmation of KAB strikes targeting Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (19:11Z) strongly indicates that the RF Vostok Group has completed pre-assault fire planning to cover the commitment of maneuver forces across the Gaychur River at Peschanoye. The focus of UAF defensive measures must immediately shift to target identification and neutralization of any armor that crosses or bridging equipment. The Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration has issued alerts (19:29Z), reflecting the high threat level.

EASTERN AXIS (Seversk/Lyman): The loss of Serebryanka is now assessed as HIGH probability due to RF official corroboration (19:35Z). RF forces have achieved a tactical penetration south of Siversky Donets River. The immediate threat is exploitation toward Siversk. UAF forces must stabilize the new line of contact and prevent the use of Serebryanka as a forward staging area for deeper envelopment maneuvers.

NORTHEAST AXIS (Poltava/Kharkiv): RF deep strike focus is broadening from airbases (Myrhorod, PSR) to critical logistics/industrial nodes (Kremenchuk, 19:29Z). The use of KABs against Kharkiv Oblast (19:30Z) suggests RF is attempting to lock down UAF counter-fire and AD assets along the border regions, complementing the ground fixing operations noted in the previous reporting cycle (PDR).

Enemy activity / threat assessment

1. Force Projection and Maneuver: The RF has shifted from preparation to execution of preparatory fires on the Southern Axis. The timing of the Dnipropetrovsk KAB strikes is a near-term (NLT 3-6 hours) indicator that the deployment of heavy armor across the Gaychur River is imminent.

  • Analytical Judgment: RF has chosen to accept the risk posed by the anticipated solar magnetic storm (PSR context) and is pushing forward with maneuver operations under cover of night and focused air strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2. Deep Strike Campaign: RF is demonstrating dynamic target selection, expanding from known military targets (airfields) to major industrial centers (Kremenchuk). This maintains pressure on UAF military sustainment capacity and economic stability. The KAB deployment into Kharkiv is assessed as a high-volume, low-risk engagement strategy intended to degrade UAF forward defenses without committing ground forces.

3. Hybrid Warfare and Logistics: The presence of RF military personnel on commercial tankers in the Baltic (19:33Z) reveals RF intent to blend military and civilian assets to protect strategic exports (oil/gas) and potentially deter targeted interference by NATO maritime forces. This is a critical insight into RF hybrid operational doctrine outside the immediate conflict zone.

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF continues to demonstrate effective tactical resilience, particularly in the drone warfare domain, documenting successful engagements of RF personnel (16:00Z, 19:08Z, 19:23Z). Morale and operational readiness remains high, as evidenced by rapid dissemination of tactical successes and counter-propaganda efforts (19:32Z).

Strategic energy resilience efforts continue, with confirmed progress in expanding supplementary energy generation networks across regions (18:37Z, 19:31Z). This directly counters the RF winter infrastructure targeting campaign.

Information environment / disinformation

RF information campaigns remain multi-layered:

  1. PSYOPS (Domestic/Military): Use of captured UAF serviceman confessions (19:21Z) to attempt to erode UAF troop morale and affirm RF operational narratives to a domestic audience.
  2. Strategic Narrative (Global): Pushing narratives of Western decline (Germany de-industrialization) and global instability (18:08Z) to fracture Western unity and support.
  3. Domestic Tightening: Increased legal pressure on high-profile investigative journalists (Andrey Soldatov, 19:33Z) signals continued internal security focus and suppression of dissent, reinforcing the regime's control ahead of planned public events (Year in Review, PSR context).

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The focus remains CRITICAL on the Southern Axis. The initiation of KAB strikes on Dnipropetrovsk strongly suggests the window for the MDCOA is narrowing to the immediate 6 hours.

MLCOA (Seversk Consolidation & Southern Maneuver Prep): (MEDIUM Confidence) RF forces will consolidate the new foothold around Serebryanka and establish forward firebases to shell Siversk. Simultaneously, RF strike assets will maintain KAB saturation of Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia, covering the movement of initial heavy armor components (e.g., reconnaissance tanks, pathfinder engineering vehicles) across the Gaychur River.

MDCOA (Immediate Armor Thrust at Peschanoye): (HIGH Confidence) RF Vostok Group will commit the main body of heavy armor (Tanks/IFVs) across the Gaychur River, leveraging the darkness and the covering KAB strikes targeting UAF reaction forces and C2 nodes. This is now the most probable and most dangerous immediate course of action, posing a strategic threat to the Southern Operational Command rear.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

The tactical situation on the Southern Axis requires immediate and focused ISR to confirm the transition from preparatory fire to maneuver commitment.

PriorityGap DescriptionCollection Requirement (CR)Target Area / DTG
PIR 1 (CRITICAL)Confirmation of RF heavy armor massing, bridging equipment deployment, or transit West of the Gaychur River at Peschanoye.CR: ISR SATURATION. Maximize all available tactical ISR (UAVs, SAR, SATCOM) over Gaychur River crossing points. Prioritize persistent IR/thermal coverage against all ground movement in the vicinity.Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Peschanoye) / IMMEDIATE (NLT 162200Z)
PIR 2 (URGENT)Status of defenses/friendly forces near Serebryanka and the exact boundary of the new Line of Contact (LOC). Identify RF direction of exploitation (toward Siversk or along the river line).CR: Tactical HUMINT/ISR Verification. Re-task short-range ISR assets to determine RF forward positions and observe the commitment of any RF follow-on forces.Eastern Axis (Serebryanka) / NLT 162300Z
PIR 3 (URGENT)Specific target designation for UAV group currently tracked toward Kremenchuk. Assess potential impact on industrial production or logistics hubs.CR: AD Intercept Analysis/Local Reporting. Confirm UAV type (Shahed/Lancet) and intended target (e.g., oil refinery, railroad junction, electricity substation) to allow for dynamic AD prioritization.Poltava Oblast (Kremenchuk) / Ongoing
PIR 4 (PRIORITY)Verify the nature of RF military presence on "shadow fleet" tankers. Are these security detachments, hybrid intelligence personnel, or Naval Infantry?CR: International SIGINT/HUMINT. Request Allied intelligence partners (Sweden/NATO) to provide detailed analysis of the personnel identification and equipment found aboard the vessels.Baltic Sea / Ongoing
Previous (2025-12-16 19:06:14Z)

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