Situation Report

Situation Update (UTC)

DTG: 2025-12-15T02:00Z PRIORITY: CRITICAL (Ballistic Threat & Information Warfare)

Key updates since last sitrep

• UAV Strikes on Moscow (01:46Z, 01:53Z, TASS, HIGH): RF authorities reported the successful interception or repulsion of a total of eight (8) adversarial Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) targeting the Moscow region. This confirms sustained UAF utilization of deep strike assets against strategic RF C2/infrastructure targets.
• RF Political IO Escalated (01:41Z, TASS, HIGH): Russian state media initiated a targeted information operation, leveraging an exiled SBU official to claim that Andriy Yermak is preparing to betray his inner circle. This effort is assessed as a deliberate campaign to sow distrust at the highest levels of Ukrainian leadership ahead of potential renewed strategic strikes.
• Odesa Infrastructure Resilience Confirmed (01:57Z, РБК-Україна, HIGH): The Odesa Oblast Military Administration (OVA) released an official update confirming that critical public services (transport, banking, commercial) remain operational despite recent RF strikes on energy infrastructure. This mitigates the intended psychological effect of the attacks.
• Ballistic Threat Delay (Analyst Judgment, MEDIUM): The anticipated high-impact strategic ballistic missile launch (predicted for the 01:00Z - 04:00Z window) remains unexecuted. The RF may be timing the strike to coincide with early morning hours (03:00Z-05:00Z) or is facing a C2 delay, but the threat level remains CRITICAL.

Operational picture (by sector)

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Current Threat Level: CRITICAL (Anticipated Ballistic Strike) / HIGH (Information Warfare)

1. Kinetic Synchronization Shift: The RF is demonstrating kinetic flexibility by initiating localized saturation fires and simultaneous high-level IO before executing the predicted strategic ballistic strike. This sequence aims to maximize UAF AD expenditure against lower-value targets (KAB/Shahed) and distract C2 with IO, setting the conditions for the high-impact ballistic strike.
2. Information Warfare (IO) Targeting (HIGH Confidence): The TASS messaging confirms RF intent to actively undermine the political integrity of the Kyiv leadership (Yermak). This IO vector is assessed as a preparatory step designed to exploit perceived internal political fragility, potentially synchronized with the kinetic escalation timeline.
3. UAV Evasion/AD Performance: The report of 8 UAVs targeting Moscow indicates a significant and coordinated UAF effort. While RF claims full interception, the necessity of committing AD assets deep in the RF rear is a favorable constraint on RF forward operations.

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF Air Defense forces are maintaining maximum readiness posture for the predicted strategic strike while managing existing low-level aerial threats. The effectiveness of AD against the inbound Nikopol Shahed is awaiting confirmation.

UAF deep strike assets continue to demonstrate operational reach and capability against RF strategic centers. This forces RF commanders to prioritize domestic security over front-line IADS deployment, potentially creating favorable conditions for UAF maneuver in sensitive sectors (e.g., exploiting the Crimean IADS gap noted in the previous daily report).

Information environment / disinformation

The primary development in the cognitive domain is the targeted RF disinformation campaign aimed at the Presidential Office in Kyiv. This narrative seeks to portray Ukrainian leadership as compromised, unstable, and ready to concede strategic gains. This requires immediate UAF strategic communications countermeasures focused on unity and operational transparency.

UAF information operations regarding Odesa infrastructure stability are functioning effectively, countering the RF objective of generating popular unrest and psychological collapse following targeted energy strikes.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

MLCOA (Most Likely Course of Action): Delayed Strategic Strike Peak (03:00Z-05:00Z). The RF will execute the strategic deep ballistic launch during the pre-dawn hours (03:00Z-05:00Z). This timing optimizes the impact on tired UAF AD personnel and maximizes the destructive effect before morning visibility improves for BDA and recovery operations. IO operations targeting Kyiv are expected to maintain peak intensity during this window.

MDCOA (Most Dangerous Course of Action): Deep Strike Decapitation. RF utilizes the current IO stress and AD engagement patterns to mask a complex strike package specifically designed to target high-level Command and Control (C2) or political decision-making centers in the deep rear (e.g., Kyiv, Dnipro). Such a strike would precede the 260th GRAU artillery surge, severely crippling UAF reaction capability during the RF ground offensive.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements