Situation Report

Situation Update (UTC)

DTG: 2025-12-15T01:35Z PRIORITY: CRITICAL (Ballistic Threat & Immediate Aerial Engagement)

Key updates since last sitrep

• KAB Launches (Donetsk): UAF Air Force confirms multiple Guided Aerial Bomb (KAB) launches targeting assets within Donetsk Oblast (01:29:30, UAF AF, HIGH). This validates predictive intelligence regarding RF's reliance on high-yield air-delivered fires in the Eastern Axis.
• UAV Threat Tracking (Dnipropetrovsk): A slow-speed Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), assessed as a Shahed-series asset, was detected in eastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and is tracking directly toward Nikopol (01:31:57, UAF AF, HIGH). This initiates an immediate AD engagement and validates the CRITICAL threat level regarding aerial intrusions into the operational rear.
• Ballistic Strike Imminent: The anticipated high-speed ballistic missile strike (Kinzhals/Iskander), predicted for the 01:00Z - 04:00Z window, has not yet occurred (Analyst Judgment, MEDIUM). The RF is demonstrating kinetic flexibility by prioritizing KAB and UAV strikes ahead of or simultaneous with the predicted strategic launch.
• RF IO Activity: Russian state media (TASS) released information confirming no Russian casualties in the Sydney terror incident, a standard information operation designed to occupy news space and demonstrate state control/concern over external events (01:29:37, TASS, HIGH).

Operational picture (by sector)

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Current Threat Level: CRITICAL (Anticipated Ballistic Strike) / HIGH (Aerial Bombardment)

1. Kinetic Sequencing: RF is currently executing a complex, multi-domain attack profile by initiating localized KAB saturation (Donetsk) and deploying Shahed assets (Nikopol) while holding the predicted strategic ballistic strike in reserve. This sequence aims to stress UAF AD engagement procedures—forcing them to choose between low-value/immediate threats (Shahed/KAB) and high-value/strategic threats (Ballistic).
2. KAB Purpose: The KAB usage in Donetsk signals that RF commanders intend to maintain destructive pressure on the Eastern Axis even before the arrival of the 260th GRAU artillery surge materials. This effort is likely concentrated on destroying hardened UAF field fortifications that slowed previous mechanized advances (e.g., near Pokrovsk).
3. Logistics Threat: The UAV targeting Nikopol (01:31:57) is geographically relevant to the Southern operational rear. If successful, such strikes could degrade critical logistical routes supporting UAF operations in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts, fitting the MDCOA defined in the previous daily report (Logistical Strangulation).

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF Air Defense Commands are actively tracking and managing engagement vectors for the inbound UAV threat near Nikopol. UAF forces in Donetsk Oblast are responding to KAB impact sites and initiating immediate damage control procedures. The immediate requirement is to sustain AD readiness for the expected ballistic strike while efficiently downing the lower-tier Shahed threat to prevent secondary damage and disruption.

Information environment / disinformation

RF official sources (TASS) continue a pattern of issuing minor, external news stories during periods of high conflict activity. This distracts domestic audiences and attempts to maintain an image of normalcy in Russian governance, despite escalating manpower demands (MVD recruitment, per previous sitrep). No new, high-intensity disinformation campaigns were observed in the reporting window.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

MLCOA (Most Likely Course of Action): Ballistic Launch and Full Aerial Saturation RF will execute the deep ballistic strike within the next 3 hours (before 04:00Z). This strategic strike will likely be timed to coincide with, or immediately follow, the next wave of Shaheds (potentially utilizing the 100kg variant confirmed in the previous daily report) to maximize the saturation effect on UAF AD processing and resource allocation. Ground operations will remain focused on fire superiority (KABs/TOS) in preparation for a localized push.

MDCOA (Most Dangerous Course of Action): Targeting of AD Networks RF uses the current KAB/UAV saturation to confirm the location of key UAF AD networks in Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia. The impending strategic ballistic launch then deliberately targets those identified AD assets, aiming to create a significant, lasting kinetic gap in UAF defenses ahead of the 260th GRAU artillery surge or a major mechanized thrust in the East.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

The shift in confirmed kinetic activity requires immediate tactical BDA collection to inform friendly force disposition and movement.