Situation Report

Situation Update (15:00Z, 13 DEC 2025)

This report integrates new intelligence regarding the geographical expansion of the RF guided ordnance threat, specific targeting of critical infrastructure near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), and strategic developments in UAF force structure formalization.

Key updates since last sitrep

• KAB Threat Expansion (14:49, Air Force UAF, HIGH): Repeated RF guided aerial bomb (KAB) launches confirmed targeting the Donetsk direction toward Dnipropetrovsk region, expanding the geographic scope of the air-delivered guided ordnance threat previously concentrated on Kharkiv.
• ZNPP Blackout Incident (14:57, РБК-Україна, HIGH): A temporary blackout was reported at the ZNPP during recent night strikes, indicating continued RF targeting of critical infrastructure linked to nuclear safety and power grid stability in the South.
• Formalization of UAF Cyber Command (14:53, ЦАПЛІЄНКО, HIGH): CinC Syrskyi announced the formation of the UAF Cyber Forces Command to be completed by the end of the year, formalizing the cyber domain in UAF doctrine.
• Huliaipole Assault Claim (14:46, Операция Z, LOW): RF sources claim a significant breakthrough and ongoing intensive assault on UAF defenses in Huliaipole (Zaporizhzhia Front). This remains UNCONFIRMED by UAF sources and is likely premature victory messaging.
• RF Economic Deterioration (14:55, ЦАПЛІЄНКО, HIGH): International financial reports project Russian oil and gas revenues for December may drop to a five-year minimum, placing strategic pressure on RF long-term sustainment capacity.

Operational picture (by sector)

Northern Operational Command (Kharkiv/Sumy)

Status: Persistent KAB/Drone Pressure The RF sustained its operational tempo in the Northern axis, utilizing KABs to erode fixed defenses and CI (Confirmed 14:20, previous SITREP). UAF forces are maintaining control, prioritizing EW countermeasures to mitigate UAV and KAB targeting data.

Eastern Operational Command (Donetsk Axis)

Status: KAB Threat Elevated, LOC Contested

• Deep Fires: The confirmed KAB strikes targeting the boundary between Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk (14:49) represent a crucial change in RF deep fire application. This action directly threatens UAF strategic logistical lines and rear staging areas necessary to support the defense of the Slovyansk/Kramatorsk hub.
• Ground Maneuver: The battle for the Kramatorsk protective belt remains kinetic. The previous UAF counter-action near Pokrovsk (14:26) indicates operational reserve mobility and effectiveness in delaying RF force consolidation, despite pressure from the North (Siversk loss).

Southern Operational Command (Zaporizhzhia/Odesa)

Status: Infrastructure Vulnerability & Kinetic Intensification

• Critical Infrastructure (CI): The temporary blackout at ZNPP (14:57) demonstrates the RF intent to create systemic fragility across multiple critical sectors, following the severe power/water outage in Odesa. This dual pressure requires UAF resources for both front-line defense and homeland security/stability operations.
• Zaporizhzhia Front: RF claims of a major breakthrough at Huliaipole (14:46, UNCONFIRMED) must be validated. The confirmed activity of RF tactical aviation in the south-eastern direction (14:56) corroborates that RF is applying high kinetic pressure on the Huliaipole salient to secure the eastern approaches to Orikhiv.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Assessment: HIGH – Geo-Expansion of KAB Targeting and CI Degradation

1. KAB Geographical Expansion (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The deployment of KABs across the Donetsk/Dnipropetrovsk boundary indicates the RF has sufficient theater-wide air superiority or standoff capacity to utilize these heavy guided weapons as a standard, sustained method of preparatory fire and logistical interdiction. UAF air defense allocation must adjust immediately.
2. Infrastructure Targeting Synchronization (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The ZNPP blackout event (14:57) confirms a sustained, synchronized effort to degrade power generation capacity in key operational sectors (Odesa, ZNPP region, Kharkiv) to destabilize rear area logistics and morale.
3. Frontal Pressure Synchronization (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF likely intends to synchronize the anticipated massive artillery preparation (GRAU surge) with multi-axis ground assaults (Pokrovsk, Huliaipole, Siversk) to maximize the probability of achieving a strategic breach toward Kramatorsk/Slovyansk.

Friendly activity (UAF)

1. Cyber Doctrine Advancement (HIGH Confidence): CinC Syrskyi's announcement of the formal establishment of the UAF Cyber Forces Command (14:53) is a strategic step toward optimizing UAF capabilities in the cognitive and electromagnetic domains.
2. Internal Personnel Friction (MEDIUM Confidence): Reports of friction regarding the retention of specialist IT/Cyber personnel within their field (14:46) are noteworthy. If confirmed, the reallocation of specialized analysts to kinetic units risks undermining the rapid stand-up and effectiveness of the new Cyber Command structure.
3. Diplomatic Leverage (HIGH Confidence): Confirmation of significant projected RF energy revenue decline (14:55) reinforces the UAF narrative regarding the sustainability of the RF war effort and provides leverage for international support mobilization.

Information environment / disinformation

1. POW Welfare IO (MEDIUM Confidence): RF attempts to use the POW parcel agreement announcement (14:42) to promote a favorable image regarding humanitarian standards. This is likely aimed at softening international opinion following the GUR's strategic prisoner release operation (previous SITREP).
2. False Operational Claims (LOW Confidence): RF claims of breakthroughs at Huliaipole (14:46) are designed to preempt UAF successes and demoralize defenders, aligning with the pattern of aggressive IO observed following the probable seizure of Pokrovsk.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The immediate threat is the RF exploitation of deep fire capabilities (KABs) against UAF logistics supporting the Eastern Front, coupled with high-intensity probing attacks to identify soft points ahead of the main mechanized thrust.

Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

KAB Saturation Targeting UAF Logistics and Fixation Attacks (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF tactical aviation will maintain KAB strikes into the Dnipropetrovsk/Donetsk boundary, aiming to disrupt the deployment of UAF reserves. Ground forces will press fixed defenses at Huliaipole (Zaporizhzhia) and Mirnohrad/Konstantinovka (Donetsk) to force UAF consumption of scarce deep fire ammunition.

Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

Attack on ZNPP Safety Margins (MEDIUM Confidence): RF forces conduct coordinated kinetic or cyber attacks targeting the remaining redundant power systems or cooling infrastructure at ZNPP to precipitate a localized crisis, necessitating immediate diversion of UAF security forces and engineering assets away from the front line.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)

1. AIR DEFENSE (J3/J7): KAB THREAT TRIAGE AND MITIGATION.

   • Action A (CRITICAL): Immediately reallocate mobile air defense assets from less kinetic sectors (e.g., portions of the Northern Axis periphery) to the Donetsk/Dnipropetrovsk operational boundary to counter the expanded KAB threat against logistics and C2 hubs.
   • Action B: Integrate existing high-performance EW systems (previously confirmed effective) into the forward edge of the Eastern Command defense to disrupt RF tactical aviation communications and guidance systems used for KAB targeting.

2. MANEUVER & FIRE SUPPORT (OC South): HULIAIPOLE STABILITY CHECK.

   • Action A (CRITICAL): Immediately task dedicated ISR assets to the Huliaipole sector. Upon confirmation of RF force concentrations or breaches, authorize deep fire assets to execute pre-planned interdiction fires on identified RF mechanized assembly areas south of the town to deny consolidation.

3. STRATEGIC FORCE DEVELOPMENT (J5/CinC/MoD): CYBER PERSONNEL RETENTION.

   • Action A: Initiate an urgent review of the personnel audit and deployment policies regarding IT and cyber specialists (P4 Gap). Ensure that necessary skill sets are retained within the newly formed Cyber Forces Command structure, preventing operational degradation due to unnecessary kinetic deployment of non-combat personnel.