Situation Report

Situation Update (06:15Z 15 DEC 2025)

Key updates since last sitrep

• UAF Deep Strike Operational Tempo Confirmed (05:54Z, TASS/BOGOMAZ, MEDIUM): The RF Ministry of Defense claims interception of 16 UAF UAVs over Russian territory within the last hour. This is a sharp increase in claimed volume compared to the 3 intercepts reported earlier, confirming sustained, high-tempo UAF long-range kinetic operations. 5 interceptions confirmed over Bryansk Oblast (05:54Z, Governor).
• Diplomatic Information Warfare Escalation (05:43Z, STERNENKO, HIGH): Multiple, wide-ranging sources (including RF MILBLOGs citing Reuters) have rapidly disseminated the report that President Zelenskyy proposed abandoning NATO accession in exchange for binding Western security guarantees. This confirms the immediate and critical engagement of this topic across the strategic information domain.
• Kryvyi Rih Control Confirmed (05:35Z, VILKUL, HIGH): Local administration (Oleksandr Vilkul) confirms that the security situation in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is "controlled." This provides assurance for the immediate operational rear following previous reports of intense RF FPV and UAS activity in the area.
• UAF Tactical Drone Success (05:54Z, Hayabusa, MEDIUM): UAF drone operators released visual evidence of a successful reconnaissance and strike operation targeting concealed RF personnel, confirming continued UAF tactical superiority in the localized UAS fight.

Operational picture (by sector)

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Current Threat Level: HIGH (Information Dominance Attempt & Deep Strike Response)

1. Response to Deep Strike Operations (RF Air Defense): The RF claim of intercepting 16 UAVs in one hour suggests that UAF operations are saturating RF AD coverage in the border regions. While the intercept numbers are self-reported and likely inflated, the scale indicates UAF is successfully sustaining kinetic pressure well beyond the front line.
2. Weaponization of Diplomatic Narrative (IO): RF information channels are immediately and aggressively exploiting the reported proposal regarding NATO membership and security guarantees. This is the new center of gravity for RF information warfare, designed to undermine domestic morale, delegitimize UAF political leadership, and pressure Western allies.
3. Sustained Ground Pressure (Donetsk): RF forces are maintaining psychological pressure on the Pokrovsk axis through intensive information operations (e.g., Myrnohrad claim), likely to disguise or mask the operational pause required while awaiting the materiel surge from the 260th GRAU (P1 gap).

Friendly activity (UAF)

1. Deep Strike Force Commitment: UAF operational commanders are committing high volumes of strike assets (16 claimed intercepts) against RF territory, demonstrating significant operational reach and resource capacity to prosecute deep operations concurrently with front-line defense.
2. Information Response: UAF channels are actively addressing the diplomatic IO threat, specifically working to counter the RF narrative that Ukraine is resistant to ending the war (05:54Z, Оперативний ЗСУ). This demonstrates swift strategic communications adaptation.
3. Localized Tactical Advantage: UAF drone units continue to display high tactical proficiency, successfully engaging concealed RF personnel and maintaining localized ISR superiority.

Information environment / disinformation

The Information Environment is now critically dominated by the reported NATO/Security Guarantee pivot.

• RF Narrative (Propagation): RF MILBLOGs and official channels are leveraging the Reuters report to push narratives of Western betrayal, Ukrainian desperation, and imminent capitulation. The goal is to maximize confusion regarding Kyiv's long-term strategic goals.
• UAF Counter-Narrative (Management): UAF IO managers are focused on framing the discussion constructively, emphasizing that the negotiation aims to prevent Ukraine from being cast as the party prolonging the conflict, thereby shifting accountability for continued fighting back onto the Kremlin.
• Tactical Disinformation: The UNCONFIRMED Myrnohrad encirclement claim remains a powerful local IO tool, although its utility will rapidly degrade if UAF can release definitive visual evidence of continued control.

Analytic Judgment: The volume and speed of information flow concerning the diplomatic shift confirm the MDCOA (Psychological Degradation) related to strategic policy is now the primary RF information objective.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

MLCOA (Most Likely Course of Action): IO Saturation and AD Engagement. UAF Air Defense forces will successfully engage or neutralize the kinetic threat targeting Novo-Ukrainka (Kirovohrad). Concurrently, RF information channels will achieve peak saturation regarding the NATO/Security Guarantee reports, potentially leading to targeted cyber attacks against critical UAF media infrastructure to amplify the confusion. Ground operations remain stable while both sides prepare for the inevitable artillery surge projected from the 260th GRAU. (Confidence: HIGH)

MDCOA (Most Dangerous Course of Action): Disruption of Central LOCs and Policy Backlash. The rotational strike strategy succeeds: the Central Axis kinetic threat (Novo-Ukrainka) results in damage to a critical logistical node. Concurrently, the intense IO campaign triggers confusion among key Western partners and creates friction within the UAF political-military command structure, impacting resource allocation decisions. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements