Archived operational intelligence briefing
| Sector | Current Status & New Activity | Confidence | Analysis |
|---|---|---|---|
| Northern Axis (Air/UAV) | Ballistic threat terminated (12:35Z). Immediate pivot to KAB strikes targeting Chernihiv (12:36Z). UAVs confirmed targeting Sumy (from North) and Kharkiv (from East/West) (12:31Z, 12:37Z). | HIGH | RF is shifting kinetic pressure immediately from high-value ballistic targets to broad CIK/logistics interdiction across the Northern belt using affordable, less-defensible munitions (KAB/UAVs). |
| Eastern Axis (Siversk) | An urgent, uncorroborated report suggests the military situation at Siversk is critical (12:32Z). | LOW | Requires urgent ISR verification. This report may indicate intense local engagement or RF attempts to capitalize on force distribution gaps. |
| Zaporizhzhia Front (Rear) | BDA update: 11 casualties and power disruption (>1000 customers) in Zaporizhzhia city (12:11Z, 12:20Z). RF MoD released video claiming action near Huliaipole (12:25Z). | HIGH (BDA) / MEDIUM (Ground) | RF sustains indiscriminate targeting of civilian CIK. RF IO is actively promoting claims in the Huliaipole area, likely to divert UAF attention or solidify informational momentum ahead of negotiations. |
| Operational Rear (RF Territory) | SSO struck an RF logistics train (12:26Z). Fatal crash of a massive RF An-22 transport aircraft in Ivanovo Oblast (12:27Z). | HIGH | Significant, immediate degradation of RF heavy airlift capacity, compounding the long-term logistical impact from the confirmed refinery strikes (Saratov/Southern RF). |
Kinetic Operations (Air/Missile/Drone): The enemy successfully executed a rapid escalation/de-escalation cycle, immediately terminating the high-risk ballistic threat (12:35Z) but immediately initiating a secondary wave of KAB and UAV strikes targeting a wider geographical area. The expansion of KAB launches into Chernihiv Oblast is a critical change in the threat environment, indicating RF now prioritizes saturation strikes deeper into the Northern sector rear.
Ground Operations: RF continues localized fixing attacks. Claims of action at Huliaipole are consistent with previous IO objectives. The unconfirmed "critical situation" at Siversk (12:32Z) represents the highest potential point of localized tactical danger and may signal an RF push designed to create favorable positions before any diplomatic breakthrough.
Logistics and Sustainment (MAJOR DEGRADATION): The loss of the An-22 (Ivanovo) is a quantifiable setback for RF military logistics, specifically the high-volume, long-range movement of equipment and personnel. When combined with the confirmed damage to two major refineries (previous sitrep) and the successful SSO strike on a logistics train (12:26Z), RF sustainment is under synchronized attack across tactical and strategic domains.
Command and Control / Intentions: RF intention is clearly to utilize air assets for immediate punitive action following UAF deep strikes, while simultaneously increasing pressure on the Eastern axis (Siversk, Huliaipole IO). The public signaling by Peskov (12:37Z) confirms RF demands explicit security guarantees against future sabotage of any diplomatic agreement, indicating a focus on securing political advantage during the Berlin meetings.
Deep Strike / Tactical Success: The SSO confirmed the precision interdiction of a moving RF logistics train using FP-2 strike UAVs (12:26Z), demonstrating sustained UAF ability to disrupt tactical supply lines. The 67th Mechanized Brigade ("Iron Falcons") released combat footage confirming destruction of enemy personnel and defensive positions (12:19Z).
Diplomatic Maneuver: President Zelenskyy confirmed his arrival in Germany (12:25Z) to discuss security guarantees with the American negotiation team (12:30Z). This crucial high-level engagement directly supports the diplomatic pillar of UAF defense. Unconfirmed reports indicate a future visit to Poland (12:20Z), likely related to ongoing security or logistics support (Dempster-Shafer belief: 0.005840 - Agreement on support with Poland).
The IO campaign is currently concentrated on undermining the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government leadership while they are engaged in critical high-level negotiations:
MLCOA (Northern CIK Degradation & IO Push): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF forces will maintain the expanded KAB and UAV pressure campaign targeting CIK nodes in the Northern Axis (Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv). This air campaign will be synchronized with a sustained, intense informational effort designed to distract from the diplomatic mission in Germany, focusing specifically on promoting narratives of internal UAF weakness, corruption, and tactical setbacks (Huliaipole).
MDCOA (Siversk Tactical Breakthrough): (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF operational command may attempt to leverage the diplomatic window and the dispersed nature of UAF air defense assets (responding to new KAB threats) to launch a concentrated, localized ground assault aimed at achieving a structural breakthrough in the Siversk sector, as suggested by the urgent warning. If successful, this could threaten the flank stability of the Bakhmut-Kramatorsk defense line.
| Priority | Gap Description | Requirement (Platform/Source) | Justification |
|---|---|---|---|
| P1 (CRITICAL) | Siversk Tactical Status. Immediate confirmation or denial of RF ground advance or structural failure near Siversk. | Tactical ISR (UAV, EW SIGINT) focused on 3-5 km depth of engagement zone. | Essential for force allocation and preventing MDCOA (Siversk breakthrough). |
| P1 (URGENT) | Varvarovka Status Confirmation. Confirm or deny RF physical control of Varvarovka (Zaporizhzhia region). (REITERATED) | Tactical ISR (UAV/EW SIGINT) focused on Vostok Group disposition south of Huliaipole. | Remains critical for UAF defensive line adjustment, especially given continued RF IO activity in Huliaipole. |
| P2 (PRIORITY) | RF An-22 Crash Impact Assessment. Determine specific cargo/personnel lost in the Ivanovo crash and project the timeline for recovery of this heavy airlift capacity. | OSINT/IMINT (Russian social media, aviation forums, satellite imagery). | Quantify the tactical/strategic impact of this material loss on future RF deployment capability. |
| P2 (PRIORITY) | Chernihiv KAB Targeting. Identify specific target types (CIK, military HQ, residential) being hit in the new KAB strike area (Chernihiv). | AD INTEL, Ground Reporting (OVA/Police) post-impact. | Required to anticipate RF operational focus: CIK, logistics, or fixing UAF AD assets. |
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