Sitrep 2025-12-15 19:35:30

Situation Update (UTC)

DTG: 2025-12-15T19:35Z

Key updates since last sitrep (19:05Z)

(19:22Z, UAF Source, MEDIUM): Unconventional UAF Air Defense TTP reported over the Odesa coast, allegedly involving a Yak-52 light aircraft successfully downing an RF Shahed, suggesting UAF mitigated the immediate threat to the Zatoka GLOC (previous P1).
(19:14Z, UAF AF, HIGH): Confirmed REPEATED launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB) targeting Donetsk Oblast, sustaining the RF aerial interdiction campaign.
(19:30Z, RF Source, MEDIUM): RF sources reinforced the tactical effort at the Gaychur bridgehead, dedicating propaganda to the "Battle for Huliaipole" and claiming continued offensive action.
(19:32Z, WSJ/UAF Sources, HIGH): The US reportedly offered Ukraine "protection from any aggression" to break negotiation deadlock (WSJ). This aligns with confirmed upcoming high-level US-Ukraine military working group discussions this weekend.
(19:12Z, 19:30Z, RF/UAF Sources, HIGH IO CONFLICT): RF Black Sea Fleet officially denied UAF claims of striking an RF submarine in Novorossiysk, while UAF sources immediately countered, labeling the denial as disinformation. BDA remains unconfirmed (Revised P2 Gap).
(19:11Z, UAF AF, HIGH): New UAV detected in Kharkiv Oblast tracking toward/past Merefa from the Northwest, adjusting the immediate deep-strike vector south of Kharkiv City.
(19:33Z, RF Source, HIGH): UAV danger warning issued in Bryansk Oblast (RF territory), confirming sustained UAF deep kinetic/ISR operations.

Operational picture (by sector)

Sector	Current Status	Key Activities / Changes	Confidence
Odesa Oblast (Zatoka)	AD Response Indicated	Unconfirmed interception of UAV threat targeting the critical bridge. Potential new UAF non-conventional AD TTP employed.	MEDIUM
Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia Border	Bridgehead Expansion Effort	RF is prioritizing maneuver toward Huliaipole, utilizing aggressive IO to support ground pressure from the Gaychur bridgehead.	HIGH
Donetsk Oblast	Sustained Aerial/Ground Fire	Repeated KAB strikes confirmed. UAF kinetic counter-strike reported in occupied Donetsk City. RF claim of Myrnohrad encirclement is UNCONFIRMED.	HIGH (Kinetic) LOW (Myrnohrad)
Kharkiv Oblast	UAV Vector Adjustment	UAV vector shifted from NW/Vilshany toward S/SW, targeting supply routes near Merefa.	HIGH
RF Deep Rear	Strategic Denial/Counter-Strike	RF officially denied Novorossiysk damage. UAF continues deep strikes (Bryansk UAV alert).	HIGH

Enemy activity / threat assessment

1. Kinetic Priority: Integrated Interdiction Campaign: RF forces are maintaining synchronized kinetic pressure across multiple axes: * KAB Mass: The confirmed repetition of KAB strikes in Donetsk Oblast emphasizes the continued effort to degrade UAF defensive positions and resupply routes into Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar. * UAV Vector Shift: The change in the Kharkiv UAV vector toward Merefa indicates RF forces are dynamically adjusting ISR and strike planning to circumvent known UAF AD zones and target secondary supply nodes south of Kharkiv City.

2. Ground Maneuver Intent: Bridgehead Consolidation (Huliaipole): The intensified RF messaging regarding the "Battle for Huliaipole" confirms the Vostok Grouping's intention to consolidate the breach across the Gaychur River (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast). The immediate objective is likely to seize Huliaipole, which would compromise the flank of the main Zaporizhzhia defense line and threaten the operational rear of the Donetsk defenses.

3. Information Threat: Denial and Diversion: The immediate, high-level RF denial of the Novorossiysk attack is a defensive IO measure intended to mitigate the strategic shock and avoid admitting vulnerability in their deep rear. Simultaneously, the UNCONFIRMED claim of encircling Myrnohrad (Donetsk) may serve as a diversionary tactic, attempting to fix UAF reserves away from the critical Gaychur/Huliaipole axis.

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF AD elements demonstrated high effectiveness, with confirmed successful Shahed interceptions by the 53rd Mechanized Brigade (STING) and 9th ZRB Sich. The reported non-conventional use of the Yak-52 for low-altitude AD over Odesa, if validated, represents tactical innovation to manage scarce AD missile resources.

Diplomatic activities continue to provide strategic depth:

US Security Guarantee: The reported US proposal offering "protection from any aggression" represents a potential mechanism to achieve long-term security without immediate NATO accession, likely aimed at influencing internal political deadlocks (e.g., Hungarian vetoes) and stabilizing the future negotiation framework.
High-Level Military Coordination: Upcoming US-Ukraine military working group talks analyzing operational maps highlight continued, deep military planning collaboration, critical for optimizing Western aid application to the current battlefield situation.

Information environment / disinformation

The primary IO conflict focuses on assessing UAF operational reach: the RF denial of the Novorossiysk submarine strike versus UAF public rebuttal. This BDA gap is being leveraged by both sides. RF propaganda is simultaneously amplifying tactical successes (Huliaipole) and future threats (Kupyansk "Kursk"), aimed at undermining UAF morale and Western resolve. UAF messaging counters kinetic setbacks with confirmed AD success and high-level diplomatic assurance.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

MLCOA (Bridgehead Expansion and Sustained Aerial Interdiction - HIGH Confidence): RF forces will launch localized, mechanized assaults from the Gaychur bridgehead toward Huliaipole (P3 CR). UAF AD will remain heavily tasked mitigating combined KAB strikes (Donetsk) and persistent UAV threats (Kharkiv/Odesa). Focus will be on exhausting UAF AD capability ahead of the anticipated 260th GRAU artillery saturation identified in the Daily Report.

MDCOA (Operational Flank Breach and Feint - MEDIUM Confidence): RF forces successfully fix UAF operational reserves near Huliaipole. Concurrently, the RF initiates a mechanized thrust southwest of Pokrovsk, exploiting the confusion generated by the Myrnohrad "encirclement" IO (P4 CR), aiming to disrupt UAF logistics feeding the Pokrovsk defense line from the south and west.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

Priority	Gap Description	Required Action / Information Need
P1 (IMMEDIATE)	Zatoka BDA & TTP Confirmation. Confirm the successful interception of the UAV targeting Zatoka (Odesa) and verify the validity and effectiveness of the alleged Yak-52 light aircraft AD TTP.	Task OC South AD/UAV ISR for BDA verification and TTP assessment. NLT 21:00Z Dec 15.
P2 (CRITICAL)	Novorossiysk Submarine BDA. Resolve the IO conflict. Determine the actual damage assessment to RF vessels/infrastructure in Novorossiysk.	Task IMINT/HUMINT assets to acquire commercial satellite imagery or verified local source reports detailing the Novorossiysk naval base status. NLT 08:00Z Dec 16.
P3 (URGENT)	Huliaipole Maneuver Commitment. Quantify the mechanized elements committed to the advance toward Huliaipole and identify the proximity of RF heavy artillery supporting the push from the Gaychur bridgehead.	Task IMINT/SAR to assess RF deployment density in the triangle Peschanoye-Huliaipole. NLT 06:00Z Dec 16.
P4 (PRIORITY)	Myrnohrad Status. Confirm the security and disposition of UAF forces in Myrnohrad and verify if RF forces are operating in proximity, or if the RF claim of "encirclement" is pure disinformation.	Task UAF units in Pokrovsk AO to confirm tactical geometry south of Pokrovsk. NLT 22:00Z Dec 15.

Actionable Recommendations:

Air Defense Optimization (J3): If the Yak-52 TTP proves viable (P1), immediately authorize trials for wider deployment of similar low-cost, manned/unmanned assets against low-speed Shahed threats to conserve precious SAM inventories for KAB and higher-tier missile threats.
Counter-Feint Preparation (OC East): Given the high-risk Myrnohrad IO (P4), deploy increased ground ISR (recon/UAV) coverage along the potential RF approach routes southwest of Pokrovsk. Prepare contingency plans to rapidly deploy maneuver reserves to block an RF feint designed to bypass the city.
Logistics Protection (OC Center/Kharkiv): The UAV vector shift toward Merefa indicates a renewed threat to the Southern Kharkiv GLOCs. Immediately reinforce short-range VSHORAD protection for the rail lines and major road intersections near Merefa.

Situation Report