Situation Report

Situation Update (UTC)

DTG: 161545Z DEC 25

Key updates since last sitrep

• KAB Threat Extension: Guided Aerial Bomb (KAB) launches confirmed targeting Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (15:25Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH). This expands the immediate fire support threat vector into the operational depth north of the Peschanoye bridgehead.
• Logistics Interdiction Confirmed: A second Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) wave was detected approaching Zatoka (Odesa Oblast), confirming a sustained enemy effort to interdict the Southern Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) (15:22Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH).
• Force Generation Update: The Ukrainian Rada passed legislation granting recruiting centers access to the "Oberih" electronic military register, significantly streamlining the mobilization process (15:14Z, RBC-Ukraine, HIGH).
• Eastern Defense Posture: UAF 7th Air Assault Corps (DShV) confirms continued robust defensive operations and logistical security maintenance in the critical Pokrovsk direction (15:17Z, Operatyvnyi ZSU, HIGH).
• Civilian Exchange: Russian Federation (RF) and Ukraine executed a cross-border exchange/repatriation of civilians near the Belarusian border (15:08Z, Poddubny, HIGH).

Operational picture (by sector)

The operational tempo is rising on the Southern Axis, characterized by increasing RF preparatory fires intended to fix UAF reserves prior to an anticipated heavy armor commitment at the Gaychur River bridgehead.

SOUTHERN AXIS (Zaporizhzhia/Dnipro):

• Peschanoye Bridgehead: Kinetic activity has shifted north, with confirmed KAB strikes hitting Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. This action is assessed as highly coordinated preparatory fire to suppress UAF counter-mobility and C2 nodes that could target the river crossing. The absence of confirmed heavy armor movement (PIR 1) suggests RF is still in the phase of consolidating the crossing and fixing UAF reserves in the immediate north and south (Huliaipole).
• Huliaipole: RF sources claim a major breakthrough and pincer maneuver threat (15:24Z, LOW confidence), which is likely Information Operations (IO) designed to mask the confirmed RF fixing operation by the 38th GMR BDE and draw UAF defensive attention away from Peschanoye.
• Odesa Coast: The sustained UAV threat against Zatoka (15:22Z) mandates the immediate activation of tertiary logistics routes (J4 recommendation from previous report).

EASTERN AXIS (Donetsk):

• Pokrovsk: UAF elements (7th DShV Corps) confirm they are holding key defensive lines, emphasizing logistics security. This sector remains a primary consumption point for UAF reserves, which RF is clearly attempting to fix via KAB saturation in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipro.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

1. Threat Synchronization (KAB/Bridgehead): The expansion of KAB usage into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is a highly effective enemy adaptation. This action directly supports the RF Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): utilizing massive aerial/artillery fire superiority to paralyze UAF decision-making and troop movement while engineering assets work to secure the Gaychur River crossing (Peschanoye) for heavy armor.

2. Deep Strike/Logistics Interdiction: The re-attack on the Zatoka GLOC confirms RF intent to achieve operational paralysis of Southern UAF sustainment. The high frequency of attacks indicates an RF priority target set.

3. Strategic Force Generation: The RF Navy's commissioning of the Project 677 diesel-electric submarine "Velikiye Luki" (15:16Z) is a long-term modernization step but does not affect the current theater balance. Routine Tu-22M3 strategic bomber flights over the Black Sea (15:21Z, 15:34Z) are a strategic show of force aimed at projecting regional deterrence.

4. OOB/Tactical Claims: RF claims of destroying a UAF artillery battery near Orikhiv (15:15Z, LOW confidence) and the Huliaipole breakthrough claims (15:24Z, LOW confidence) indicate heightened RF kinetic activity across the Zaporizhzhia front, but lack corroboration regarding operational success.

Friendly activity (UAF)

1. Force Generation Efficiency (CRITICAL): The Rada's decision to integrate recruiting centers with the "Oberih" electronic register is a fundamental positive change in UAF force generation capability. This should reduce processing times and improve the accuracy of mobilization efforts (HIGH confidence, Actionable).

2. Resilience and Sustainment: The identification of 800 MW of recoverable electrical capacity (15:24Z) is a significant logistical and national resilience enhancement, mitigating the operational impact of RF deep strikes against civilian infrastructure.

3. International Support: High-level diplomatic engagement continues, securing long-term defense planning ($60B requested for 2026, Ramstein format) and political support (Zelensky/Netherlands audience), ensuring sustainment viability.

Information environment / disinformation

RF IO is currently focused on tactical exaggeration and strategic distraction:

• Tactical Exaggeration: Amplification of the unconfirmed Huliaipole breakthrough (15:24Z) aims to demoralize UAF forces and reinforce the perception of RF operational momentum in the Zaporizhzhia sector.
• Strategic Dissuasion: RF messaging continues to push narratives of European economic collapse due to sanctions (e.g., amplification of Salvini's critique, 15:22Z) to undermine the Western coalition.
• Humanitarian Masking: The civilian exchange (15:08Z) serves to frame RF actions within a humanitarian context, offsetting recent negative media attention regarding RF conduct.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The tactical environment is escalating rapidly due to the expansion of preparatory fires. The next 6-12 hours represent the window during which RF will either complete the conditions for heavy armor commitment or fail to exploit the Peschanoye bridgehead.

MLCOA (Condition Setting & Attrition): (HIGH Confidence) RF forces will maintain KAB saturation across Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts to ensure UAF cannot redeploy reserves. UAV strikes on the Odesa GLOC will continue. Consolidation of the Peschanoye bridgehead will proceed, likely involving the covert movement of heavy engineering and bridging assets under the fire umbrella, but the commitment of Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) remains unlikely until the crossing is fully secured.

MDCOA (Immediate Flank Breach): (MEDIUM Confidence) Under the cover of expanded KAB strikes, RF forces attempt a high-risk, immediate insertion of heavy armor (possibly IFV-heavy motorized rifle units) across the Gaychur River, leveraging the current positional advantage to drive a wedge into the UAF rear area before UAF can fully integrate reserves using the new "Oberih" system efficiency.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

The extension of the KAB threat reinforces the criticality of PIR 1 (Peschanoye) and PIR 2 (GRAU Vector), as the convergence of these two factors dictates the RF Main Effort.