Situation Report

Situation Update (15:10Z, 13 DEC 2025)

This update focuses on the geographical diversification of RF guided ordnance threats into the Southern Operational Zone (Zaporizhzhia) and the implementation of a significant UAF strategic economic action against Russian maritime financing.

Key updates since last sitrep

• KAB Strikes Confirmed in Zaporizhzhia (15:01Z, Air Force UAF, HIGH): UAF Air Force confirmed ongoing Russian guided aerial bomb (KAB) launches targeting the Zaporizhzhia region, confirming the sustained, theater-wide operational use of glide bombs across the entire Southern Operational Zone perimeter.
• Major Maritime Sanctions Package Implemented (15:06Z, Zelenskiy Official, HIGH): Ukraine implemented sanctions against nearly 700 maritime vessels (tankers and cargo ships) utilized by the RF for energy resource transport across over 50 jurisdictions. This constitutes Ukraine's largest sanctions package specifically targeting the financing of the RF war effort via maritime trade.
• Aggressive RF Recruitment Drive (15:01Z, Два майора, MEDIUM): RF launched a renewed, financially incentivized contract recruitment advertisement campaign targeting high-density civilian centers, specifically Moscow Oblast (Podmoskovye), indicating a sustained need for replacement personnel due to high attrition.
• RF Disinformation Targeting UAF C2 (15:01Z, TASS, LOW): RF state media disseminated an unconfirmed POW testimonial claiming UAF command sent personnel into Siversk without accurate situational awareness that the town was already controlled by RF forces, an attempt to erode UAF command integrity.

Operational picture (by sector)

Southern Operational Command (Zaporizhzhia Front)

Status: High Kinetic Pressure via Stand-off Ordnance The confirmed KAB launches in Zaporizhzhia (15:01Z) demonstrate that RF tactical aviation is actively applying heavy guided ordnance pressure against the UAF defenses throughout the sector. This tactical shift complements existing pressure around the Huliaipole salient, strongly suggesting RF intent to degrade fixed positions and supply lines prior to any possible ground maneuver toward Orikhiv.

Eastern Operational Command (Donetsk Axis)

Status: LOC Vulnerability Elevated No new maneuver developments in the last hour. The primary threat remains the expanded KAB targeting zone affecting the Donetsk/Dnipropetrovsk logistics tail (confirmed in previous SITREP). RF IO regarding the Siversk sector (15:01Z) attempts to leverage prior RF tactical gains by undermining UAF C2 effectiveness.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Assessment: HIGH – Geo-Diversification of KAB Use and Personnel Sustainment

1. Guided Ordnance Threat Diversification (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The deployment of KABs into the Zaporizhzhia sector confirms the RF capacity and intent to apply this threat broadly and dynamically across the depth of the Ukrainian operational rear area. This significantly increases the required coverage area for UAF mobile air defense assets.
2. Personnel Sustainment Strategy (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): The aggressive, financially explicit recruitment drive (15:01Z) confirms continuous RF reliance on contract service personnel, rather than general mobilization, to sustain force levels. This indicates high confidence in RF internal recruitment ability despite high attrition rates.
3. Command Integrity Attack (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The RF use of specific POW narratives (15:01Z) is a deliberate information warfare tactic aimed at causing internal friction and dissent within UAF operational units by suggesting leadership incompetence or malice.

Friendly activity (UAF)

1. Strategic Economic Sanctions (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The implementation of the sanctions package against 700 maritime vessels (15:06Z) is a crucial strategic step. It directly targets the RF war economy's lifeline (energy export revenues) and leverages existing international pressure on the RF. This action complements the formation of the Cyber Forces Command (previous SITREP) by applying pressure in non-kinetic domains.
2. Force Posture: UAF defensive posture remains generally stable despite high kinetic and IO pressure, focused on mitigating the KAB threat and securing critical infrastructure (ZNPP, Odesa supply lines).

Information environment / disinformation

1. C2 Erosion Campaign (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The Siversk POW narrative (15:01Z) demands immediate counter-action by StratCom. Allowing this specific claim of command negligence to circulate risks rapidly diminishing trust among frontline units.
2. Cultural/Global Framing (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RT's "Time of Our Heroes" campaign (15:01Z) is part of the RF effort to legitimize the conflict domestically and globally through cultural propaganda, framing the aggression as a heroic defense against perceived Western threats.
3. External Diversion: RF proxy channels reporting on attacks against US forces in Syria (15:03Z) aim to distract international attention and promote a narrative of global instability connected to US interventionism, thereby implicitly justifying RF actions in Ukraine.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The immediate kinetic outlook is characterized by sustained, multi-sector RF deep fire targeting, especially via KABs. RF ground forces are likely preparing to exploit any resulting degradation in UAF logistics or C2 capabilities.

Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

KAB Suppression Preceding Probing Attacks (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF tactical aviation will maintain KAB saturation targeting logistics hubs (Donetsk/Dnipropetrovsk border) and fixed defenses (Zaporizhzhia). Ground forces will simultaneously conduct coordinated fixing attacks at key contested points (Huliaipole, Pokrovsk approaches) to prevent UAF reserve deployment, while the IO campaign focuses on demoralization.

Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

Immediate Mechanized Thrust on Huliaipole supported by KAB (MEDIUM Confidence): RF launches a concentrated, KAB-supported mechanized assault on the Huliaipole salient, aiming to achieve a rapid, deep penetration that severs the logistical connection between the eastern and southern defensive commands before UAF air defense assets can adjust to the new Zaporizhzhia KAB vector.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)

1. AIR DEFENSE (J3/J7): DUAL-SECTOR KAB MITIGATION.

   • Action A (CRITICAL): Immediately reallocate mobile Air Defense assets to establish overlapping coverage protecting key logistical hubs along both the Donetsk/Dnipropetrovsk boundary and the primary supply routes leading into the Zaporizhzhia sector. Prioritize SHORAD/EW deployment along confirmed flight paths identified by CR P2 and P3.

2. STRATCOM/IO (J9): COUNTER C2 FAILURE NARRATIVE.

   • Action A (URGENT): Execute the counter-narrative strategy (CR P4). Issue an immediate, authenticated denial of the TASS POW report regarding Siversk command failure, leveraging the recently formalized Cyber Command structure to ensure rapid dissemination and trust reinforcement.

3. FORCE MANEUVER (OC South): DEFENSE IN DEPTH.

   • Action A: Given the sustained KAB pressure in Zaporizhzhia, confirm that reserve units positioned in the deep rear area are adequately dispersed and hardened against KAB strikes. Authorize pre-planned interdiction fires against RF tactical assembly areas upon confirmation of any large force concentration (CR P1), exploiting the current gap between KAB preparation and ground assault.