Situation Report

Situation Update (14:40Z, 13 DEC 2025)

This intelligence update covers critical developments regarding intensified RF kinetic operations on the Northern Axis, the deterioration of Odesa's critical infrastructure, and confirmed UAF counter-action near Pokrovsk.

Key updates since last sitrep

• Odesa Infrastructure Damage Severity Increased (HIGH Confidence): Odesa Oblast Military Administration confirmed the timeline for restoring both electricity and water supply following recent strikes is unknown (14:23, ЦАПЛІЄНКО). This indicates the kinetic strikes achieved significantly greater systemic disruption than initially assessed.
• Sustained KAB Strikes on Kharkiv (HIGH Confidence): UAF Air Force confirmed repeated launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB) targeting Kharkiv Oblast (14:20, Air Force UAF). This confirms the integration of KABs into the Northern Axis targeting pattern as a persistent threat, not an isolated incident.
• UAF Counter-Attack near Pokrovsk (HIGH Confidence): UAF unit "СКЕЛЯ 425" successfully engaged and destroyed an RF mechanized column near Pokrovsk (14:26, БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС), directly contradicting RF claims of established control and "cleanup operations" in the area.
• RF Rear Logistics Disrupted (HIGH Confidence): A major railway derailment occurred at Chais station, Penza Oblast, involving 23 cisterns carrying fuel oil (14:27, ТАСС). This is a confirmed disruption to RF domestic energy logistics and sustainment flow.
• GUR Confirms Strategic Prisoner Release (HIGH Confidence): The GUR head confirmed the recent release of Belarusian political prisoners (including V. Babaryka and 5 Ukrainians) was executed as a special intelligence operation facilitated by US and European partners, linking the action to anticipated future US aid for Ukraine (14:29, Zaporizhzhia OVA).

Operational picture (by sector)

Northern Operational Command (Kharkiv/Sumy)

Status: KINETIC ESCALATION SUSTAINED The RF continues synchronized operations combining high-end guided ordnance and tactical UAV strikes.

• Kharkiv: Confirmed repeated KAB strikes (14:20). Concurrently, RF drone attacks targeted civilian administrative infrastructure in central Kharkiv and a civilian vehicle in Zarichne, Chuhuiv district (14:26, 14:27). This saturation strategy aims to overwhelm UAF air defense while degrading C2 and generating terror/collateral damage.
• Sumy Direction: RF Akhmat SpN claimed strikes against UAV depots/equipment (14:12), confirming continued RF targeting of UAF logistics and technical supply lines near the border.

Eastern Operational Command (Donetsk Axis)

Status: HIGHLY CONTESTED The fight for the Kramatorsk protective belt remains fluid.

• Pokrovsk/Mirnohrad: RF sources continue to claim "cleanup actions" (14:31), indicating a push to consolidate control following the probable seizure of Pokrovsk (previous daily report). However, UAF reports of a successful engagement destroying an RF convoy (14:26) confirm that organized UAF resistance is holding key lines of communication and denying RF operational freedom. The situation is assessed as highly contested and kinetic, pending the arrival of the 260th GRAU munitions surge.

Southern Operational Command (Odesa)

Status: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FAILURE The inability of regional authorities to provide a timeline for restoring basic utility services (power and water) in Odesa represents a significant strategic success for the RF deep strike campaign. This situation creates a severe vulnerability for logistics, internal stability, and public health in the immediate term. UAF EW capability remains a strong defense factor, claiming 94,000 aerial assets suppressed over the last month (14:30).

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Assessment: HIGH – Infrastructure Exploitation & Hybrid Warfare Synchronization

1. Exploitation of Infrastructure Collapse (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The RF is attempting to capitalize immediately on the infrastructure damage in Odesa using targeted Information Warfare (IO). Multiple RF channels explicitly linked the power outages to promoting local insurrection against police and Territorial Recruitment Centers (TCCs) (14:11, 14:14). This is a direct, documented attempt to leverage kinetic damage for hybrid destabilization of UAF mobilization efforts.
2. Sustained Guided Ordnance Use (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The repeated KAB strikes in Kharkiv confirm the RF intent to utilize heavy guided ordnance across multiple fronts, forcing UAF to disperse scarce air defense assets. RF forces also claimed the use of FAB-250s against a UAF UAV launcher in Huliaipole (14:15), indicating KAB/FAB is now integrated into tactical fire support in Zaporizhzhia as well.
3. Logistical Vulnerability (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The derailment of the fuel oil train in Penza (14:27) highlights the vulnerability of the RF deep logistical network, which may be tied to UAF deep strikes or internal sabotage. This disruption will likely affect fuel supply chains in the RF Central Military District, though immediate impact on forward units is assessed as LOW.

Friendly activity (UAF)

1. Effective EW Capability (HIGH Confidence): The reported suppression of 94,000 aerial assets (including 2,200 Shaheds) over a month confirms a robust and adapting Electronic Warfare capability, which is crucial for mitigating the RF drone and cruise missile saturation strategy.
2. Strategic Diplomatic Maneuver (HIGH Confidence): GUR’s confirmation that the Belarusian prisoner release was an operation linked to future US aid strategically reframes the event, turning a perceived humanitarian concession by Belarus into a geopolitical success for Kyiv and Washington.
3. Front Line Resilience (HIGH Confidence): The UAF counter-action near Pokrovsk (14:26) indicates that despite significant pressure and the loss of adjacent key terrain (Siversk, Pokrovsk probable seizure), UAF units retain the ability to conduct coordinated counter-attacks and disrupt RF force consolidation.

Information environment / disinformation

1. Targeted Incitement (HIGH Confidence): RF IO is focusing its narrative explicitly on encouraging violence against UAF mobilization authorities (TCCs) and local police in Odesa, capitalizing on the psychological impact of power and water outages (14:11, 14:14).
2. Diplomatic Pressure on Black Sea (HIGH Confidence): Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has issued a call for the cessation of hostilities in the Black Sea (14:37), confirming diplomatic pressure is mounting following the previous strike on the Turkish-owned vessel.
3. False Surrender Claims (LOW Confidence): RF channels are spreading UNCONFIRMED claims that UAF has surrendered Huliaipole (14:11). This is assessed as premature victory messaging, contradicted by simultaneous RF reports of kinetic strikes in the same vicinity (14:15).

Outlook (next 6-12h)

RF forces will likely escalate hybrid efforts in the South to exploit infrastructure damage and will maintain high-intensity preparatory fires in the East ahead of the anticipated mechanized thrust.

Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

Infrastructure Exploitation and IO Amplification (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The RF will maximize IO efforts targeting Odesa's population to foment social unrest and disrupt mobilization/recruitment efforts, diverting UAF military and security resources away from the front line. Concurrently, KAB utilization in Kharkiv will continue to erode defensive capacity.

Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

Systemic Odesa Collapse (MEDIUM Confidence): RF forces, recognizing the success of previous strikes, conduct a rapid follow-on attack targeting the remaining vulnerable systems (e.g., wastewater treatment plants, critical pumping stations, or primary rail junctions) in Odesa, aiming for complete and sustained systemic failure that necessitates major UAF troop reallocation for humanitarian relief and security stabilization.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)

1. HOMELAND DEFENSE & STRATCOM (OC South/J7): COUNTER-DESTABILIZATION.

   • Action A (CRITICAL): Immediately increase security posture around all TCCs and police stations in Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Kherson, anticipating RF-instigated violence leveraging the infrastructure crisis.
   • Action B (CRITICAL): Launch a high-frequency StratCom campaign in Odesa focusing on transparent updates regarding water/power restoration efforts and explicitly warning the population about the RF disinformation campaign encouraging violence against authorities.

2. MANEUVER & FIRE SUPPORT (OC East): CONSOLIDATE POKROVSK DENIAL.

   • Action A: Expedite reinforcement and resupply to the units (e.g., SKELYA 425) currently conducting successful counter-attacks near Pokrovsk. Leverage deep fire assets to preemptively target known RF staging areas/assembly points immediately West and South of Pokrovsk to prevent the consolidation of RF forces for the next mechanized thrust.

3. AIR DEFENSE (J3/J7): KAB THREAT MITIGATION.

   • Action A: Given the sustained nature of the KAB threat, prioritize the allocation of Electronic Warfare (EW) assets previously identified as highly effective (94k suppression metric) to the areas most frequently targeted by KAB carrier aircraft flight paths in the Northern operational area.
   • Action B: Reiterate the counter-KAB operations plan, authorizing aggressive air patrols and SAM targeting against high-altitude RF tactical aviation platforms operating in the designated launch zones for Kharkiv.