Situation Report

Situation Update (15:39Z, 13 DEC 2025)

Key updates since last sitrep

• Quantified UAF Gain in Pokrovsk (15:33Z, ЦАПЛІЄНКО, HIGH): UAF Commander Syrskyi confirmed the recapture of 16 square kilometers of territory in the northern sector of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration over recent weeks. This quantifies and validates the previous assessment of a successful UAF counter-attack ("Skelya 425").
• RF Claims Deep Thrust towards Dnipropetrovsk (15:16Z, Операція Z, LOW/UNCONFIRMED): Russian military correspondents (RVvoenkor) claimed that the RF "Center" military grouping is assaulting the encircled city of Myrnohrad and advancing into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. This highly ambitious claim is likely IO designed to inflate operational success and destabilize the UAF rear.
• RF UGV "Depesha" Usage Promoted (15:11Z, WarGonzo, MEDIUM): RF channels are disseminating media promoting the operational deployment of the "Depesha" unmanned ground vehicle (UGV), framing it as a technological solution for battlefield logistics and troop survivability. This indicates RF intent to mitigate personnel risk via automation.
• RF Mobile AD Success near Kharkiv (15:15Z, Colonelcassad, HIGH): RF forces published evidence of a successful engagement by a mobile air defense group belonging to the "Sever" grouping near the Kharkiv border, confirming active and effective RF counter-UAV operations in the Northern Axis.
• Zaporizhzhia Air Raid Abolished (15:32Z, Zaporizhzhia OVA, HIGH): The air raid alarm in Zaporizhzhia Oblast has been terminated, temporarily signaling a reduction in the immediate deep-fire threat (KAB/Missile) that characterized the sector earlier today.
• Strategic Sanctions Entered Force (15:10Z, Оперативний ЗСУ, HIGH): Ukraine confirmed the entry into force of sanctions against nearly 700 RF-affiliated maritime vessels across over 50 jurisdictions, directly targeting the financing of the war effort.

Operational picture (by sector)

Eastern Operational Command (Donetsk Axis)

Status: Stabilized Front Line, High Risk of RF Feint/Deep Attack UAF defensive geometry in the Pokrovsk area is confirmed to be stable, with the counter-attack success quantified (16 sq km regained, 15:33Z). However, RF informational messaging is aggressively pushing the narrative of a deep breakthrough, claiming the encirclement of Myrnohrad (approximately 40km west of the contested line) and penetration into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (15:16Z). This disparity between RF claims and corroborated UAF ground truth suggests a strong likelihood of an informational feint preparing for localized attacks, or a diversionary effort to draw UAF reserves away from Pokrovsk.

Northern Operational Command (Kharkiv/Sumy)

Status: Sustained Kinetic and Counter-UAV Activity Kharkiv City center sustained a drone strike (15:21Z), resulting in minor damage, confirming the ongoing RF tactic of fixing UAF Air Defense. RF operational reporting confirms the effective use of mobile air defense units near the border (15:15Z), complicating UAF ISR and close-range drone operations in the cross-border area.

Southern Operational Command (Zaporizhzhia/Odesa)

Status: Temporary Reduction in Deep Fire Threat The air raid abolition in Zaporizhzhia (15:32Z) provides a brief window of opportunity to reposition the mobile air defense assets tasked following the earlier confirmed KAB strikes. The threat of large-scale KAB usage remains high (as per previous SITREP), but the immediate kinetic pressure has eased.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Assessment: HIGH – Ground Maneuver Intent (Exaggerated) and Technological Adaptation

1. Exaggerated Operational Claims (LOW CONFIDENCE): The aggressive claims regarding Myrnohrad and Dnipropetrovsk penetration (15:16Z) serve primarily an informational function. However, they indicate the RF intention to prioritize the geographic expansion of the conflict zone in their planning and propaganda, likely to pressure UAF logistical nodes in Dnipro/Kryvyi Rih.
2. UGV Deployment and Adaptation (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): The visible promotion and likely testing of the "Depesha" UGV (15:11Z) highlight RF efforts to adapt to high casualty rates by automating transport roles. If widely adopted, this could improve frontline sustainment velocity while reducing exposed logistics personnel.
3. Logistics Disruption Confirmed (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The confirmed operational friction in RF deep logistics, specifically the railway incident (15:36Z), will impose delays on the movement of heavy equipment and ammunition into the forward staging areas, potentially delaying or reducing the scope of the previously anticipated massive artillery barrage.
4. IO Targeting Western Aid (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF channels are actively framing unrelated political developments in donor countries (e.g., Czech Republic, 15:37Z) as evidence of failing and unsustainable Western support for Ukraine, attempting to weaken domestic resolve.

Friendly activity (UAF)

1. Tactical Success Quantified (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The confirmation of 16 sq km regained territory in the vital Pokrovsk area (15:33Z) stabilizes the Eastern Axis and provides a material and morale boost. This success must be rapidly exploited to consolidate the newly recaptured areas.
2. Strategic Economic Pressure (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The entry into force of the maritime sanctions package (15:10Z) represents a multi-jurisdictional strategic strike against the RF economy, complementing UAF Black Sea naval successes by increasing the cost and complexity of RF energy exports.
3. Key Personnel Skepticism (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): Former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili's statement regarding US security guarantees (15:33Z) introduces a potentially destabilizing narrative into the political-military domain, requiring careful diplomatic mitigation by Kyiv.

Information environment / disinformation

1. Operational Exaggeration Campaign: RF state media and military bloggers are using highly exaggerated claims (Myrnohrad encirclement, Kursk "adventure" aftermath, 15:16Z, 15:33Z) to mask the UAF tactical success at Pokrovsk and boost domestic morale.
2. Hybrid Warfare Vector (Odesa): Pro-RF channels are escalating rhetoric, openly endorsing attacks on "civilian vessels in international waters" and exploiting the Odesa power crisis to mock and antagonize residents (15:38Z). This rhetoric directly supports the previously identified hybrid threat targeting the Black Sea and Odesa civil stability.
3. Diplomatic Influence Operations: Reports of Turkey's optimistic peace statements (15:38Z) signal an increase in diplomatic mediation attempts which the RF will leverage to push for terms favorable to its current operational footprint.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

RF forces will likely attempt to capitalize on their self-proclaimed breakthrough by intensifying localized probing attacks near Myrnohrad/Pokrovsk, despite UAF reports of consolidation. The temporary lift of the deep-fire threat in Zaporizhzhia provides a tactical window for UAF resupply and redeployment in the South.

Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

Consolidated Push on Pokrovsk Flanks (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF forces, mitigating the effects of rail disruption, will continue fixing the UAF counter-attack success at Pokrovsk (16 sq km) while attempting to probe the flanks near the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad line to validate their deep informational claims. RF tactical aviation will resume KAB strikes rapidly following the current pause.

Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

Coordinated Hybrid/Kinetic Attack on the Black Sea Supply Line (MEDIUM Confidence): Leveraging the power instability in Odesa and aggressive IO rhetoric endorsing attacks on shipping, RF conducts a coordinated long-range missile/UAV strike on Odesa port infrastructure while simultaneously launching ground attacks in the South (Huliaipole) to divert UAF attention and prevent reinforcement of Black Sea defenses.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)

1. FORCE MANEUVER (OC East): POKROVSK CONSOLIDATION AND EXPLOITATION.

   • Action A (CRITICAL): Rapidly integrate the 16 sq km gain into a stabilized, prepared defense zone. Immediately conduct limited exploitation attacks to pressure RF forces before they can recover and redeploy reserves, leveraging the morale advantage from the confirmed success.
   • Action B (CRITICAL): Do not commit strategic reserves based solely on the unconfirmed, high-tempo RF claims regarding Myrnohrad (CR P1). Reserves should be positioned dynamically to respond to verified penetrations, not informational feints.

2. AIR DEFENSE (J3/J7): DYNAMIC KAB/UAV MITIGATION.

   • Action A (URGENT): Utilize the current air raid abolition window in Zaporizhzhia (15:32Z) to urgently reposition mobile SHORAD assets based on P4 CR intelligence. Ensure assets are dispersed and hardened to prevent RF counter-suppression of air defenses.

3. STRATCOM/IO (J9): COUNTER DEEP PENETRATION CLAIMS.

   • Action A (IMMEDIATE): Preemptively deny the Myrnohrad/Dnipropetrovsk claims (15:16Z) using the verified UAF gain in Pokrovsk (16 sq km) as counter-evidence, framing RF claims as desperate disinformation.
   • Action B: Develop counter-narratives and fact checks to address the targeting of Western aid sustainability (15:37Z) and the skepticism regarding security guarantees (15:33Z).