Situation Report

Situation Update (UTC)

DTG: 2025-12-14T09:10Z PRIORITY: CRITICAL (RF forces are continuing the targeted deep strike campaign against critical logistics nodes, demonstrating active commitment to achieving GLOC severance in the Southern Operational Zone (OZ) and the Eastern OZ boundary.)

Key updates since last sitrep

• Zatoka Bridge / Odesa Area Under Direct Threat: Strike UAVs were detected approaching Serhiivka and the Zatoka bridge area (08:47:01, AFU AF, HIGH). This activity was immediately followed by RF channels broadcasting attack footage from Zatoka (08:47:51, Kotsnews, MEDIUM), indicating high confidence in follow-on kinetic action or active BDA in the critical GLOC area.
• KAB Campaign Sustained (SE Axis): New launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB) confirmed targeting Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts (09:08:22, AFU AF, HIGH). This validates the enemy MLCOA to surgically disrupt the Eastern logistics tail.
• Zaporizhzhia City Sustained Strikes: Multiple kinetic strikes confirmed across different districts of Zaporizhzhia City, causing civilian casualties (4 wounded) and targeting civil infrastructure (supermarket/store) (08:55:06, STERNENKO, HIGH).
• RF Logistical Systemic Stress: Critical reporting from Russian sources indicates significant logistical shortcomings, including VDV units relying on stalled public crowdfunding for "assault measures" and food delivery (09:05:01, Arkhangel Spetsnaza, HIGH) and claims of starvation among RF forces on Dnieper Delta islands (09:07:01, BUTUSOV PLUS, MEDIUM).
• Kherson Water Infrastructure Hit: RF shelling targeted critical water supply infrastructure in Kherson, causing city-wide water shortages (08:56:18, Operatyvny ZSU, HIGH).

Operational picture (by sector)

Southern Axis (Odesa/Black Sea Coast)

The threat to the Zatoka railway bridge remains the single most critical operational vulnerability. Confirmed UAV activity approaching Serhiivka and Zatoka (08:47Z) combined with immediate RF propaganda broadcasting alleged attack footage indicates a high probability of follow-on BDA or kinetic attempts to ensure GLOC severance. The operational objective of the RF is demonstrably the isolation of the Southern OZ.

Southeastern Axis (Zaporizhzhia)

RF kinetic pressure is maintained via combined aerial assets. The confirmed KAB strikes (09:08Z) targeting the critical logistics boundary (Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia) are executing the RF operational plan to degrade Eastern supply routes. Within Zaporizhzhia City, UAV/missile strikes have inflicted collateral damage and casualties in civilian areas (08:55Z), signaling an intent to maintain psychological pressure and exhaust emergency services.

Eastern Axis (Pokrovsk/Donbas)

The tactical situation around Pokrovsk remains contested, supported by recent documentation of a successful UAF interdiction of an RF motorized column near Hryshyne on 10 DEC (08:47Z). This indicates UAF is successfully preventing the RF from translating local breakthroughs into operational depth, despite the escalating KAB threat to their rear logistics.

Kherson Sector

RF forces are prioritizing non-kinetic targeting to degrade civilian resilience and administrative function. Direct shelling of centralized water supply systems (08:56Z) creates widespread resource constraints, forcing UAF and civil administration to divert manpower to stability and restoration efforts. Logistical friction within forward RF units (starvation claims on Dnieper Delta islands, 09:07Z) suggests that RF occupation and holding forces in this sector are critically under-resourced.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

The primary threat remains the synchronized application of air power (KAB/UAVs) to achieve Logistical Operational Paralysis, coupled with exploiting internal logistical fragility within secondary RF units.

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF is balancing immediate defensive requirements with long-term modernization efforts.

1. Defense of Depth: Successful defense against RF thrusts near Pokrovsk validates the continued operational effectiveness of high-mobility units ("Skelya 425") in securing key terrain.
2. Force Generation: Continued documentation of high-level cadet training utilizing advanced simulation technology (Wartac in Germany) ensures future force readiness.
3. Crisis Management: UAF resources are engaged in immediate AD response in Odesa/Zatoka and managing the fallout of infrastructural attacks across multiple oblasts (Kherson water supply).

Information environment / disinformation

RF IO focuses on undermining Ukrainian morale and international support by:

1. Domestic Deception: Masking severe logistical failures (VDV funding appeal) with appeals for public support, shifting the burden of military sustainment onto the civilian population while denying systemic problems.
2. Political Friction: Immediately utilizing alleged diplomatic reports (Zelenskyy’s response to "Trump plan") to foster mistrust and doubt regarding Ukraine's commitment to diplomatic resolution among Western audiences.
3. Exploiting Instability: Diversionary focus on international terror events to normalize global violence and dilute attention on Russian aggression.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

MLCOA (Targeted GLOC Destruction and Fixing): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF forces will execute follow-up kinetic action (KABs, UAV swarms, or potentially cruise missiles) against the Zatoka railway bridge and adjacent infrastructure (Serhiivka) to guarantee GLOC severance before UAF can implement countermeasures. Concurrently, KAB concentration will remain high along the Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia rail corridor. Ground forces will maintain pressure (Pokrovsk, Varvarivka, Huliaipole) but will not commit to decisive breakthroughs unless logistical damage permits a high probability of success.

MDCOA (Simultaneous Logistical & Internal Collapse): (CRITICAL CONFIDENCE) RF achieves success in destroying or rendering the Zatoka bridge non-operational, immediately isolating the Southern OZ supply lines. This severe logistical shock is timed with an increased intensity of hybrid operations in the affected oblasts (Odesa, Kherson) focusing on exploiting the water/energy crisis to incite localized unrest or attacks on TCCs/police infrastructure, forcing UAF to divert high-readiness units away from the front lines during a period of critical resupply weakness.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

The operational picture is entirely dominated by the need for immediate BDA on critical infrastructure.