Archived operational intelligence briefing
DTG: 2025-12-13T23:59Z Focus: UAF deep strike operations demonstrate continued operational expansion, now impacting critical infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai (Afipsky). The Southern Axis remains the key point of friction as the critical window for RF hybrid operations in Odesa approaches (NLT 140600Z).
The confirmed UAV penetration into Krasnodar Krai significantly increases the strategic strain on RF Air Defense (AD) posture. The Afipsky area, potentially targeting the local refinery or nearby military infrastructure, directly threatens fuel supply chains essential for the Southern and Crimean axes, complementing the disruptive effects of the Uryupinsk strike on the Eastern Axis. RF is now compelled to defend a geographically vast arc stretching from Krasnodar to Volgograd.
UAF activity is high, evidenced by the western trajectory of the UAV group over Mykolaiv. This movement is assessed to be either aggressive ISR to confirm RF naval/ground positioning or a kinetic strike preparation against specific targets (e.g., ammunition depots, air defense systems) prior to the anticipated RF hybrid execution in Odesa (NLT 140600Z).
The tactical situation remains highly contested (Pokrovsk), but the strategic situation is fluid due to logistics vulnerability. The confirmed strikes in Volgograd (Uryupinsk) and Krasnodar (Afipsky) will require RF C2 to prioritize defensive measures and damage assessment over immediate offensive resupply, potentially reducing the operational tempo of mechanized thrusts planned for Pokrovsk and Kupyansk in the short term (T+6h).
1. Logistics and C2 Strain (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The combined deep strike campaign (Uryupinsk/Afipsky) forces RF command to make difficult choices regarding strategic AD allocation, particularly for high-value infrastructure. The immediate consequence is assessed as a potential degradation of fuel distribution fluidity across both the Southern and Eastern Military Districts.
2. Persistent Hybrid Threat (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The Odesa threat remains critical. The intelligence window is closing (NLT 140600Z). RF preparatory ISR (previously reported Kherson activity) coupled with the strategic distraction of the deep strikes is consistent with a high probability of execution for organized proxy attacks leveraging civil unrest caused by infrastructure failure.
3. Counter-Narrative Shaping (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): The prominent promotion of RF ZALA UAV capabilities serves a dual purpose: reinforcing RF forces in the tactical domain by highlighting air/ISR advantages, and distracting from the systemic failure of strategic air defense in the operational rear.
UAF maintains strategic initiative in the deep kinetic domain, successfully holding critical RF infrastructure at risk across multiple military districts. Tactical UAF forces are exhibiting proactive ISR/strike preparation on the Southern Axis, demonstrating responsiveness to the immediate RF threat profile.
RF IO focuses on showcasing specific military technology (ZALA UAV) to normalize domestic military activity and counter the recent narrative of widespread UAF strike success. This effort aims to stabilize morale amongst frontline units facing deep strike logistical friction and assure the domestic population of continued battlefield advantage.
MLCOA (Coordinated Hybrid Strike and Logistics Defense): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF forces will initiate organized hybrid operations targeting TCCs and police infrastructure in Odesa before 140600Z, attempting to disrupt UAF Southern logistics and command structure. Simultaneously, RF will prioritize immediate damage assessment and security hardening (AD reallocation and counter-UAV/sabotage measures) around high-value logistics nodes (refineries, rail hubs) in Krasnodar and Volgograd regions.
MDCOA (Retaliatory Escalation and Mass Denial): (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF Command utilizes the confusion created by deep strikes and potential internal Odesa turmoil to execute massed, retaliatory missile and KAB strikes targeting key UAF C2 nodes and infrastructure (potentially including a feint or escalation involving ZNPP instability previously reported). The aim is to achieve systemic operational paralysis on the UAF Southern Axis.
| Priority | Gap Description | Collection Requirement (ISR Tasking) |
|---|---|---|
| P1 (CRITICAL) | Odesa Hybrid Execution Indicators: Immediate indicators of organized RF proxy groups preparing to physically attack TCC/Police infrastructure in Odesa. (Execution phase imminent) | Task SBU/National Guard HUMINT/SIGINT for verified reports of planned gatherings, specific targets, and logistical support. |
| P2 (CRITICAL) | Afipsky/Uryupinsk Damage Assessment: Determine the extent of damage at the Afipsky site and Uryupinsk oil depot, specifically targeting the quantifiable impact on RF fuel reserves and logistics throughput (Rostov/Crimea/Eastern fronts). | Task GEOINT/IMINT (Satellite/OSINT imagery) for Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) over Afipsky and Uryupinsk. Quantify disruption NLT 140600Z. |
| P3 (URGENT) | UAF Mykolaiv UAV Intent: Determine the target and mission profile (ISR, SEAD, or kinetic strike) of the UAF UAV group detected moving west over Mykolaiv, particularly in relation to the Odesa threat. | Task ELINT/COMINT/Local UAF C2 to confirm mission status and flight plan. Determine target NLT 140100Z. |
| P4 (PRIORITY) | RF AD Reallocation (South/East): Identify any newly deployed or redirected RF Strategic Air Defense assets (e.g., S-400s) protecting logistics routes or high-value infrastructure in the Rostov/Volgograd/Krasnodar MDs. | Task SIGINT/IMINT focused on RF AD/EW spectrum analysis in the Southern Military District operational rear, specifically the Afipsky/Novorossiysk axis. |
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