Situation Report

Situation Update (13:45Z, 13 DEC 2025)

This report integrates intelligence derived from new sources (13:17Z - 13:38Z, 13 DEC 2025) with baseline context, focusing on emerging deep-strike coordination and significant diplomatic shifts involving Belarus.

Key updates since last sitrep

• Strategic Diplomatic Shift (HIGH Confidence): A special operation orchestrated by GUR, supported by the US, secured the release of approximately 100 detainees, including five Ukrainian citizens, from Belarusian custody (13:24, Zelenskiy). This exchange is assessed as linked to the US granting sanctions relief, specifically targeting a key Belarusian potash enterprise (13:33, Colonelcassad), signaling a temporary thaw between Minsk and Washington.
• Immediate Dual UAV Threat (HIGH Confidence): A new enemy UAV track is reported operating over Kharkiv Oblast, heading toward the settlements of Derhachi and Zlatopil (13:38, Air Force UAF). This confirms a second, concurrent kinetic interdiction effort simultaneous with the previously identified Poltava threat.
• Massed KAB Utilization Confirmed (HIGH Confidence): RF forces initiated launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB) targeting specific areas within Donetsk Oblast (13:22, Air Force UAF). This confirms the widespread use of high-payload aerial ordnance across the Eastern front.
• Warcrime Incitement PSYOPS (HIGH Confidence): Pro-RF radical elements (DSHRG Rusich) publicly called for the systematic sexual assault of captured Ukrainian servicewomen (13:36, БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС). This constitutes direct incitement to war crimes and requires immediate legal and informational response.
• Hybrid External Mobilization Call (MEDIUM Confidence): Pro-RF channels are exploiting Jordan’s new visa-free regime for Russians, actively encouraging citizens to travel there to infiltrate Palestinian territories for militant action (13:30, Alex Parker).

Operational picture (by sector)

Eastern Operational Command (Donetsk Axis)

Status: INTENSIFIED AERIAL FIRE SUPPORT The RF ground offensive remains focused on the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka corridor. The confirmed use of KABs (13:22) signifies the RF transition to highly destructive guided aerial fire, aiming to neutralize hardened UAF defensive positions ahead of mechanized thrusts, supplementing the heavy thermobaric fires observed in Huliaipole (previous sitrep). UAF must adjust maneuver and dispersal tactics to mitigate KAB effects.

Northern Operational Command (Kharkiv/Kupyansk)

Status: KINETIC INTERDICTION ESCALATION The sector faces immediate threat from a confirmed tactical UAV track heading toward key population centers/logistics hubs near the northern outskirts of Kharkiv (Derhachi/Zlatopil, 13:38). This is an urgent, localized threat demanding rapid response, independent of the ongoing deep-strike threat focused on Poltava.

Southern Operational Command (Zaporizhzhia)

No new kinetic reporting received since the TOS-2 confirmation. The focus remains on maintaining the defensive line on the western bank of the Haychur River.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Assessment: CRITICAL – Synchronization of Kinetic Attacks and Geopolitical Leverage

1. Kinetic Overload (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The enemy is utilizing dual independent strike axes (Poltava deep strike, Kharkiv tactical strike) to saturate UAF air defense assets. This tactic aims to ensure penetration success on at least one axis, likely targeting crucial transportation or C2 infrastructure.
2. Increased KAB Risk (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The widespread use of KABs in Donetsk raises the risk profile for UAF forward deployment, requiring more robust concealment and counter-battery targeting against launch platforms.
3. Hybrid Mobilization Attempt (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): The IO effort promoting infiltration via Jordan (13:30) suggests RF proxies are seeking to utilize conflict zones outside Ukraine to divert global attention and potentially recruit external manpower for various proxy operations.
4. Information Attack on UAF Command (LOW Confidence): RF channels are attempting to undermine UAF morale by highlighting perceived weaknesses or complaints from UAF Assault Force commanders (13:17). This is standard PSYOPS designed to exploit localized tactical difficulties.

Friendly activity (UAF)

• Successful Sensitive Operation (HIGH Confidence): The GUR/US cooperation on the prisoner release from Belarus (13:24) demonstrates UAF ability to conduct sophisticated intelligence and diplomatic operations, achieving strategic objectives outside the kinetic domain. This success can be leveraged for morale and international confidence.
• Immediate Threat Warning (HIGH Confidence): Air Force UAF channels are effectively maintaining real-time awareness of incoming aerial threats (KABs, UAVs), facilitating rapid civilian and military response actions.

Information environment / disinformation

The primary focus has shifted to the US-Belarus sanctions deal:

1. US Political Fragmentation Narrative (HIGH Confidence): RF/Belarusian sources immediately deployed narratives linking the sanctions lift to US domestic politics (specifically mentioning Trump's alleged involvement and request) (13:34). Goal: Undermine the continuity of US foreign policy and cast doubt on Washington’s resolve in Kyiv.
2. War Crime Normalization (HIGH Confidence): The public incitement of sexual violence by known RF military units (Rusich) (13:36) represents an extreme escalation in IO designed to psychologically intimidate UAF personnel and normalize atrocity.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The RF will press synchronization, executing kinetic strikes while continuing to soften forward defenses. The diplomatic success with Belarus must be cautiously monitored for unintended operational consequences.

Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

Kinetic Strike Execution and Sustained Artillery (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF kinetic strikes will materialize in Poltava and Kharkiv Oblasts within the next 4-8 hours. Simultaneously, KAB and heavy artillery fires will be sustained throughout the night on the Donetsk axis, preventing UAF forces from stabilizing the front in preparation for renewed mechanized assaults targeting Konstantinovka by first light.

Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

Exploitation of Belarusian Neutrality (MEDIUM Confidence): The RF leverages the temporary US-Belarus diplomatic thaw to increase the volume of sensitive logistics or strike component transshipments through Belarus (e.g., Iranian component parts for Shaheds), utilizing the lessened risk of Western diplomatic pressure to enhance deep-strike capabilities in the Northern operational command area.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)

1. AIR DEFENSE & FORCE PROTECTION (J3/J7): NORTHERN/CENTRAL DEFENSE HARDENING.

   • Action A (CRITICAL): Simultaneously activate and deploy all available mobile air defense and counter-UAS systems to secure high-value targets (HVT) in Kharkiv (C2 nodes, critical rail junctions) and Poltava (oil/fuel storage, large rail yards), anticipating near-term kinetic strikes on both axes.
   • Action B: Implement a minimum 6-hour blackout/EMCON protocol for C2 communications in the immediate vicinity of the identified UAV flight paths to deny final targeting guidance.

2. COUNTER-HYBRID OPERATIONS (J7/SBU): WAR CRIME DOCUMENTATION.

   • Action A: Immediately synthesize the DSHRG Rusich incitement evidence and transmit it to partner nations’ war crimes tribunals and the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the highest-level documentation and prosecution filing.
   • Action B: Task StratCom to develop and deploy high-impact counter-PSYOPS messaging that isolates the Rusich elements and emphasizes the RF’s descent into barbarism, contrasting it with UAF professionalism and humanitarian success (Belarus release).

3. MANEUVER & FIRE SUPPORT (OC East): COUNTER-KAB TACTICS.

   • Action A: Mandate immediate dispersal of all unit HQs and logistics nodes near the Donetsk front line, increasing camouflage and concealment discipline to reduce vulnerability to broad-area KAB strikes.
   • Action B: Re-task deep-strike assets (if necessary, away from the TOS-2 hunt in Zaporizhzhia) to focus on known forward RF airbases or refueling points within range, increasing the cost of tactical aviation sorties.