Situation Report

Situation Update (UTC)

DTG: 2025-12-13T16:10Z

Key updates since last sitrep

• RF UAV Activity (North) (15:52Z, Повітряні Сили ЗСУ, HIGH): A Russian Federation (RF) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) was detected entering Chernihiv Oblast, moving toward Kholmy/Koryukivka. This confirms renewed low-altitude ISR/strike probing in the Northern Axis, requiring a change in local Air Defense posture.
• Immediate UAV Threat (South) (16:06Z, Повітряні Сили ЗСУ, HIGH): A UAV was launched from the Black Sea waters targeting the Odesa region (vicinity of Yuzhne). This confirms a critical, time-sensitive kinetic threat to maritime/port infrastructure in the Southern Operational Command (OC South).
• Civilian Repatriation from Belarus (15:46Z, Координаційний штаб, HIGH): 114 Ukrainian civilians were successfully repatriated from the Republic of Belarus under Presidential authority. This confirms the stability and utility of the diplomatic channel with Minsk/Washington for detainee exchanges.
• RF PVO Success over Bryansk (15:53Z, AV БогомаZ, HIGH): RF Air Defense (PVO) units claimed the detection and destruction of a fixed-wing UAF UAV over Bryansk Oblast, confirming UAF attempts to execute deep ISR or kinetic strikes continue.
• Slovak PM Fico Calls for Russia Rapprochement (15:40Z, ТАСС, HIGH): Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico called for the restoration of economic relations and commissions with the RF, representing a confirmed vector of fracture in unified Western support and a strategic intelligence victory for Moscow.
• RF Reconfirms IO Target (16:05Z, Народная милиция ДНР, LOW): RF/DPR propaganda claimed the downing of a UAF drone over "encircled Dimitrov." This confirms that Dimitrov (the pre-2016 name for Myrnohrad) is the specific target for RF informational warfare, reinforcing the previous assessment of a deep informational feint.

Operational picture (by sector)

Eastern Operational Command (Donetsk Axis)

Status: Highly Contested (Pokrovsk), Sustained IO Pressure The UAF tactical gain of 16 sq km near Pokrovsk remains confirmed (15:55Z). The enemy is reacting to this consolidation via aggressive informational warfare (IO). RF channels are using the archaic name "Dimitrov" (Myrnohrad) (16:05Z) to continue pushing the false narrative of deep encirclement and breakthrough toward Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. This IO is likely designed to fix UAF reserves and distract from the Pokrovsk success. Immediate ground verification remains critical (CR P1).

Northern Operational Command (Kyiv/Chernihiv/Sumy)

Status: Renewed ISR Activity UAF Air Force reported a UAV track entering Chernihiv Oblast (15:52Z), moving southwest towards Kholmy/Koryukivka. This marks a potential operational shift, indicating RF intent to probe vulnerabilities or conduct targeted strikes/ISR deep into the UAF Northern rear. RF PVO activity over Bryansk (15:53Z) confirms that UAF deep strike/ISR operations are continuing, drawing a kinetic response from RF strategic PVO assets.

Southern Operational Command (Odesa/Black Sea)

Status: Elevated Kinetic Threat to Maritime Logistics A confirmed UAV launch from the Black Sea targeting Yuzhne/Odesa (16:06Z) represents an immediate and specific threat to port facilities and naval access routes. This aligns with the previous MDCOA assessment of a kinetic/hybrid attack against the Black Sea supply line, leveraging the existing power instability in Odesa (as per the daily report). AD assets must be prioritized for dynamic interdiction in this area.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Assessment: HIGH – IO Penetration and Multi-Domain UAV Probing

1. Sustained Deep IO/Feint (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF continues to use highly localized, specific claims (e.g., "encircled Dimitrov," 16:05Z) to create a perception of operational success far exceeding ground reality. This campaign is strategically designed to pressure UAF logistical hubs and decision-makers by forcing resources toward Myrnohrad/Dnipropetrovsk based on fear rather than fact.
2. UAV Vector Expansion (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The simultaneous detection of UAVs in Chernihiv (15:52Z) and over the Black Sea/Odesa (16:06Z) indicates a coordinated multi-domain effort to stress UAF air defense assets across geographically diverse axes. The intent is likely to maximize opportunities for KAB strikes or massing ground forces while AD capacity is dispersed.
3. Logistics/Equipment Adaptation: RF channels continue to promote technological adaptations (UGV "Depesha" in the previous sitrep). Separately, RF IO used a highly visible, detailed animated map of strikes (15:43Z), demonstrating intent to visually boast about sustained high tempo strike capabilities despite potential logistical friction (rail derailment noted in the previous sitrep).

Friendly activity (UAF)

1. Tactical Consolidation: The quantification and re-confirmation of 16 sq km regained in the Pokrovsk area by CinC Syrskyi (15:55Z) is crucial for maintaining morale and validating the successful counter-attack ("Skelya 425").
2. Diplomatic Success: The repatriation of 114 civilians from Belarus (15:46Z) confirms a functioning, discreet prisoner/civilian exchange mechanism, successfully mitigating a humanitarian and political pressure point.

Information environment / disinformation

1. Erosion of Western Unity (HIGH IMPACT): Slovak PM Fico's statement (15:40Z) provides significant leverage for RF strategic communications, confirming the RF narrative that Western coalition unity is fractured and unsustainable. This will be immediately amplified to undermine EU resolve regarding sanctions and aid continuity.
2. Electoral Legitimacy Campaign (CRITICAL): RF propaganda is aggressively targeting the legitimacy of potential Ukrainian elections, alleging the need for "mass repression" (15:46Z, 16:00Z). This narrative is a direct attempt to destabilize the political landscape and erode international legitimacy, coinciding with internal discussions regarding the future of the wartime government.
3. Propaganda Visualization: RF use of detailed, animated strike maps (15:43Z) is a form of operational theater, designed to project unstoppable kinetic power to both domestic and international audiences, masking tactical failures.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The immediate kinetic outlook is dominated by UAV threats in the South and North, likely acting as precursors to follow-on kinetic or IO operations. RF forces will maintain pressure on the Pokrovsk flanks while simultaneously attempting to fracture Western diplomatic unity using the Fico statements.

Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

Coordinated UAV/KAB Pinpoint Strikes (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF will utilize the confirmed UAV presence in the Chernihiv and Odesa axes to identify critical infrastructure or air defense sites. This ISR will immediately precede targeted KAB or missile strikes aimed at interdicting critical logistical nodes (Dnipro boundary) and pressuring port facilities (Odesa/Yuzhne).

Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

Deep Strike on Northern Reserves (MEDIUM Confidence): Based on the Chernihiv UAV detection (15:52Z), RF utilizes long-range strike assets (missiles/Shahed UAVs) to attack reserve staging areas or forward command posts in the Kholmy/Koryukivka area, forcing OC North to divert reinforcements intended for the critical Eastern Axis.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)

1. AIR DEFENSE (J3/J7): NORTHERN/SOUTHERN UAV INTERDICTION.

   • Action A (CRITICAL): Immediately elevate alert status and task mobile EW/SHORAD assets to patrol the projected UAV track in Chernihiv Oblast (Kholmy/Koryukivka area). This area may be unprotected against this new threat vector (CR P2).
   • Action B (IMMEDIATE): Divert available SHORAD capacity to protect critical port infrastructure near Yuzhne/Odesa to mitigate the confirmed Black Sea-launched UAV threat (16:06Z).

2. FORCE MANEUVER (OC East): POKROVSK DEFENSE INTEGRATION.

   • Action A (CRITICAL): Leverage the confirmed tactical success (16 sq km) to rapidly prepare and integrate new defensive fire support plans. Emphasize counter-battery fire against RF forces that may attempt to use artillery in support of the Io feint against Dimitrov/Myrnohrad (CR P1).

3. STRATCOM/IO (J9): COUNTER FICO AND ELECTORAL DISINFORMATION.

   • Action A (IMMEDIATE): Prepare a coordinated diplomatic response to the Slovak PM Fico statement, emphasizing the unified EU stance on sanctions and minimizing the appearance of internal Western discord.
   • Action B: Proactively debunk the RF electoral legitimacy campaign (15:46Z, 16:00Z) by issuing statements confirming the government’s operational focus is solely on maintaining combat effectiveness and infrastructure stability.