Situation Report

Situation Update (14:15Z, 13 DEC 2025)

This intelligence update integrates new reporting from 13:39Z through 14:05Z, focusing on the tactical expansion of guided aerial ordnance and UAF administrative modernization.

Key updates since last sitrep

• KAB Utilization Expands to Northern Axis (HIGH Confidence): RF forces initiated launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB) targeting Kharkiv Oblast (13:41, Air Force UAF). This marks a significant escalation from previous KAB use which was localized primarily in Donetsk/Eastern sectors.
• Southern Energy Infrastructure Damage Confirmed (HIGH Confidence): A massive night-time attack successfully damaged energy facilities in Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Kherson Oblasts (13:47, Операция Z). Odesa military administration confirmed disruption, but power restoration efforts are underway (13:57, РБК-Україна).
• UAF Administrative Mobilization Step (HIGH Confidence): The Ukrainian Government approved the transition to automatic and digital military registration for citizens (13:59, Оперативний ЗСУ; 14:05, РБК-Україна). This is assessed as a critical long-term effort to enhance personnel readiness and mobilization efficiency.
• Belarusian Release Scope Confirmed (HIGH Confidence): Belarusian President Lukashenko pardoned 123 individuals, including political prisoners (Kolesnikova confirmed released) and individuals sentenced for espionage, terrorism, and extremism (13:39, Оперативний ЗСУ; 13:44, ТАСС).

Operational picture (by sector)

Northern Operational Command (Kharkiv)

Status: ESCALATED AERIAL THREAT The RF has escalated the kinetic threat in the Kharkiv sector by initiating KAB strikes (13:41). This confirms RF intent to use heavy guided ordnance to soften targets or defensive positions in the Northern operational area, supplementing the existing tactical UAV threat (identified in the previous sitrep). UAF air defense assets are now subject to simultaneous, high-intensity threats across three domains (UAV, Ballistic/Cruise Missile, Guided Glide Bomb).

Southern Operational Command (Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson)

Status: GRID INTERDICTION RF forces successfully executed deep strikes against energy infrastructure during the night (13:47). While the immediate power disruption was significant, UAF resilience (repair/restoration efforts) indicates the attack did not achieve long-term systemic failure (13:57). This sector remains the primary focus of RF deep strikes aimed at crippling Ukraine's logistical and economic capacity.

Eastern Operational Command (Donetsk Axis)

No new kinetic reporting received since the previous sitrep confirming widespread KAB use in this specific axis. The baseline assessment remains that mechanized assaults targeting the Kramatorsk hub will follow massive KAB and artillery preparatory fires.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Assessment: HIGH – Synchronization of Guided Ordnance and Deep Strike

1. Guided Ordnance Overload (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The deployment of KABs against Kharkiv Oblast (13:41) alongside the sustained KAB attacks in Donetsk and concurrent UAV/Missile deep strikes (Southern grid attack) demonstrates the RF ability to sustain a high-volume, multi-vector guided kinetic assault across the theater.
2. Internal Dissidence Regarding War Economy (HIGH CONFIDENCE on content, LOW on immediate impact): High-profile Russian sources (Strelkov, 13:58) are criticizing RF leadership for actively avoiding a full transition to a wartime mobilization economy, driven by political weakness and fear. This suggests potential friction between the political elite and hardline military commentators regarding strategy and resource commitment.
3. IO Focus on Diplomatic Gains (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF/Belarusian sources are framing the Belarusian prisoner release not as a humanitarian or diplomatic concession, but as the release of hostile elements ("spies, terrorists"), aiming to diminish the perceived strategic gain for Kyiv and Washington.

Friendly activity (UAF)

• Force Generation Efficiency (HIGH Confidence): The decision to implement automatic military registration (13:59) is a vital step toward improving force generation, manpower tracking, and potentially speeding up future mobilization processes.
• Infrastructure Resilience (HIGH Confidence): UAF and local authorities rapidly commenced power restoration in Odesa (13:57), demonstrating robust preparedness and mitigating the strategic effect of the RF deep strike.

Information environment / disinformation

1. Information Isolation (HIGH Confidence): The Russian Ministry of Justice designated Deutsche Welle (DW) as an "undesirable" organization (13:55). This is part of a sustained campaign to eliminate access to independent Western information sources within the RF domestic sphere, facilitating censorship and control of war narratives.
2. Diplomatic Friction Maintained (HIGH Confidence): The EU issuing specific protocols on interaction with Russian diplomats (14:03) highlights that despite isolated tactical thaws (Belarus/US), the general international diplomatic isolation of the RF regime remains in place.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The RF will continue to synchronize KAB attacks with ground operations in the East, while attempting to overwhelm air defenses on the Northern axis.

Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

KAB Saturation and Air Defense Testing (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF tactical aviation will leverage the newly established KAB operational pattern over Kharkiv and Donetsk, executing multiple high-altitude sorties within the next 6 hours to further degrade UAF logistics and C2 targets ahead of the expected major mechanized push toward Kramatorsk/Konstantinovka (as detailed in the previous daily report).

Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

Exploitation of Deep Strike Success (MEDIUM Confidence): Following the successful (albeit temporary) energy grid disruption in the South, the RF executes a coordinated, multi-wave attack targeting critical water filtration/pumping stations or major grain export facilities in the Odesa/Mykolaiv regions, aiming to create a humanitarian and economic crisis that diverts UAF resources from the front line.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)

1. AIR DEFENSE & FIRE SUPPORT (J3/J7): COUNTER-KAB OPERATIONS.

   • Action A (CRITICAL): Immediate reallocation of long-range air defense assets to cover key nodes in the Kharkiv region, prioritizing protection against high-altitude KAB launch platforms. Implement aggressive air patrol sorties in zones allowing early interdiction of KAB carrier aircraft.
   • Action B: Re-task deep fire assets to prioritize identified KAB launch airfields/staging areas over known artillery concentrations, shifting focus to neutralizing the most destructive ordnance delivery system currently in use.

2. MANEUVER & FORCE PROTECTION (OC South): CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEFENSE.

   • Action A: Increase physical security and deploy dedicated mobile C-UAS/MANPADs around key energy substations and water infrastructure in Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Kherson, anticipating follow-on strikes leveraging the initial damage assessment.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (J7/MFA): COUNTER-CENSORSHIP.

   • Action A: Task StratCom to amplify public access methods (VPN, mirror sites) for Deutsche Welle content within RF-occupied territories and the broader RF information space to counter Kremlin censorship efforts.