Archived operational intelligence briefing
| Sector | Current Status & New Activity | Confidence | Analysis |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zaporizhzhia (Huliaipole/Orikhiv) | RF sources (Rybar) are focusing informational effort on "clearing" Varvarovka (11:32Z). This suggests the fight for the terrain is still ongoing or the claims are premature. The area remains a primary RF ground effort vector, supporting the Adaptive Squeeze MLCOA. | MEDIUM (Claims UNCONFIRMED, focus HIGH) | RF is attempting to force a tactical gain to increase leverage in ongoing diplomatic negotiations (MLCOA). P1 ISR tasking remains critical. |
| Eastern Axis (Donbas) | No new kinetic reports since the KAB saturation warning (10:43Z). Diplomatic statements confirm this sector is central to peace negotiations, with Kyiv willing to discuss a status quo ceasefire line (11:19Z). | HIGH | The operational tempo in this sector remains high despite the diplomatic engagement. UAF is attempting to convert the recent "Skelya 425" counter-attack success into a strong negotiating position. |
| Southern Axis (Odesa) | UAV threat remains active (11:15Z). Immediate infrastructure threat continues. | HIGH | RF persists in degrading UAF logistical capacity and compounding the systemic infrastructure failure previously reported. |
| Operational Rear (RF Territory) | RF claimed massive UAF drone strikes on RF energy facilities (11:30Z). | LOW (RF Claim UNCONFIRMED) | If verified, this represents UAF willingness to conduct deep precision strikes on RF critical infrastructure, aligning with the MDCOA of reciprocal escalation. |
Ground Operations: RF forces continue to prioritize the claimed tactical breakthrough in Eastern Zaporizhzhia (Varvarovka). The repetition of this claim across multiple RF milblogger channels (Rybar, Poddubny) suggests a coordinated informational/psychological effort designed to fix UAF attention and prevent reinforcement of other critical sectors like Pokrovsk.
Air/Missile/Drone Threat: The threat level remains CRITICAL in the South, where the Shahed attack is ongoing (11:15Z). The alleged UAF counter-strike on RF energy infrastructure (11:30Z) suggests that the RF force protection posture for CIK (Critical Infrastructure Key resources) on its own territory may be vulnerable to UAF long-range UAVs.
Information Warfare/Hybrid Operations: RF Information Operations (IO) are deeply integrated with the diplomatic maneuvering:
Diplomatic Maneuver (Primary Operational Domain): UAF High Command is leveraging the current operational resilience (e.g., Pokrovsk counter-attack) to negotiate from a position of relative strength, despite acknowledging the need for "compromises."
Kinetic Activity: UAF Air Defense is managing the ongoing UAV threat in the Southern Axis (11:15Z).
The informational environment is characterized by intense RF efforts to undermine diplomatic progress and project a false sense of territorial momentum.
MLCOA (Diplomacy-Driven Kinetic Pressure): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF forces will maintain focused kinetic pressure in the Zaporizhzhia sector (Huliaipole/Varvarovka) and sustained UAV attacks on Odesa/Southern infrastructure throughout the Berlin negotiation window. The tactical goal is not necessarily a massive breakthrough but securing enough of a perceived victory (e.g., confirmation of Varvarovka) to influence the immediate negotiation stance.
MDCOA (Breakdown of Disengagement Proposal): (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF rejects the reciprocal disengagement proposal (as framed by Zelenskyy regarding governance and mutual withdrawal distances) and instead initiates a high-intensity fire assault (either the delayed 260th GRAU artillery or expanded KAB use) against the Donetsk/Dnipropetrovsk administrative boundary to force a rapid, unilateral UAF retreat in the Donbas rather than a negotiated buffer zone.
| Priority | Gap Description | Requirement (Platform/Source) | Justification |
|---|---|---|---|
| P1 (URGENT) | Varvarovka Status Confirmation. Confirm or deny RF physical control of Varvarovka (Zaporizhzhia region). (REITERATED) | Tactical ISR (UAV/EW SIGINT) focused on Vostok Group disposition south of Huliaipole. | Essential for adjusting UAF defensive lines and countering RF operational momentum claims during diplomatic talks. |
| P2 (PRIORITY) | UAF Deep Strike BDA (RF Territory). Verify the RF claim of a massive UAF drone strike on RF energy infrastructure (Dec 14th) and identify target locations. | OSINT/IMINT focused on Russian internal reports/damage assessment, Satellite imagery. | Required to assess UAF capabilities for reciprocal deep-strike operations and potential RF retaliation calculus. |
| P3 (PRIORITY) | US Compromise Governance Details. Obtain further details on the proposed governance structure and monitoring mechanisms for the proposed Donbas disengagement zone. | HUMINT/OSINT monitoring of US, German, and Ukrainian statements post-Berlin meeting. | Influences UAF ability to negotiate protective security guarantees and defines the risk of an unmonitored vacuum. |
| P4 (ROUTINE) | Shahed Strike BDA (Odesa). Determine specific targets and severity of damage from the ongoing Shahed attack. | AD INTEL/Ground reporting from Odesa OVA/National Guard. | Required for prioritizing repair crews and allocating remaining mobile AD assets. |
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